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ABSTRACT 
 
Problems in the U.S. legal system became a significant public issue during the 
1970s and 1980s; “court congestion” was one of these. Alternative processes 
(Alternative Dispute Resolution, or ADR) were proposed as a major component of legal 
reform, and ADR programs were established in several jurisdictions. In Texas, ADR 
legislation was enacted in 1983 and 1987. Since then, ADR (primarily mediation) has 
become widely practiced in many areas of the state. Data collected by the Office of 
Court Administration which includes the type of case, the number of cases filed, and the 
type of disposition of the case for district courts in Texas is used to determine whether 
ADR has been effective in reducing court congestion in Texas. The results fail to show a 
significant impact from ADR. ADR continues to enjoy wide support, however, and this 
apparent contradiction between the empirical results and the acceptance of ADR is 
explored. Theoretical concerns are also discussed. ADR may be addressing more 
fundamental goals than merely reducing litigation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), or the settlement of disputes between two 
or more parties without use of the traditional courts, has become an important part of the 
U.S. legal system. Both of the two most common forms of ADR, arbitration and 
mediation, have long been used throughout history, including here in the U.S.  However, 
a 1987 edition of one casebook noted that "Ten years ago, most American lawyers 
would have associated mediation with international or labor relations disputes, and 
probably confused it with arbitration."1  It is a new trend--one that is still evolving. 
Despite its youth, however, ADR has rapidly spread to many jurisdictions.  
Most commentators date the beginning of ADR to 1976 and, more specifically, 
to a speech by Frank Sander. The event was an important professional gathering of 
leaders in the legal field: "The Pound Conference." To put ADR into the proper 
perspective, then, one must understand the situation of the legal system in 1976. 
Criticism of the effectiveness and relevance of many political and government 
institutions had been growing. Social unrest had been fostered by racial tensions, the 
Vietnam War, the "sexual revolution," the spreading use of recreational drugs, and other 
traumatic changes in society.2  At the same time, the lack of respect for the 
                                                 
1 L. L. RISKIN & J. E.  WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, 84 (Abridged ed., 1988). 
2 See, e.g., J. HASKINS & K. BENSON, THE 60s READER 1 (1988) (describing the 1960s as a decade 
of division, confusion, and waves of social movements); R. R. JONES & G. L. SELIGMANN, THE 
SWEEP OF AMERICAN HISTORY 589 (1974) (noting that during the 60s there was "widespread revolt 
against the accepted values and institutions of middle-class American society"); R. A. DIVINE et al, 
AMERICA PAST AND PRESENT (2011) (Chapter 16 is titled: “Years of Turmoil, Years of Change, 
1969-1980”). 
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“establishment” by some elements of society extended to the legal system: it was viewed 
as a tool for the oppression of the politically weak. There had also been a significant 
increase in the demands put on the legal system, especially in terms of the number of 
disputes. The legal system had been trying to cope with a sharp increase in legislation 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and this growth seemed to be continuing. The general 
consensus, therefore, was a "litigation explosion" which exacerbated flaws that had 
existed all along. 
The Pound Conference was intended to address these issues. And why was it 
called the Pound Conference? For that, one must go back even further, to 1906. The 
setting of the 1906 event was anything but auspicious -- an annual gathering, basically a 
convention, of the American Bar Association, held that year in St. Paul, Minnesota. As 
one would expect, the list of speakers included respected members of the legal 
profession. Among those slated was Roscoe Pound, the “phenomenal” Roscoe Pound, 
“an expert on every legal system and on all branches of Anglo-American law,”3 the 
future Dean of the Harvard Law School, who was widely regarded as the finest legal 
scholar in the country at that time. So it is unlikely that anyone suspected that his address 
would be anything other than a scholarly lecture on some aspect of the law. 
The title of Pound's speech is "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice." Pound begins innocuously enough, “Dissatisfaction with the 
                                                 
3 A. L. Goodhart, Roscoe Pound, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1964). 
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administration of justice is as old as law."4 And then, as he works his way through the 
history of the usual grievances, his observations become more pointed. One list of the 
abuses in legal administration amounted to 155 items, this from the Mirror of Justices. 
And one of those 155 abuses is that judges are no longer executed for corrupt or illegal 
decisions.5  
Pound’s concern is that dismissing the criticism as nothing more than the usual 
complaints would lead to overlooking the real and serious deficiencies of the day. He 
then begins a detailed examination of those deficiencies. He has four major categories 
that he discusses, in turn. The first is criticism or dissatisfaction with any system. These 
are problems that are common across the board, and so they are to be found in the 
American legal system as well as others. The second group of criticism is the flaws that 
are peculiar to the American legal system, the ones related to the characteristics that 
distinguish it from others. The third group of problems is due to the structure and 
procedures of the legal system. And the fourth set of flaws comes from what he calls the 
environment of the judicial administration.6  
The reaction from the audience was “mixed.”7  Pound’s speech was considered, 
by some, as an unconscionable attack on an institution and profession that had been 
constructed through centuries of wisdom. Another commentator notes “a cool” 
                                                 
4 R. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. 10 Crime & 
Delinquency 355, 355 (1964). 
5 Id. at 357. 
6 Id.  
7 R. E. Lee, The Profession Looks at Itself: The Pound Conference of 1976, 1981 BYU L. REV. 737, 737 
(1990). 
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audience.8  The speech was a shock -- shock that such an imminent personage as Pound 
was the one who gave voice and, therefore, credence to the popular complaints. It was a 
coming-of-age moment, when the country’s greatest legal mind was confident enough to 
subject the legal system to a harsh self-critique. It was “the first truly comprehensive, 
critical analysis of American justice and of problems that had accumulated in the first 
130 years of our independence.”9  Pound’s speech did find willing ears among enough of 
the bar, however, to spark “decades of reform.”10  It is now considered to be the most 
influential speech/paper by an American legal scholar. Time, then, has cast Pound’s 
contribution in a favorable light. 
It was no accident that threescore and ten years later, in the same forum and at 
the same podium that Roscoe Pound used for his address, another national law assembly 
was held. The 1976 conference was the result of careful planning by leaders from the 
bar, the Chief Justices of the various states, the U.S. Judicial Conference, and, behind it 
all, was the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Warren Burger.  
Burger had started organizing the conference at least a year earlier with the idea 
of continuing the Pound legacy and addressing the “unfinished business.”11  Burger 
called it the “ first time that the chief justices of the highest state courts, the leaders of 
the federal courts, ....organized Bar, legal scholars, ....have joined forces to take a hard 
                                                 
8 B. McAdoo & N. Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map? 18 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 376, 376 (1997). 
9 W. E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.: a need for systematic anticipation, 15 Judges' J. 27, 27 (1976). 
10 R. T. Shepard, Introduction: The Hundred-Year Run of Roscoe Pound. 82 Indiana Law Journal 1153, 
1153 (2007). 
11 E. A. Tamm & P. C. Reardon, Warren E. Burger and the Administration of Justice, 1981 BYU L. Rev. 
447, 512 (1981). 
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look at how our system of justice” performs.12  Burger had orchestrated the conference 
in such a way to focus not just on the problems, but also to suggest solutions. The most 
important solution came in the form of Professor Frank Sander’s speech.  
Once again an outstanding legal scholar takes to the podium, and his speech 
triggers widespread reform throughout the legal community. Sander’s speech has been 
called the “big bang”13 of ADR. In his speech, Sander readily admits to the problems of 
the judicial system, and he observes that the traditional litigation system is equipped to 
effectively deal with only certain types of disputes. Other types of disputes would be 
better served by other methods, and so the ideal courthouse would take the incoming 
disputes, sort them, and send them to the most appropriate method. Thus, the concept of 
the “multi-door” courthouse was born.14  
At the time, the concept of alternative dispute resolution was much more 
"alternative" than today. Sander’s speech gave the idea legitimacy. And all leaders of the 
legal community understood, only too well, that these suggestions had the blessing of the 
highest authorities in the land. Sander’s 1976 speech referred to multiple modes of 
dispute resolution, but they have been grouped together under the ADR umbrella since 
the earliest years. Even in later assessments of the progress of ADR and its future 
                                                 
12 Burger (1976), supra note 9, at 27. 
13 M. L. Moffitt, Special Section: Frank Sander and His Legacy as an ADR Pioneer: Before the Big Bang: 
The Making of an ADR Pioneer. 22 NEGOTIATION J. 437, 437 (2006). 
14 Id. 
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prospects, Sander continues to make little distinction between mediation and binding 
arbitration, for example.15  
The “dissatisfaction” of 1906 and 1976 share much in common, yet there are 
some clear differences. Pound’s 1906 critique was broad in nature, with multiple causes 
giving rise to several manifestations of disrespect of the law. The 1976 analysis, while 
presented within the same general framework as Roscoe Pound’s analysis, was much 
more pointed – it reflected a dissatisfaction on the part of the legal system within itself. 
Specifically, the specter of increasing caseloads was perceived by jurists and by others 
as the main threat. This overriding concern by the master architect of the 1976 Pound 
Conference, Chief Justice Warren Burger, is emphasized by his calling for fundamental 
changes.16  
ADR, then, was intended from the start to be an important addition to the U.S. 
system of justice. It is the modern label applied to what is an old, informal technique. 
Many references to extra-judicial dispute settlement can be found in the historical 
records. Often these references include the common practice by ethnic or religious 
groups of settling disputes among group members by informal procedures within the 
group community.17 References to this type of community dispute resolution are often 
used to support the argument that ADR is preferable in some respects to court 
                                                 
15 J. R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR: An Argument That the Term ADR Has Begun to 
Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97 (2000). 
16 W. E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 445 (1983). 
17 K. KOVACH, MEDIATION IN A NUTSHELL 21-22 (2010). 
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adjudication. The important point, however, is that ADR is new in that it represents a 
different approach to dispute resolution. It is an old procedure with a new name. 
Sander had to educate his audience about the characteristics of ADR, and his 
concern is well-taken. The general nature of ADR is fundamental for understanding how 
this process works and, thus, what the research parameters are. The basics of ADR are 
simple: third party intervention in settling disputes. This is obvious from the long history 
of ADR. Along with a new name, though, ADR has also acquired more structure as it 
has evolved from informal procedure to an institutionalized process. ADR encompasses 
several distinct forms, including, but not limited to: arbitration, mediation, mini-trial, 
moderated settlement conference, and summary jury trial. This list is not exhaustive nor 
definitive--it is merely a description of the more common processes.  
There are several other ways to categorize dispute resolution processes. One way 
is by consent. Traditional court proceedings are non-consensual in that a party may be 
required to submit to the authority of the court. Some ADR processes, like arbitration, 
may be non-consensual in that one party may prefer a different forum, but pre-dispute 
agreement or court rules may specify that the party must submit to the ADR process. 
The ADR procedures that are typically considered to be consensual include mediation, 
moderated settlement conferences, pre-trial conferences, etc. These procedures are 
different from non-consensual ones in that in each the resolution of the dispute must be 
acceptable to both disputants.  
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Proponents of ADR cite several advantages. 18  The primary advantages to the 
disputants are: 
 ADR is less expensive than regular litigation 
 ADR is quicker 
 ADR offers more control over the outcome in that each disputant 
may choose which element on which to compromise. 
 ADR fosters the repair or development of a working relationship 
between the disputants, which may be important if some 
relationship is expected to continue.  
 
There are also advantages to the sovereign (state):19  
 a reduction in court congestion 
 a reduction in judicial branch expenditures 
 an increase in the access to justice by state citizens 
 an improvement in the quality of justice (associated with the 
control and relationship factors above) 
   
Table 1 lists the states that enacted ADR legislation during the 1980s. It took five 
years after the Pound Conference (the 1976 "start" of the ADR movement) for the first 
state, New York, to adopt ADR in 1981. The next five years saw only five more states 
added to the list. By 1989, 14 states had ADR legislation in place.   
  
                                                 
18 Id. at 38 (listing eight advantages: 1) time and cost savings, 2) confidentiality and privacy, 3) self-
determination, 4) authorizing and acknowledging feelings and emotions, 5) opportunity for preserving 
relationships, 6) potential for creative solutions, 7) process flexibility and informality, and 8) avoidance of 
legal precedent). 
19 Few commentators compile lists of benefits to the state, but these four advantages are implicitly 
recognized as beneficial to the state.  
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TABLE 1: STATES WITH COMPREHENSIVE ADR LEGISLATION, 1980s 
 
STATE YEAR OF ADOPTION 
Colorado 1983 
Florida 1985 
Hawaii 1989 
Illinois 1987 
Iowa 1985 
Michigan 1988 
New Jersey 1987 
New York 1981 
Ohio 1989 
Oklahoma 1983 
Oregon 1989 
Texas 1987 
Virginia 1988 
Washington 1984 
 
 
 
Mediation/ADR in Texas 
 
The fundamental Texas statute governing ADR and mediation gives the state 
policy regarding alternative dispute resolution: 
It is the policy of this state to encourage the peaceable resolution of 
disputes, with special consideration given to disputes involving the parent-child 
relationship, including the mediation of issues involving conservatorship, 
possession, and support of children, and the early settlement of pending litigation 
through voluntary settlement procedures.20  
 
The statute also defines mediation.  
 (a) Mediation is a forum in which an impartial person, the mediator, 
facilitates communication between parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, 
or understanding among them.  
                                                 
20 Chapter 154 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Section 154.002 
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(b) A mediator may not impose his own judgment on the issues for that of 
the parties. 
(c) Mediation includes victim-offender mediation by the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice described in Article 56.13, Code of Criminal 
Procedure.21  
 
Mediation differs from arbitration in that the mediator does not fashion the 
settlement. Mediation also differs from other forms of ADR in that “pure” mediation 
places the emphasis on the process. Mediation focuses, too, on the feelings and interests 
of the parties rather than legal issues. It looks to the future and how the parties’ 
relationship may evolve and continue rather than looking at the past to assign fault.  
Perhaps the most basic tenet of mediation is that the parties (disputants) are in control of 
negotiation, and the mediator is in control of the process. Since the parties’ participation 
must be voluntary and in good faith, mediation is not always successful. When it is, 
however, it can lead to effective agreements and the avoidance of future conflict. 
The mediator and the process are the keys to successful mediation, Most of the 
literature and studies focus on the role of the mediator, mediator behavior, and mediation 
models. The reason for the focus on the mediator is that he or she is in control of the 
process, and it is the process that leads to a resolution.  A few of the important functions 
the mediator may play are:22  
                                                 
21 Id. at Section 154.023 
22 Like the advantages of ADR, commentators have their lists.  See, e.g., RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra 
note 1, at 92 (listing 12 mediator roles: 1) urging parties to communicate, 2) helping parties understand the 
process, 3) conveying messages, 4) helping parties to agree on the issues, 5) setting the agenda, 6) provide 
an appropriate environment, 7) keeping order, 8) helping parties to understand the problems, 9) identify 
unrealistic expectations, 10) helping parties devise proposals, 11) assist with negotiations, and 12) 
persuade parties to accept a particular solution). 
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 an environmental control device to keep the atmosphere civil, 
 a playing-field leveler to ensure that the process is fair and that 
each party has a chance to participate in the process,  
 a lightning rod to absorb some of the accusations/hurt that the 
parties would otherwise direct towards one another, 
 a reality check to assist the parties in objectively evaluating their 
expectations, and 
 a fresh look to suggest or explore alternatives which may not be 
apparent to the parties. 
 
There are several dimensions involved in mediation.  There are different 
mediation “versions,” settlement strategies, and mediator styles.23  Some terms are 
relatively common, such as the community or neighborhood justice model, the caucus 
model, and the conference model. The community or neighborhood justice model is 
designed primarily for interpersonal disputes in which continuing, significant personal 
relationships are involved.  Neighbors, friends, and family members may be involved, so 
there is a need for improving the relationships among the parties.24   
The caucus model is a type of shuttle diplomacy. The disputants meet privately 
with the mediator to discuss settlement or resolution terms. The mediator can speak with 
the caucus party more directly and can elicit confidential information.  The conference 
model is also settlement-oriented, but there is a greater use of joint meetings with all 
disputants.   
                                                 
23 S. S. Silbey, & S.E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL’Y 7, 8-25 (1986). 
24 See G. Pavlich, The Power of Community Mediation: Government and Formation of Self-Identity, 30 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 707 (1996). 
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Mediation may occur at any stage of the dispute. It commonly occurs after a 
lawsuit has begun (after filing and citation) but before trial begins. Mediation may be 
court-ordered: the judge determines the case might settle in mediation and orders the 
parties to attempt mediation before trial. Mediation may also be required by prior 
agreement.  
The possible outcomes are: the parties reach full agreement (settlement), they 
reach partial agreement, or the parties fail to agree. In the event of failure, there may be 
further mediation efforts before resorting to court. If the mediation was court-ordered, 
the mediator usually reports back to the court whether the case was settled or not.  
The mediation process is a confidential one. This confidentiality belongs to each 
of the parties, so either one may assert his right to keep all communications and 
disclosures confidential. The confidentiality is one of the key incentives to mediation. 
Far better to discuss these matters in front of the mediator (who is prevented from 
disclosing them) than to air them in open court. Confidentiality is a bar, however, to 
gathering data. 
Organization and Hypotheses 
The organization of this study is as follows. The next section summarizes the 
important issues in the literature. ADR does not belong exclusively to any one field, and 
the literature reflects the diversity and overlap. Section III describes the data more fully. 
One important contribution of this research is the richness of the Texas district data. 
Section IV discusses the theory that has been developed. Although relatively scant 
compared to the vast literature on the practice of ADR, especially mediation and 
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arbitration, the theory provides a basis for a more complete understanding of this 
phenomena. Section V outlines the method of analysis. Section VI explains the analysis 
of the filings and dispositions. Section VII discusses the theoretical implications of the 
results.  Section VIII concludes and gives recommendations. 
In summary, this study uses court data to examine the claim that ADR reduces 
court congestion.  The specific ways that court congestion is reduced is: 
 Fewer disputes are filed with the court system, 
 More disputes in the court system are settled by ADR without 
formal adjudication, and 
 Concomitantly, there are fewer trials (adjudications). 
 
The formal hypotheses, then, are: 
 Null Hypothesis #1: The disputes filed with the courts have not 
declined because of ADR. 
 Null Hypothesis #2: The number of disputes settled without 
formal adjudication (trial) has not increased because of ADR. 
 Null Hypothesis #3: The number of disputes in the court system 
resolved by trial has not declined because of ADR.  
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II. LITERATURE 
Conflict 
There are several strands of literature relevant to this research.  Since dispute 
resolution presumes a dispute, it is appropriate to begin with a review of conflict theory.  
Conflict in the theoretical literature can be defined in different ways.  One definition is 
simple: the existence of incompatible interests, as in a disagreement or competition.25  A 
better definition, though, is that conflict “is the interaction of interdependent people who 
perceive incompatible goals, and interference from each other in achieving those goals.26 
The first definition is broad; the existence of incompatible interests would 
encompass most situations.  Parsing the second, narrower definition specifies the 
following four elements: 1) interaction, 2) interdependence, 3) perception of 
incompatible goals, and 4) interference.  These requirements restrict the concept of 
conflict to include just those situations in which a person’s goals are adversely impacted 
by interactions with others.  In other words, the actions of one of the parties must have 
negative consequences for the other.  Besides requiring at least two participants, a 
conflict also has two aspects of interaction: a mixture of cooperation and of 
competition.27   And, of course the qualifying term in the definition, the term “perceive,” 
also allows for the situation where the conflict is resolved once the parties come to a 
better understanding of each other’s goals.   
                                                 
25 J. P. FOLGER, M. S. POOLE, & R. K. STUTMAN, WORKING THROUGH CONFLICT: 
STRATEGIES FOR RELATIONSHIPS, GROUPS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 4 (1997) (citing C. F. Fink, 
Some conceptual difficulties in the theory of social conflict, 12 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 412 (1968). 
26 Id. (citing J. L. HOCKER & W. W. WILMOT, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT (1985). 
27 Id. at 5. 
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The interaction aspect of the definition gives rise to two basic types of 
interaction: productive and destructive.  Interaction is deemed productive if it promotes 
the benefits mentioned above.  One the other hand, if the interaction makes the benefits 
more distant, such as escalation, avoiding the issues, and a general hardening of the 
disputants’ positions, the interaction is destructive.28  The key, then, is how the parties in 
a dispute interact -- how they attempt to bolster their own goals, how they deal with the 
goals of the adverse party, and their general choice of strategies and behaviors.   
Conflict is usually regarded as being negative, or destructive, but it also may 
produce some benefits, too.  The positive aspects of conflict have been noted as 
including: 1) addressing important issues, 2) sparking new and creative ideas, 3) 
allowing the venting of frustrations and tensions in less-harmful ways, 4) strengthening 
relationships, 5) promoting the evaluation and description  of goals and missions, and 6) 
improving social justice and equity.  Conflict, therefore, should be viewed as normal and 
healthy.29  There are several different theoretical approaches in conflict literature.  The 
traditional approaches include: the psycho-dynamic perspective, field theory, 
experimental gaming research, the human relations perspective, and intergroup conflict 
research.  A brief survey of the main, traditional approaches begins with the psycho-
dynamic perspective, which is a product of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory.  The 
fundamental premise of this perspective is a “hydraulic model of human motivation.”30 
                                                 
28 Id. at 8-9.   
29 Id. at 1. 
30 Id. at 14.  
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The psychic energy in the mind must be released, and psycho-dynamic theory describes 
the mechanisms for controlling and directing this energy.  The components of the 
mechanism are: the id, the source of the energy; the superego, which constrains the 
energy by means of a value system; and the ego, which mediates the first two 
components.  When a conflict develops, two impulses are generated – the aggressive 
impulse and anxiety.  The psycho-dynamic perspective, therefore, explains the 
aggression and anxiety that accompanies conflict.  It shows the importance of substitute 
activities, displacement, scapegoating, and inflexibility, plus it incorporates the concept 
that the unconscious or subconscious plays a major role.31  Studies have shown that even 
pre-verbal infants form a type of implicit knowledge, often based on perceived intent, 
which continues to affect thought, expectations, and responses throughout adulthood.32  
The field theory approach conceptualizes conflict within the framework of 
“climate.”  The individual, when responding to conflict, is affected by different “fields of 
force.”33  There are goals, barriers, and requirements.  An important characteristic of this 
theory is how the individual perceives his environment in the psychological sense.  The 
competitive nature of conflict depends on how the individual views his interdependence; 
the individual’s trust, attitudes, beliefs, and other perceptions provide a feedback, re-
enforcing or influencing themselves and how the individual interacts.34 This perspective 
                                                 
31 Id. at 18. 
32 See Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPSG), The foundational level of psychodynamic meaning: 
Implicit process in relation to conflict, defense and the dynamic unconscious, 88 INT’L J. 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 843 (2007). 
33  FOLGER et al, supra note 25, at 19.   
34 Id. at 21.   
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emphasizes the importance of interdependence in conflict. 
Another approach to conflict involves two related perspectives: the social 
exchange perspective and experimental gaming.  Both perspectives are based on two 
assumptions.  The first assumption is the interdependent nature of conflict, and the 
second assumption is that the individual’s behavior is affected by rewards and costs.35  
The social exchange perspective claims that the guiding principle for individuals 
is self-interest and that, in interacting with others, the rewards and costs of that 
interaction are evaluated by the individual in terms of their self-interest.  In essence, 
individuals exchange resources by interacting, and this exchange is expected to result in 
acceptable outcomes: behavior on the part of the other individual that is consistent with 
the first individual’s self-interest.  Conflict arises, then, when the other individual is 
blamed for unsatisfactory outcomes – when the other person is preventing his self-
interest from being achieved.36  
Social exchange and the experimental gaming research perspective use concepts 
that are shared by economics.  These perspectives view conflict, and all interaction, as a 
strategic game in which one individual’s behavior depends on the expected behavior of 
the other, interacting individual.  One advantage of the experimental gaming research is 
the insights available from applying game theory to the processes involved in conflict.  
Social exchange and experimental gaming research both focus on the strategies used by 
individuals in conflict situation.  Both observe the series of behaviors, moves, and 
                                                 
35 Id. at 22. 
36 Id. at 23. 
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counter-moves that are often observed in conflicts and recognize that the rewards and 
costs are interdependent: that effect of the moves and counter-moves on the relationship 
is of great importance.37    
Another approach to conflict, the human relations perspective, has developed 
within the context of organizations and communication within organizations.  It focuses 
on the work group, the arena in which most significant interactions take place, and on 
what is considered to be the most important work relationship: the superior-subordinate 
relationship.  This approach also identifies familiar patterns and behaviors that 
individuals use.  These behaviors are based on two factors: assertiveness (which is 
related to the pursuit of one’s own interests) and cooperativeness (which is related to the 
satisfaction of the other individual’s concerns).  Several categorical styles of behavior 
that combine the two factors include: competing, accommodating, avoiding, 
collaborating, and compromising.  There are value judgments associated with these 
styles, and so this approach yields a prioritization of behaviors.  In practice, though, 
there is no need of making value judgments since there may not be a single, “proper” 
way to resolve conflict.38  
The last approach in this survey of the traditional perspectives is the intergroup 
conflict research.  This approach views conflict as inherent in the different characteristics 
of groups.  Researchers in this area have used social categorization to investigate how 
individuals view themselves by identifying the groups with which the individuals claim 
                                                 
37 Id. at 29. 
38 Id. at 33. 
 19 
 
to belong.  The assumption is that there are natural conflicts between different groups.  It 
is, basically, a have/have-not distinction.  Rich/poor, liberal/conservative, and other 
divisions give rise to group differences, which in turn become conflictual in nature.  
Usually, the differences can be related to economic or political differences, but the basic 
idea is that group identity, by itself, creates differences (and conflict) between groups.  
The differences lead to polarization between the groups on certain issues, and then to 
stereotyping – a movement to “we/they” situation.  After time, the issues/attitudes 
become entrenched, and there is a self-fulfilling prophecy in that the “we/they” becomes 
integral to the group identity.  This approach is useful to understanding the dynamics of 
some aspects of conflict that exert a strong influence on the individual – in many cases 
this influence may be a barrier to resolving the conflict.39  
In addition to the traditional approaches, there are several more modern 
approaches and refinements.40  Noting the number of approaches that have been 
developed is relevant in that there are many different ways to characterize conflict. There 
is no single, exclusive theory that applies to a particular situation; several perspectives 
are possible, with each one providing some insight into the conflict.   
Regardless of the multiplicity of theoretical approaches, the management of 
conflict is, necessarily, closely tied to the communication aspect of any attempt at 
resolution.  An example of the application of this communication framework that is often 
                                                 
39 Id. at 34-37. 
40 See, e.g., J. Rothman & M. Albertstein, Individuals, Groups and Intergroups: Theorizing about the Role 
of Identity in Conflict and its Creative Engagement, 3 J. DISP. RESOL. 631 (2013) (theoretical work on 
the role of identity in conflicts). 
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crucial to ADR and mediation is “face.”  Again, there are different definitions, but the 
central concept is that “face” is the party’s desire “to be seen as a certain kind of 
person.”41  Face is central to the self-identity of a person and is intimately bound to the 
emotional aspect of the conflict.   Positive interactions in a conflict, then, respect the 
parties’ identities and are not threatening, while a destructive attack is an attempt to 
humiliate the other party.   “Face” is just one aspect of conflict resolution that can be the 
crucial element to a voluntary settlement of a dispute, so a fuller discussion of “face” can 
serve to illustrate the social/psychological problems that can be a deciding factor in 
disputes and settlements. 
“Face” is a mix of three basic identity needs: acceptance/belonging (fellowship 
face), value/respect (competence face), and freedom from being controlled by others 
(autonomy face).  Interestingly, “Face” is also dependent on the cultural/social 
environment.   “Face” in China, for example, comes in two distinct forms: one relating 
to something akin to integrity, and the other corresponding to a social standing. “Face” 
can be highly contextual, then, in that the characteristics of the parties may be very 
important aspects of the issue of “face.”42   
A loss of “face” is often the result of an attack by the other party.   To “lose face” 
is to have one’s identity challenged or ignored, as when a person is shamed or 
humiliated.  It can also be the result of a mistake that becomes known to the other parties 
(competence), or even when chance circumstances seem to conspire against one of the 
                                                 
41 FOLGER et al, supra note 25, at 128.   
42 Id. at 127-129. 
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parties.43  “Face-saving” is a defensive behavior after loss of face or after an attack on 
one’s face.  The identity, or “face,” of the parties is also an integral aspect of how the 
parties manage to “give a little” in the negotiations (or mediation) in order to reach a 
compromise.   Folger notes that “face,” especially when there are attacks or loss of face 
involved, can become major issues in the conflict.44  If “face” becomes important, it can 
change the climate of the interaction into a destructive rather than positive one and 
makes the parties more inflexible in their positions.  Face, then, can become the 
controlling factor in the process and prevent any potential agreement.45  
The concept of face is but one of the crucial issues to cooperative problem-
solving, and it is linked to several strategies and behaviors.   These include the positive 
behaviors regarding face, or “face-saving.”   Face-saving includes the type of interaction 
which supports or contributes to the other party’s face.46  Face-saving interaction can be 
broken-down further, and the detailed aspects of face-saving behavior is, as one would 
expect, just as complex as the other aspects of face.  One important point is that the way 
in which the parties interact can be viewed as identifiable strategies and behaviors 
affecting face, and that these can serve as warnings (markers) that the specific interaction 
behaviors are positive or destructive.   
Interaction involves communication, including nonverbal communication.  If the 
interaction (or communication) is positive (designed to resolve conflict), then it is called 
                                                 
43 Id. at 129. 
44 Id. at 135. 
45 Id. at 137.    
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“person-centered.”  These communication behaviors incorporate the psychological 
viewpoint of the other person to anticipate the likely response or behavior of the other 
person.  If, instead, the interaction of the parties ignores or fails to incorporate the 
perspective of the other party, perhaps focusing on the other issues or the initial roles, the 
interaction is termed “position-centered.”47    
Another frequent aspect that is mentioned in the literature is “venting.”  The 
expression of anger, or “venting,” is sometimes viewed as cathartic and, possibly, 
beneficial, and so the mediator may allow a disputant to “vent” (in caucus, preferably) as 
part of his role.  Emotions are part of the dispute; addressing the emotional intelligence 
problems is necessary to advance negotiations.48   
Another aspect of communication, the actual choice of words used, has been the 
subject of recent research.  The closer the match of language style, the greater the 
amplification of interests, which can be either good or bad.  In dating, matched language 
styles will predict more successful results, but in conflict negotiations, the closer the 
language styles the more likely that the negotiations will fail.49    
In summary, conflict, disputes, and settlement may often be more a clash of 
personalities, communication failures, and self-image issues such as “face” rather than 
costs and damages.  Most ADR professionals and the literature make a point of 
acknowledging the emotional aspects of the dispute resolution process.  A complete 
                                                 
47 Id. at 147-151. 
48 L. S. Schreier, Emotional Intelligence and Mediation Training, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 99 (2002). 
49 M. Krakovsky, The Words That Bind: Deal or No Deal? DISCOVER, Nov. 2013, 28, 30.   
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understanding of litigation and settlement must include the basic “human” aspects of 
conflict.50  
Why Litigate? 
The next important issue is why people in conflict turn to litigation instead of 
working cooperatively to resolve the conflict. There are different ideas about the 
particulars of the motive for litigation, but the basic rationale is that litigation occurs if a 
cost-benefit analysis predicts a positive result.  Spier expresses the decision as “the 
expected gross return from litigation…exceeds the cost of bringing the case to trial,” but 
notes that other considerations (such as the impact on future litigation, business 
reputation, etc.) may be significant.51 Gould explains litigation based on wealth and 
utility, but the same motivating factor: increasing the wealth/utility of the plaintiff is 
subsumed in his analysis.52 Another scholar uses the same foundation and adds that the 
expected return can be increased by additional investment: “…each select a level of 
resource inputs that maximizes his expected utility in the event of a trial.”53  
Additional notions include Posner’s characterization of the court system as a part 
of the market for judicial services,54 which continues to assume a positive value or 
benefit that can be gained by the plaintiff.  The concept of dispute resolution as a service 
                                                 
50 See A. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 
(1994) (Medical findings are that, without the capacity to feel emotion, the mind can function 
intellectually, but it is not able to make good decisions). 
51 K. E. Spier, Litigation, 259 at 264 in A. M. POLINSKY & S. SHAVELL, HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (Elsevier, 2007). 
52 J. P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973).  
53 W. M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 LAW & ECON. 61, 101 (1997). 
54 W. M. Landes & R. A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). 
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is consistent with economic functions of basic social behaviors, including those found in 
primitive societies.55 Galanter, in explaining litigation, looks at “who sues whom.”56 The 
relationships between and the characteristics of the parties describes much of the pattern 
of litigation that is observed.  There are two types of litigants: “one-shot” and “repeat-
player” parties.  A substantial amount of litigation is by repeat players suing one-shots: 
litigation as a means of disciplining or correcting deviant behavior.  Litigation serves as 
the method of enforcing the rules.57  
Munger’s study of litigation in West Virginia finds that advancing or defending 
business interests may explain much of litigation activity.58 Another scholar writes that 
litigation is commonly assumed to be a bane to the economy, yet it can be a means of 
doing business.59  This idea views litigation as a method of pursuing economic activity 
as well as a means of resolving disputes; Jobobi finds that there is a close relationship 
between the amount of litigation and economic activity. The combined findings of 
Munger and Jabobi suggest that business interests (organizational or individual) are 
making decisions based on profit maximization and not just loss minimization, similar to 
the cost-benefit analysis noted by Spier. 
                                                 
55 R. A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 LAW & ECON. 1 
(1980). 
56 M. Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 348 (1975). 
57  Id. at 360. 
58 F. W. Munger, Commercial Litigation in West Virginia State and Federal Courts, 1870-1940, 30 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 322 (1986). 
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A related view is litigation rent-seeking.60  In the rent-seeking view, the parties 
decided how much to invest, with the idea that investing in the litigation will increase 
the expected return. One outcome that rent-seeking models can explain is how the 
parties’ behavior often dissipates value.61   
The causes of litigation are complex.  Even within one specialized area, that of 
construction project management, empirical studies have found that there are many 
sources of conflict that generate disputes.62  One dominate factor, however, in most of 
the disputes was a substantial degree of uncertainty.  Careful planning and drafting of 
contracts is urged as one way to prevent disputes that result from uncertainty.  The 
emotional intelligence of personnel involved was also identified as a major factor.  If the 
parties involved in the project were unable to work cooperatively to negotiate solutions 
as problems developed, disputes were much more likely to occur.63  
In summary, one common view is that litigation is wasteful and should be 
avoided.  More careful analysis, however, indicates that litigation can, like conflict, have 
a positive side.  It can be a way of enforcing compliance, as noted by Galanter, or a 
method of seeking financial/business advantages, as explained by Munger and Jacobi.  
                                                 
60 G. Dari-Mattiacci, & F. Parisi, Rents, Dissipation and Lost Treasures: Rethinking Tullock's 
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61 Id. at 419-420.  
62 P. Love, P. Davis, J. Ellis & S. Cheung, A systemic view of dispute causation, School of Built 
Environment, Curtin University (2010) (available at 
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Instead of assuming that the goal is no litigation, perhaps the goal should be to determine 
the optimal level of litigation. 
Failure 
In private matters, where the parties are free to settle their differences without 
litigation, it may appear to defy rationality that the parties fail to settle.  This apparent 
irrationality springs from the fact that failure to settle is not well understood.64  The vast 
majority of cases do settle, however, and the need for research in this area has been 
noted.  One reason for the paucity of research is that, besides a lack of understanding, 
settlements are very complicated.65  
Spier notes that litigation involves additional costs, so there is a clear advantage 
to settling.66  Settlement can save the cost of litigation; a saving that can be divided 
between the parties and increase the plaintiff’s benefit while decreasing the defendant’s 
loss. The reasons that parties fail to settle, then, is explored in the literature.  Ashenfelter 
writes that research has identified four characteristics as possible reasons for failure: 
difference in expectations, the principal-agent problem, attitudes of the disputants about 
risks, and the costs involved in seeking intervention/aid.67  
The first characteristic, differences in the parties’ expectations, is the same thing, 
essentially, as a disparity in beliefs about what a fair or objective resolution of the 
dispute would be. It is the difference in the expected values. At least two underlying 
                                                 
64 O. Ashenfelter & J. Currie, Negotiator Behavior and the Occurrence of Dispute, 80 AM. ECON. 
REV. 416, 416 (1990).  
65 D. A. WATERMAN & M. A. PETERSON, MODELS OF LEGAL DECISION MAKING vii  (1981).  
66 Spier, supra note 51, at 269. 
67 Ashenfelter & Currie, supra note 64, at 417-419. 
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principles may be responsible. First is the difference in the parties’ information set. This 
can also be characterized as the parties’ beliefs. The information sets include private 
facts as well as the individuals’ assumptions and constructs about the rules and 
procedures for resolving the dispute. Each disputant’s private information significantly 
influences the disputant’s estimate of the expected resolution outcome.  A second reason 
for the difference in beliefs may be the observed psychological phenomenon that 
individuals tend to over-estimate the probabilities of success.68  
The difference in information, or asymmetry of information, can pose problems 
for settlement because of strategic incentives.69  The conflicting information results in a 
failure to settle.  To elaborate, the ordinary assumption is that a guilty defendant will 
settle in order to save litigation costs.  An innocent defendant will not settle for anything 
more than the costs of litigation since she knows that trial will prove her innocence.  
These two conditions give rise, though, to an incentive by a guilty defendant to act as 
though she were innocent: to fail to settle.70  Settlement failure, then, may be a strategic 
move by some guilty defendants.  
The second characteristic that Ashenfelter cites for negotiation failures is the 
principal-agent problem. Principals hire the agents because they think the agents will 
obtain the principal a better outcome, but the agent’s incentives are to increase his own 
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fee. Agents are prone to intensify and prolong the dispute, therefore. If both principals 
(disputants) hire agents, then the dispute becomes even more complicated.71  
The third characteristic is the disputants’ view of the uncertainties involved. The 
use of a dispute resolution process is inversely related to the risk of the outcome. The 
issue of risk is a major topic in the literature and is discussed later in this section.  
The fourth characteristic is costs. Again, this is often a focus of the literature.  
Costs are a primary factor because they are avoidable by settling. The higher the cost of 
litigation, then, the more likely that settlement will occur.72  
Spier adds that if there are other, important concerns (such as the indivisibility of 
the resource, non-pecuniary issues, etc.), then these concerns could be a reason that 
settlement may fail.73 Strategic issues may be involved, too.  As Galanter notes, a repeat 
player may decide it is in his best interest to pursue litigation to send a signal to other 
potential disputants. His decision to litigate involves considerations that go beyond the 
particular dispute at hand.  Conversely, a one-shot player whose gain or loss depends on 
just the one dispute has a different, narrower focus.74  
The difference in players also pertains to the resources and expertise that the 
players possess.  This affects their anticipated success in litigation and, concomitantly, 
their willingness to settle.  A disputant with a strong bargaining position may refuse to 
settle even if the offer is in her settlement zone. The bargaining strength is affected by 
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the facts of the case, previous experience, financial resources, political and emotional 
aspects of going to trial, as well as subjective assessments of other factors, such as her 
own persuasive ability, the court’s attitude, etc.75  
Another issue pertaining to success or failure may be the defendant's self-interest 
in maintaining secrecy. Secrecy may shield the defendant from additional litigation or it 
can relate to other concerns.76   
Litigation Explosion 
The primary reason for the rapid acceptance and growth of ADR is a general 
frustration with the traditional legal system. In particular, the delay, cost, and 
unsatisfactory results of the court system were considered to be intolerable.  The 
underlying cause of these problems, it was generally believed, was a drastic rise in 
litigation – an “explosion” of litigation that started in the 1950s and became more 
onerous in the two decades following.  
Deep concern about congestion in the court system was expressed as early as 
1958, when Chief Justice Earl Warren addressed the American Bar Association.  He 
reported that the increase in litigation and the resulting delay in justice was “corroding 
the very foundations of constitutional government.77 The next Chief Justice, Warren 
Burger, continued sounding the alarm. Burger remarked that increase in litigation in the 
federal court system was six times the rate of growth in the population. The growth in 
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76 Spier, supra note 51, at 324. 
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the federal courts of appeal was 16 times the population growth rate. This increased 
litigiousness was also being felt in the state courts.78   
The Chief Justice’s alarm was shared by many observers. One scholar developed 
a list of the causes and examined each cause at length.79 The first cause examined was 
the introduction of attorney advertising.80 The initial step in opening up the doors to 
advertising occurred in 1976 when the Supreme Court ruled that free speech extended to 
commercial and business endeavors.81  That case involved state restrictions on 
advertising by pharmacists. The state restrictions on advertising by pharmacists was just 
one example of widespread limitations on advertising by licensed professionals. The 
court, in ruling for the pharmacist, based its decision at least in part on the history of 
labor negotiations--labor organizations and employers were protected by their First 
Amendment rights during contract negotiations. The court noted that the key aspect 
involved was economic interest of the parties, and the fact that the parties were acting in 
their own self-interest did not remove the protection of free speech.82  
Attorneys were not far behind the pharmacists.  The following year, the court 
ruled prohibitions on attorney advertising by a state bar violated free speech protection.83  
Following the same reasoning as the pharmacists’ case, the court noted that advertising 
may lead to more litigation but that the improvement in the access to justice was a good 
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thing. The court pointed out that research had indicated that a large percentage of the 
population was not adequately served by the legal system. Higher awareness and more 
information on the part of the general public was not a harm; these could bring great 
benefits. Injured parties would be better able to seek remedies in the courts, and so it 
would serve society at large by deterring improper behavior. Advertising the court said, 
is the traditional and accepted mechanism for sellers to inform potential buyers of the 
availability of goods and services and the price. A free market economy works best 
when this free flow of information exists. The court also opined that advertising could 
serve to lower the costs of legal services in the market.84  
Free speech in advertisements was extended in a subsequent case where a picture 
of a contraceptive device was publicized.85 The picture was of a Dalkon Shield, which 
had caused severe medical problems for many of its users.  The idea behind the 
advertising was twofold. First, some users may not have been aware that the product 
they had been using was the exact product that could have been responsible for their 
medical problems, and the time limit for filing claims was fast approaching. This 
advertising, directed at specific, potential litigants, was upheld.86  
A recent Supreme Court case that has further extended this line of reasoning to a 
situation that involved the use of pharmacist records by drug companies to target 
particular consumers.87  This activity is called detailing. The pharmacist must keep 
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records of patients and prescriptions pursuant to state regulations, so drug companies 
seek to collect this information and use it to their advantage. Despite the fact that this 
information is required by the state, and the purpose of the drug companies is aimed at 
manipulating the doctors, state restrictions on the access and use of this information was 
struck down.88 The law has moved from upholding restrictive regulation of business 
practices to a position where any regulation by the state must satisfy a high standard of 
state and public interest. 
Another major development that contributed to the increase in litigation, 
according to Olson, was the rise in the use of contingency fees.89   Contingency fees are 
a type of fee arrangement for legal services in which the attorney is paid for the bulk of 
his fees only if the injured party wins and collects damages. If the injured party loses, 
she owes the attorney nothing. The main alternative to contingency fees is that the 
attorney is paid on an hourly basis by the plaintiff, win or lose. The impact is that 
plaintiffs must have substantial financial resources to pursue legal redress.  
By the 1960s all of the states had rules in place that allowed contingency fees on 
the part of attorneys.  Plaintiffs could instigate legal action with little or no financial risk 
as long as they could find a willing attorney.  Contingency fees are commonly thought of 
as encouraging lawsuits that have no merit. A notable point of fact, too, is that the vast 
majority of personal injury cases filed in the U.S. involve contingency fees.90 Another 
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criticism of contingency fees is that they encourage litigation by providing “excessive 
recovery” on the part of attorneys.91  
Another development that Olson notes is the rise in class action litigation.92 In 
class actions, a large group can be represented by a much smaller number of plaintiffs. 
Class actions address the problem “free-riders” and other collective action problems.  
The injury suffered by each injured party is small compared to the cost of litigation.  
Without class-action, then, injurers will escape liability for the bulk, possibly the 
entirety, of the damages they cause.93  
Another development that increases the amount of litigation is the extension of 
the jurisdiction of state courts to hear disputes that involve a nonresident defendant.94 
Historically, states had jurisdiction (the power or the authority to hear the case) only if 
both parties were citizens of the state. The seminal case that changed this was in 1945 
where state jurisdiction over a non-resident was upheld based upon certain minimal 
activity or contacts within the state.95 The exercise of jurisdiction under these 
circumstances was not deemed to be inconsistent with the traditional notions of justice; 
soon thereafter, other states adopted similar rules, either by statute or by court rules. 
These extensions of jurisdiction, which  became known as “long-arm” statutes, resulted 
in an increase in the number of potential defendants. The traditional notions of justice 
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would not prevent an out-of-state citizen to escape liability simply by conducting his 
business operations from another state.96  
Another extension by state courts is the choice of the law for deciding cases.  
This “choice of law” allows courts too much discretion, Olsen argues, and the result is 
competition between the states in attracting plaintiffs.97 The legal standards for the 
choice of law (usually, a choice between the law of the state where the injury occurred or 
the law of the state of the tribunal) are even lower than the standard for jurisdiction.98  
The assumption behind this criticism, it should be noted, is that the states are competing 
for potential litigation. 
Another development which increased litigation was a change in pleading rules.99 
The traditional form of pleading was that the defendant and plaintiff filed successive 
pleadings with the court, and this process would narrow the issues to allow the judge to 
arrive at a just verdict. This type of pleading elevated form over substance:  satisfaction 
of the rules became more important than the merits of the case. The change, a move to 
less formal, “notice pleading,” was a change to a much lower standard, and this lower 
standard encouraged more litigation. 
Another, related, development that led to an increase in litigation is the adoption 
of modern discovery as an integral part of the litigation process.100 Since the pleadings 
no longer served to narrow the dispute, discovery was instituted. There are five purposes 
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to discovery: (1) to increase the probability of settlement, (2) to increase the fairness and 
accuracy of settlements, (3) to improve the accuracy of trials, (4) to filter complaints 
better in order to terminate meritless disputes, and (5) to lower the transaction costs of 
resolving disputes.101   
Discovery is a key aspect of any discussion on risk, litigation, and settlement.  
One common concept of litigation posits that the parties are relatively optimistic about 
their outcome, so that each side prefers a trial rather than settlement. Providing 
information to correct the other side's false beliefs fosters settlement. Additionally, 
discovery, as a substitute for the common-law pleadings, also promotes a fair and 
accurate outcome by the court.  A court, to have complete information, must have full 
knowledge of the law and the facts of the case; complete information allows an accurate 
decision.102  
Another factor that Olsen lists is the shift from firm rules to “fuzzy” rules, and he 
discusses the change in custody rules to the “best interests of the child” standard.103 It is 
obvious that discarding a firm, well-defined custody standard for one that allows more 
discretion by the court will encourage more litigation on these matters.   
Historically, the father had long been considered the parent who had the superior 
right of custody (and control, in general) over minor children.104 As society’s views of 
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women changed, this assumption of male superiority in all matters changed, and custody 
became an issue for the court to resolve.  The fuzziness of “the best interest of the child” 
does not necessarily mean that alternative standards would reduce litigation, though.  In 
Minnesota, the child’s primary caretaker was added to the “best interest” standard, but 
the change “spawned an incredible amount of litigation concerning who changed more 
diapers…”105 The point is that any relaxing of a rigid standard can be expected to 
generate litigation.   
Olsen’s next factor is the increase in the use of expert witnesses.106 Two main 
concerns are raised when an expert witness is used in litigation.  The first of these is that 
the expert is a biased witness.  Economic principles say that “large-scale monetary 
incentives will change behavior,” and this should be just as true for experts as for 
novices.107 The second concern over expert witnesses is the difficulty of cross-
examining an expert witness.  The expert, being on his pedestal of special knowledge, is 
hard to dislodge.  Fact-finders (the judge or the jury) will overweigh the testimony of an 
expert witness with his halo of superior insight. 
The next factor Olsen lists is the destruction of the sanctity of contracts by the 
use of excuses:  “unconscionable,” “contracts of adhesion,” etc.108 These precepts can 
allow a plaintiff to successfully fight the applicability of a contract’s terms, thus 
                                                 
105 G. Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-
Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 2 
MINN. L. REV. 427, 452 (1990). 
106 OLSON, supra note 79, at 152-165. 
107 M. J. Mandel, Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
113, 113 (1999). 
108 OLSON, supra note 79, at 197-219. 
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increasing litigation.  The principles, though, can be viewed as a “safety net” for 
catching “unfair” behavior that the rigid, formulaic contract law let slip through.109  
Next on Olsen’s list is the increasingly aggressive atmosphere of the legal 
system.110  In essence, this complaint is the same as the “sporting theory” of Roscoe 
Pound: it is the win that counts, and no one respects the loser for having played by the 
spirit as well as the letter of the rules.  Pound coined the term “the sporting theory of 
justice,” and the criticism of the legal system is still valid.111  
The next item on the list of factors is the “nuisance suit,” or “frivolous 
litigation.”112   Both of these are used to refer to litigation that has no merit.  In other 
words, the chances of the plaintiff prevailing at trial are equivalent to zero.  Despite the 
fact that there is no benefit from trial, there is the possibility that the litigation can 
produce a positive value for the plaintiff if the defendant is risk averse or faces a 
significant opportunity cost to defending the suit.  An example of the latter is a real 
estate development project that is halted by the filing of litigation.  The opportunity cost 
(the cost of the delay of the development project) may be high enough that the defendant 
is willing to “pay-off” the plaintiff.113 
                                                 
109 A. J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 73-77 
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The last major factor on Olsen’s list is that lawyers can’t be sued by non-clients 
for frivolous suits, invasion of privacy, or other harms inflicted on defendants.114  They 
can participate in the increase in litigation and profit from that surge in business without 
having to be concerned about any downside – any potential liability for accepting a 
nuisance suit, for example.  This aspect of the legal system, the importance of the 
economic incentives on the part of attorneys, is the subject of some research that 
supports the idea that attorneys have a major role in shaping the development of the law 
and the amount of litigation.115  
Olsen’s explanation of the litigation explosion was comprehensive and well-
written.  It resonated with many. Even Chief Justice Burger praised it.116  The irony is 
that almost all of Olson’s criticisms are levied at changes that were themselves reforms 
designed to cure more egregious faults.  Instead of comparing the reforms to the original 
situation, though, Olson focuses on the imperfections in the reforms in an attempt to 
explain the then-current frustrations.   
Risk 
Risk is one of the most commonly discussed issues in the literature.  Often, 
however, it is not precisely defined.  Many scholars appear to use the term “risk” as 
equivalent to uncertainty, but the two are not necessarily the same. Risk is often 
regarded as a distinct issue, separate from the issue of costs, but some commentators, 
                                                 
114 OLSON, supra note 79, at 317-326. 
115 See P. H. Rubin & M. J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 
(1994). 
116 R. M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 199, 199 (1991).   
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Posner, for one, view risk as a type of cost.  This general view of risk as a cost 
corresponds to a failure of the court to precisely “carry out those functions assigned to 
it.”117   
The usual discussion of risk is to compare the decisions of a risk-neutral 
disputant with those of a risk-averse disputant.  In general, the higher the risk, the more 
likely that settlement or ADR will be preferred to trial.  The presumption, again, is that 
trial is “risky.”  Although an accurate decision is assumed to be the goal, what is usually 
omitted from the discussion is that fact that greater accuracy entails greater costs.118   
Nevertheless, reduction of risk is one of the perceived advantages of ADR compared 
with traditional litigation, and it is a major incentive to settle the dispute.   
One concept related to risk is the arbitrator exchange concept.119  This approach 
is based on the fact that, in most arbitrations, the disputants must agree on the selection 
of the arbitrator, in contrast to a trial where the disputants have no choice of the judge.  
Arbitrators, then, act in their own self-interest in that their incentive is to be acceptable 
to both parties, the defendant and the plaintiff.  The result is that the arbitrators will act 
the same way.  If an arbitrator is considered to have favored plaintiffs in past disputes, 
defendant will not agree to use him.  If, conversely, the arbitrator’s history is to favor 
defendants, then plaintiffs will not agree to him.  This process selects only those 
arbitrators that have scrupulously avoided being viewed as friendly to one side or the 
                                                 
117 R. A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 399, 400 (1973). 
118 L. Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 
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other, which means the arbitrators are, in essence, “exchangeable.”120  
Another aspect of risk in the context of arbitration is the format of the arbitration.  
For example, final offer arbitration is intended to produce offers from the two disputants 
that are close to one another.121 This creates a strong incentive for the disputants to make 
an offer that is closer to the “correct” value than the offer from the other party, which, in 
turn, makes the arbitrator’s award more accurate.  
Evaluation 
By the late 1980s, several attempts had been made to evaluate the success of 
ADR.  The best research at that time was limited, though, in the ways in which the 
answers were sought.  To gauge how well mediation worked, for example, most studies 
used settlement rates and satisfaction surveys. There was very little evidence, though, 
that mediation has had any appreciable effect in reducing court backlogs.122  Even in the 
earliest research, it was recognized that several reasons may be involved. First, some 
disputants might take advantage of mediation programs over matters that they would not 
otherwise pursue. Since ADR costs less, there will be more disputes that have a positive 
value as a result of the cost-benefit analysis.  In this way, ADR may be too successful in 
that it encourages parties to take action over relatively minor issues.123  Another 
consideration that was obvious from the beginning was that mediation programs would 
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attract the easy cases: mediation skims the cream.  But this is one of the purposes of 
mediation, to take the easy route for the easy disputes and leave the more difficult cases 
for the courts.  The courts get the disputes which would have wound up being litigated 
regardless of any mediation program.124  
There were problems with using satisfaction surveys used to measure the 
effectiveness of the programs instead of control groups.  Without a well-constructed 
experimental design that includes a control group and random assignment, the results of 
any study are suspect.125  In many studies of programs with different groups, however, 
the more cooperative disputants wound up in the mediation group while the more 
antagonistic disputants are found in the comparison (“no mediation”) group.  This is the 
same “skimming the cream” issue that was noted, above.   
In 1995, a study was published evaluating one of the few random assignment 
experiments involving ADR.  The program was designed to assess whether mediated 
settlement conferences (MSC) could produce more efficient, less costly, and more 
satisfying results.126  In reference to the efficiency issue, the evaluation addressed four 
aspects: 1) time to disposition, 2) frequency of settlement, 3) frequency of trial, and 4) 
court workload (judges and other court officials).   The program encompassed 13 
counties and extended from 1991-1992.  For evaluation purposes, three counties were 
designated as “intensive-study” counties, and cases filed during that time period were 
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randomly assigned to either the Mediation Group or the Control Group.   For disputes 
assigned to the Mediation Group, the senior resident judge could order the parties to 
participate in MSC proceedings.  Disputes assigned to the Control Group were excluded 
from the MSC program, but the parties could, of their own accord, seek mediation or 
other forms of ADR outside of the court-sponsored program.127   
During the program period in the three intensive-study counties, there were 1,986 
cases total, or just a little under 1,000 disputes in each group.  Of these 2,000-some 
cases, a random selection of cases was drawn for detailed study.  There were 245 
Mediation Group cases that reached final resolution by the end of the study assessment, 
with only nine cases still unresolved.  The Control Group numbered 244 cases (all but 
about ten of these disputes had reached a final resolution by the conclusion of the study).  
An additional random sampling, the Preprogram Group, was also taken from cases filed 
during 1989 – cases which would have been eligible for the MSC program if there had 
been one at the earlier date.128    
The key results of the study, for the purposes of this research, are in the analysis 
of the impact on court congestion.  Much of the literature assumes that court congestion 
is alleviated if the average time to disposition is reduced.  Although the number of cases 
on the court docket does bear a relationship to how congested the court might be, it is 
not the best measure.  The MSC program design and evaluation selected another way of 
measuring court congestion.  A queue at the courthouse does not work the same way as a 
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queue at a check-out counter.  The reason is that the litigation process takes time.  The 
filing of a case starts a timer (of sorts), but it is for the parties/attorneys and not the 
court.129 It is but one of several possible time segments, the number and duration of 
which depends in large part on the disputants/attorneys.    
Once the various procedural matters are completed, the case is ready to go to 
trial.  Often, this comes to the attention of the court at docket call, which is the court’s 
periodic updating of the status (including scheduling issues) of the cases that have been 
filed with the court.  Docket calls may be held every Tuesday morning, for example, and 
each case that is “on the docket” may receive the attention of the court.  Many of the 
cases will still have procedural matters in progress (e.g., discovery processes such as 
depositions) and this will be noted by the court.   If the procedural matters are 
completed, however, the court will move the case to the trial calendar (set a date for 
trial).  It is at this stage that any additional delay is due to court congestion instead of 
case preparation.  If the court’s trial calendar is such that the first open date is some time 
far in the future, then court congestion has caused that delay.   
To re-iterate, court congestion is not just a matter of how many cases are “active” 
in the court’s docket.  It is how much delay is involved in getting the court to process 
any motions or other items in preparation for trial, and to “hear” the dispute once the 
parties are ready for trial.  Although the number of cases on the docket is associated with 
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court congestion or delay, the underlying reason for congestion is the total demand on 
the court’s time.   A relatively large number of cases may be on the docket, but if each 
case requires very little in terms of the court’s time, there may be little congestion.  But 
if each case requires a substantial amount of the court’s time, then even a few cases may 
result in significant delay.     
The North Carolina MSC study used court records of the selected cases (the three 
groups) to measure the number of documents (motions, orders, and other papers) that 
were signed by the judge or the court clerk.  This count was used as a proxy or indicator 
of the amount of court time used by the cases.  For the Mediation Group, the average 
was 1.95 orders signed by the judge versus 1.21 and 1.54 for the Control Group and 
Preprogram Group, respectively.  Since the Mediation Group cases would have required 
an order to MSC, the higher figure for these cases is understandable.  The numbers for 
documents signed by the court clerk were 1.24, 1.14, and 1.32 for the Mediation Group, 
Control Group, and Preprogram Group, respectively.  Other than the orders to MSC, 
then, there was not a significant difference in court workload.130  
Trials, of course, present the biggest use of court time for many disputes.  The 
MSC program did not result is a significant reduction in the percentage of cases that 
went to trial, however.  Although it is a central tenet of ADR that the process will result 
in fewer cases being tried (by any traditional means, whether it be jury trial, bench trial, 
or otherwise), the percentage of disputes in each group that continued on to trial was 
                                                 
130 CLARKE, et al, supra note 126, at 37-38. 
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quite similar.  The combined (all forms of trial) rates were 9.4%, 9.8%, and 11.9% for 
the Mediation, Control, and Preprogram Groups, respectively. Jury trial rates (jury trial 
being even more time-consuming for the court) were also close: 5.7%, 6.8%, and 7.4%, 
respectively.131   
If the trial rates and other matters (orders, motions, etc.) are so similar, then is 
there any advantage to the court to have cases on the MSC track?  In one sense, the 
answer might be yes.  The judges in the program did report that, in their opinion, the 
program did reduce the number of cases that were placed on the trial calendar but then 
settled before trial.  Once a trial calendar is prepared, a case that is on the calendar that 
winds up settling before trial creates a gap in the calendar that may be filled with the trial 
of a different dispute.  The judges reported that the MSC disputes, on average, resulted 
in fewer of these MSC cases being placed on the trial docket.  The report notes that the 
evaluation of the program did not examine trial calendars or any other way to 
independently verify the judges’ claims.132  In sum, the North Carolina MSC program 
was one of the most carefully planned studies of the effectiveness of mediation at 
reducing court congestion up to that time, yet the best that can be said is that some delay 
reduction may have been realized in the area of making the trial calendars more efficient. 
Just a year later, in 1996, another comprehensive, in-depth study was published.  
The report was an evaluation of a pilot program encompassing alternative dispute 
resolution techniques.  An independent evaluation of the program was conducted by the 
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RAND Institute for Civil Justice at the request of the Judicial Conference and the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.133  The study analyzed ADR programs in six 
federal district courts during 1992-93.  Four of the districts used mediation, two of which 
involved mandatory ADR assignment--which allowed random case referral to a 
mediation group or control group.   
The avowed objective of the study was to assess the implementation, costs, and 
effects of the new ADR programs.  The study used several evaluation criteria: 
 
  length of litigation 
  litigation expense (to the parties) 
  ADR program cost (court/government costs) 
  settlement/damages outcomes 
  level of satisfaction with the process 
  perception of fairness of the process 
 
Table 2, below, lists the districts and the basic characteristics of each program.  
 
 
 
                                                 
133 J. S. KAKALIK, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (U.S.) & JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
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TABLE 2: DISTRICTS AND PROGRAMS 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
ADR 
Method 
Mandatory 
Program 
Random 
Selection 
NY Southern Mediation Yes Yes 
PA Eastern Mediation Yes Yes 
OK Western Mediation No No 
TX Southern Mediation No No 
CA Southern Other Yes No 
NY Eastern Other No No 
 
 
The study made several basic findings:  
 
 length of litigation is not significantly shortened 
 litigation expense is not significantly reduced 
 ADR programs cost from $130 to $490 per case 
 monetary settlements are more likely with ADR 
 ADR does not increase perceived fairness 
 mediation does seem to increase the level of satisfaction among 
litigants134  
 
The report notes that “sound empirical research on various ADR mechanisms is 
quite thin.”135  The report concludes that no major effects, good or bad, could be found 
in the programs studied, and it notes that the results are consistent with prior empirical 
research.136   
Of the six evaluation criteria, the length of litigation (time to disposition, or 
TTD) statistic is the most relevant to court congestion.  The length of time a dispute 
remains on the docket is related to the total court resources expended on that case, as 
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noted.  The study concluded that ADR was associated with some small reduction in 
TTD, but it was statistically insignificant.137  
One of the most recent comprehensive reviews of empirical research was 
published in 2004.138 This survey, too, notes the dearth of quality research in the field: 
settlement rates and participant satisfaction continues to be the primary tool of 
researchers.  This survey notes that, of the eight studies of general jurisdiction courts that 
used a comparison group of cases that were not mediated, only four of those involved 
random assignment.  Half of the comparison group studies reported favorable results in 
terms of higher settlement rates, but half reported no difference. Wissler also notes that 
there were mixed results regarding participant satisfaction.139  
In summary, very little research to date has focused on the effectiveness of ADR 
for reducing court congestion.  What research has been done has looked at settlement 
rates and satisfaction, and even these studies have produced mixed results.  The 
relationship between the use of ADR and traditional court litigation remains uncertain.   
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III. DATA 
The Texas Judicial Council and the Office of Court Administration publish an 
annual report which summarizes data that they collect from all of the courts in the state. 
The report covers activity in the Texas Supreme Court all the way down to the 
Municipal Court and Justice of the Peace levels. In Texas, the District Courts have 
original jurisdiction over all matters unless specific statutory authority rests with another 
court. The District Courts' jurisdiction (or authority to “hear” a case) includes civil and 
criminal matters. In 2000, there were 414 district courts that collectively received 
746,015 new cases, of which 486,320 (64.8%) were civil, a 7% increase over the 
previous year.140   
The published data is reported by county, not by district, in both summary 
fashion and in detail for civil, criminal, and juvenile matters.  An example of a detailed 
report is available in Appendix A. The civil case data is used by this research. The civil 
report consists of 11 different categories, how the cases are added to the docket, and the 
type of disposition. The case categories for the reports remained mostly unchanged 
during the 1980-2010 time period. Likewise, the changes made to the docket 
status/action were minor. The consistency in the reporting scheme from 1980-2010 
allows for the testing of the hypotheses. 
                                                 
140 Unless otherwise noted, all data is from TEXAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM: FISCAL YEAR 2000 (2000). 
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An explanation of case categories is provided in each report, but the wording 
seldom changes. The 2000 annual report, for example, lists the civil case categories (all 
categories and explanations are found on page 166 of the report): 
 INJURY OR DAMAGE INVOLVING MOTOR VEHICLE 
 INJURY OR DAMAGE OTHER THAN MOTOR VEHICLE 
 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
 TAX 
 CONDEMNATION 
 ACCOUNTS, CONTRACTS, NOTES 
 RECIPROCALS 
 DIVORCE 
 OTHER FAMILY LAW 
 OTHER CIVIL 
 
The explanation given for “INJURY OR DAMAGE INVOLVING MOTOR 
VEHICLE” is: “All cases for damages associated in any way with motor vehicle (auto, 
truck, motorcycle, etc.), with or without accompanying personal injury. Examples 
include personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death cases which involve motor 
vehicles.” 
For the second category, INJURY OR DAMAGE OTHER THAN MOTOR 
VEHICLE, the explanation is: “Cases for personal injury or damages arising out of an 
event not involving a motor vehicle. Examples include “slip-and-fall” cases, as well as 
personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death not involving motor vehicles.” 
The third category, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, are cases that are “Appeals 
from awards of compensation for personal injury by the Workers' Compensation 
Commission (Ch. 410, Labor Code).” 
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TAX is the fourth category, and these cases are: “Suits brought by governmental 
taxing entities for the collection of taxes.”  The next category, CONDEMNATION, are: 
“Suits by a unit of government or a corporation with the power of eminent domain for 
the taking of private land for public use.”  ACCOUNTS, CONTRACTS, NOTES are: 
“Suits based on enforcing the terms of a certain and express agreement, usually for the 
purpose of recovering a specific sum of money.” 
The next three categories deal with marriage and family.  RECIPROCALS are 
cases that are: “Actions involving child support in which the case has been received 
from another court outside the county or state.”  The next category, DIVORCE, is: “A 
suit brought by a party to a marriage to dissolve that marriage pursuant to Family Code 
Chapter 6. (Annulments are not reported here, but under All Other Family Law 
Matters.)”  The category of OTHER FAMILY LAW says: “Includes all family law 
matters other than divorce proceedings and those juvenile matters which are reported in 
the Juvenile Section, including: 
 Motions to modify previously granted divorce decrees, or other 
judgments or decrees, in such matters as amount of child support, 
child custody orders, and other similar motions which are filed 
under the original cause number; 
 Annulments; 
 Adoptions; 
 Changes of name; 
 Termination of parental rights (child protective service cases); 
 Dependent and neglected child cases; 
 Removal of disability of minority; 
 Removal of disability of minority for marriage; 
 Voluntary legitimation (Section 13.01, Texas Family Code); and 
 All other matters filed under the Family Code which are not 
reported elsewhere. 
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The last category, OTHER CIVIL, is: “All civil cases not clearly identifiable as 
belonging in one of the preceding categories.”  
Information on docket and disposition activity is also contained in the reports.  
The 2000 report lists the following for docket activity:  
 Cases Pending 9/01/99 
 Docket Adjustments 
 New Cases Filed 
 Other Cases Added 
 Total Cases Added 
 Percent of Total Added 
 Cases Pending 8/31/00 
 
The specific line items for dispositions changed, but the dispositions for 2000  
are: 
 
 Default & Agreed Judg. 
 Summary Judgments 
 Final Judgments 
 Dismissed 
 Other Dispositions 
 Total Dispositions 
 Percent of Total Dispositions 
 Percent of Total Pending  
 Disp. As % of Total Added 
 
For 2000, there were a total of 470,529 dispositions in the district courts 
statewide. Of these dispositions, 24.2% were default and agreed, 0.728% (less than one 
percent) were summary judgments, 24.3% were final judgments, 26.4% were dismissals, 
and 24.3% were “other” dispositions. 
There are three general issues about the data: missing data, inconsistent data, and 
the reports of the Dispute Resolution Centers (DRCs).  
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The reports are, for the most part, complete in that data is reported for all 
counties. There are a few instances, however, where the reports note that data was not 
received from particular counties before the publication date. In most of those few 
instances, the missing reports are from the small counties, and the missing data should 
not materially affect the research analysis or conclusion. 
Most instances of apparent problems with inconsistent data were due to data 
entry errors. The data for recent years is available online, either in pdf or excel 
spreadsheet format. The data from earlier years is available from the reports available in 
selected libraries across the state, and the information must be copied and manually 
entered into a computer. Most apparent inconsistencies were eliminated after the data 
was verified.  A few, remaining inconsistencies remained, including:  
 inconsistent sums, totals, or figures in older, “hard-copy” reports (all sums and 
totals were verified after computer entry and checked against the printed sums 
and totals; the few errors in the data that were discovered were rare and minor, 
and never amounted to more than a few cases; verification was primarily for the 
purposes of identifying transcription errors, which were relatively common due 
to the usual data entry mistakes and the difficulty inherent in reading poor 
quality, printed copies of the reports) 
 inconsistent or blank cells/numbers in the pdf/spreadsheet files (at least one 
instance of apparent missing/incorrect data in the 2003 file was identified, but the 
file did contain enough information that made it possible to compute and correct 
certain missing entries) 
 
Another apparent inconsistency is that there was a change in case categories.  
Starting with 1986, “Family” replaced “non-adversarial.”  The cases which fell under the 
category of “non-adversarial” would still be reported under “family” because they fall 
 54 
 
under the family code. To illustrate, the “non-adversarial” category (used from 1980 to 
1985) includes only: 
 Adoptions 
 Changes of Name 
 Occupational Driver’s License 
 Termination of Parental Rights 
 Dependent and Neglected Child Cases 
 Removal of Disability of Minority 
 Removal of Disability of Minority for Marriage 
 Voluntary Legitimation (Section 13.01 Texas Family Code) 
 
Thus, the 1986 changes in case categories amounted to a minor re-shuffle and a 
rename. Neither should have any effect on the consistency of the data before and after 
1986.   
There were two major changes to the law which had significant impacts on the 
reported case categories: workers compensation (WC) and reciprocals. WC law in Texas 
underwent a major change that took effect in 1991.141  WC litigation (and costs to 
employers) had been increasing significantly for a number of years. In 1980, 18,766 WC 
cases were filed in Texas. In 1990, that number had risen to 29,799, an increase of 59%. 
Businesses complained about the high cost of injuries, but even more about the high cost 
of litigation. The 1991 law was designed to reduce the amount of litigation, and it did. 
The result was a drastic reduction in WC filings.  
                                                 
141 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Arts. 8308-09 (Vernon 1991). There have been several revisions to the 
statute, the most recent being in 2013. 
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Reciprocals is the label used for cases brought under the original Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA)142 or Revised Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA), a later revision. These uniform laws allowed a 
state (if the state adopted the uniform act) to enforce another state's family support 
orders. The impetus was to prevent the 'deadbeat' dads from avoiding their family 
support obligations (alimony, maintenance, child support, etc.) by moving to another 
state. Before the original URESA, the poster-board example was a woman who was left 
with small children and no means of support after the ex-husband/father absconded to 
another state. The poor woman was left with no option other than to follow the ex to his 
new home state (follow at least in the sense that she had to obtain legal representation 
there) and basically repeat the same legal procedures to obtain support. If she was 
successful, or it looked as though she might be, the ex would move, again, to yet another 
state, and the process had to begin again. 
URESA/RURESA was replaced by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA).143  UIFSA eased the burden of the spouse seeking to enforce support orders 
from a foreign (out of state) court order and simplified the process. With the adoption of 
UIFSA, the number of “reciprocals” in terms of new cases filed dropped dramatically.  
                                                 
142 The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (original, 1950 version), was adopted in Texas in 
1951 (1951 Tex. Gen. Laws, Ch. 377, at 643). 
143 Texas enacted the act in 1995, chapter 159 of the Family Code. Adoption of the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act was required by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (42 
U.S.C. §466) in order to maintain certain federal funding. 
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The data for WC and reciprocals is not consistent due to changes in the law. The 
underlying “cause of action” giving the court jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit changed. 
For purposes of this research, therefore, the two case categories of workers comp and 
reciprocals have been removed from the data set used for analysis, and a “revised total” 
number of cases has been computed to replace the reported “total.” 
Other reporting changes during the years pertained to the docket activity.  Docket 
adjustments and “show causes added” are two examples.  The docket information used 
in this research, though, was limited to “new cases filed,” which did not change.  
There were also changes in disposition reporting.  In 1996 “change of venue” 
dispositions was dropped. Considering the small number of cases involved, though, this 
change would not significantly alter the disposition percentages used by this research. 
A major change in reporting that does affect this research, was a consolidation of 
certain types of dispositions. Starting in 1996, three actions (default & agreed, final 
judgments, and dismissed) consolidated what had been seven separate reporting actions. 
“Default & Agreed” combined two actions that had previously been reported 
separately. Final judgment combined three actions: bench trial, jury trial, and directed 
verdict, which had been separately reported. The third major combination was 
“dismissed,” which replaced dismissed by plaintiff and dismissed for want of 
prosecution. Although the disaggregated reported numbers would have allowed a more 
precise analysis of the dispositions, using the combined actions preserves the 
consistency of the data and allows meaningful analysis. 
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In summary, the changes that were made in the reporting format did not 
materially affect the consistency of the district data. Some precision of the data was lost 
when some of the types of dispositions were consolidated, but enough differentiation 
remains to conduct a reasonable analysis. On the whole, the time period 1980 through 
2010 was a 31 year period during which very little changed in the way district court data 
was reported in Texas. 
The last major consistency problem is the reporting for the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Centers (DRCs). Reporting began in 1988 (the comprehensive statute was 
enacted the previous year), and reporting stopped with the 2006 publication. During the 
1988-2005 reporting years, some centers did not report any data. In at least one instance 
(Austin/Travis), the center was active but just stopped sending in reports. In other 
instances (Denton, for example) the centers waned, sometimes to be renewed.  The 
DRCs were designed to foster ADR and to provide ADR services to those who could not 
otherwise afford it, but not to monopolize. The concept is that the DRCs serve some 
parts of the community but also act to promote ADR in general.  Accordingly, this 
research does not presume that reported DRC activity reflects anything more than a 
qualitative indication of the relative ADR activity of the county.  The DRC data is used, 
then, to identify which counties are “active” in mediation/ADR. A group of 15 counties 
are identified as being very “active.” More information is given in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 3: DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTERS AND ACTIVE GROUPS 
 
CENTERS LISTED IN 
REPORTS 
ACTIVE 15 
COUNTIES
LARGE 9 BIG 4 DH 
Amarillo/Potter & Randall Bexar Denton Bexar Dallas 
Austin/Travis County  Brazos El Paso Dallas Harris 
Beaumont/Jefferson County  Collin Jefferson Harris  
Bryan/College Station/Brazos 
Valley  
Dallas Lubbock Tarrant  
Conroe/Montgomery County  Denton Montgomery   
Corpus Christi/Nueces County  El Paso Nueces   
Dallas/Dallas Dispute Mediation 
Service, Inc  
Harris Potter   
Denton/Denton County  Jefferson Randall   
El Paso/El Paso County  Lubbock Travis   
Fort Worth/Tarrant County  Montgomery    
Houston/Harris County Nueces    
Kerrville/Hill Country  Potter    
Lubbock/Lubbock County  Randall    
Paris/Lamar County  Tarrant    
Plano/Collin County Travis    
Richmond/Fort Bend     
San Antonio/Bexar County      
San Marcos /Hays County      
Waco/McLennan County      
Woodville/Tyler County      
 
The DRC data was also used to discriminate among the active counties to 
determine when the counties established active ADR programs. Two counties, Harris 
and Dallas, established centers even before the earlier, 1983 legislation (which allowed 
counties to charge court fees to support ADR programs).  These two counties (DH) are 
used as a separate "active" ADR group. Another group, the four counties (BIG 4) that 
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adopted ADR programs early, are also used as a separate group for analysis. Another 
group of nine of the remaining 15 counties is used as a fourth active group. Table 3 lists 
the counties in each group. 
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IV. THEORY AND MODEL 
General Theory 
Critics note that the ADR literature, though large, is confused, unsystematic, and 
of variable quality.144  The theory is scant – most of the work is aimed at practical 
matters or is intended to criticize or defend particular aspects of ADR. The paucity of 
ADR theory is notable because one of the primary concerns of legal theorists has been 
the nature of adjudication.  
Theoretical work concerning disputes, or more generally, justice, has a long 
history. The Bible, Aristotle, Plato, and St. Thomas Aquinas are some of the ancient 
sources of legal theory.145 Aristotle wrote at length about the theory of justice and 
focused on two types: general justice, or observing the relevant laws, and particular 
justice, which encompasses distributive (equal distribution on an equal basis) and 
corrective justice (correcting unfair portions, such as making good the harm that one has 
caused another).  He notes that the general nature of the law sometimes fails to produce 
the right result; there are certain matters that the law cannot resolve.  Aristotle considers 
justice to be of two sources: man-made, and from nature.   The principles of nature, he 
says, are the same everywhere, but the principles of man-made law may differ.146   
St. Thomas Aquinas also conceived of justice as consisting of distinct but related 
concepts: a universal law, a natural law that derives from the eternal law, and human 
                                                 
144 W. L. Twining, Alternative to What? Theories of Litigation, Procedure and Dispute Settlement in 
Anglo-American Jurisprudence: Some Neglected Classics, 56 MOD. L. REV. 380, 380 (1993). 
145 R. C. SOLOMON & M. C. MURPHY, WHAT IS JUSTICE?: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 
READINGS 17-60 (1990).  
146 ARISTOTLE & H. APOSTLE (Trans.), THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 91-92 (1980). 
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law. St. Thomas qualified the human law as being right or just only if it is consistent 
with natural law.147  St. Thomas also contemplated the need for changes in human law 
but explained that changes would be expected as man was able to evolve (in a sense), or 
move closer to perfection.148  
Legal theorists often ascribe the beginnings of modern legal theory to Bentham's2 
writings. Bentham, "England's most famous jurist,"149 was a prolific critic and reformer. 
His grand design, allegedly, was to implement a complete reform of the entire British 
legal system.  His theory, based on utility, was intended to provide cheap, accessible 
justice. Bentham’s work was a great influence on later thinkers. One of these was Karl 
Llewellyn (1893-1962) who added significant developments to legal theory.  Llewellyn 
observed that there were three major categories of problems that confronted society.  
One problem was dealing with disputes, one was creating a system that coordinated 
activity and minimized disputes, and the third problem was, when a novel situation 
arose, deciding who had the responsibility (or authority) to choose or create a solution 
and determine how to implement it?150  
Llewellyn’s theoretical contributions, often referred to as law-jobs theory, is 
particularly relevant to ADR because dispute prevention and dispute resolution form the 
core of a general, sociological theory of the legal system and, more broadly, the 
                                                 
147 AQUINAS, THOMAS (SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS), JEFFREY HAUSE (ed.) & ROBERT 
PASNAU (ed.), BASIC WORKS, 624-630 (2014). 
148 Id. at 669-674.  
149 Twining, supra note 144, at 383. 
150 K. N. LLEWELLYN & F. F. SCHAUER, THE THEORY OF RULES 63 (2011).  
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functions of government. A brief explanation of this theory is that all individuals belong 
to groups. At first, the family, and then, later, a work group, etc. And, of course, a very 
important group, the state. There is, in any group, an implicit social agreement: certain 
requirements, including rules that are designed to organize and control the behavior of 
its members. Well-developed rules will prevent unnecessary conflict and will specify the 
resolution of conflict when it does occur. The rules for the resolution of conflict, 
moreover, have several goals. The first is to resolve any disputes in such a way as to 
minimize disruption and preserve the cohesiveness and functioning of the group. 
Another goal is the rules must be able to accommodate change. Behavior and 
expectations of the members may have to be altered to align with the new circumstances. 
A third goal is that of creating and regulating the decision-making process, including the 
authority figures and procedures. Last, the rules must provide a way of developing 
techniques, skills, and other practical concerns that are necessary for implementing all of 
these goals. This last one is termed the job of juristic method.151  
There are several important characteristics of Llewellyn's theory. The first one is 
the applicability to all groups, from two to millions of members and from primitive 
societies to the vastly complex. Another important point is that his theory obviates the 
need for a narrow definition of law. Small groups, institutions, and all forms of 
organized human activity share these attributes regardless of whether a label of "legal" is 
applied. This is particularly relevant to ADR since ADR extends across the boundaries 
                                                 
151 Twining, supra note 144, at 383. 
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of what is usually considered as the traditional legal system. A third point is that the law-
jobs system of rules is a requirement for group longevity and accomplishment of group 
objectives. These rules may or may not be highly formal or institutionalized, but the 
system must operate with some degree of effectiveness for the group to survive. The last 
characteristic of note is that the theory is contextual. Any component must be viewed in 
relationship to the whole. The broad view is the key, and it would be a mistake to focus 
on one aspect without considering its place in the overall scheme.152 This, too, is 
especially relevant to the current legal system and ADR. Many disputes never reach the 
legal system or any formal ADR process, and most of those that do are resolved without 
resort to trial. ADR must be viewed in relationship to the entire dispute resolution 
process -- not just with respect to traditional litigation. 
Llewellyn's law-jobs and other theoretical work has been the foundation for 
others in the field. One of these later theorists, Mirjan Damaska, advanced Llewellyn's 
ideas in several important ways. Damaska adopts a relatively abstract view--a detached 
observer--of legal theory. He subdivides his theory into three parts with each part 
consisting of a polar model.153 These three parts form the framework of analysis: 
 System of government, 
 Structure of state authority, 
 System of procedures.  
 
The first part, system of government, addresses the theoretical roles of 
government. At one polar extreme, the managerial state, government's role is to manage 
                                                 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 389-390. 
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all of the important aspects of social life. At the other extreme lies the reactive state, in 
which the role of government is limited to providing just the framework within which 
the citizens interact. These extremes parallel comparative economics: a command 
economy versus a free market or laissez-faire economy. 
The second part, structures of state authority, have the polar extremes of 
hierarchical authority versus co-ordinate authority. The hierarchical model is a rigid, 
bureaucratic system with professionals who make decisions based on precisely defined 
standards. This model calls to mind a tightly-controlled military organization that runs 
by standard operating procedure, and everything requires a particular form. The other 
extreme is a system with amorphous standards rather than rigid ones. Instead of 
hierarchical authority its members are expected to participate in the system even though 
they may be lay people without formal training or specialized knowledge. The authority 
is shared. It is a horizontal or single level system. Twining notes that this contrast 
comports well with the difference between the English jury system of lay citizens 
compared to the European system of all adjudicatory decisions made by a hierarchical 
system of judges and official personnel. 
The third part, the systems of procedure, contains the polar models of 
inquisitorial versus adversarial modes. He distinguishes these concepts from the 
common usage of these terms, however. In his system, these two modes are not different 
means to the same end -- they are means with different goals. The inquisitorial mode has 
the goal of solving a problem by implementing government policy. The adversarial 
mode is to resolve a particular dispute between specific, identifiable citizens. 
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Although Damaska creates a theory using these three polar parts, his emphasis is 
not on choosing which polar models to adopt. Instead, consistent with the notion that an 
entire system must be viewed as a whole, the three polar systems provide a framework 
of analysis -- they are ideal types in a sense, but not necessarily ideal choices. The ideal 
choice, ideal in the sense of best choice for a society, will be some mix of the polar 
extremes, but a mix that, when viewed as an overall system, is optimal for that society. 
Although there is a multitude of possible mixes, the best mix for conflict resolution, and 
by extension ADR, will probably be a system of coordinate authority in a reactive state 
with adversarial procedures.154    
A discussion of legal theory would not be satisfactory unless it included some of 
the observations made regarding primitive societies. It has already been noted that the 
social and cultural anthropology aspects of legal theory are important sources. 
Admittedly, there are competing points of view as to whether primitive societies can be 
analogous to modern ones. Richard Posner supports the claim that an understanding of 
primitive and archaic societies can add to our knowledge.155  Posner's approach is that of 
economic analysis, but his perspective is broad enough to incorporate non-market and 
social matters in general. Posner's goal in looking at primitive systems is to determine 
whether social efficiency and wealth can be used as the basis of analyzing these cultural 
systems. His theoretical framework largely rests on the information and insurance 
                                                 
154 Id. at 391. 
155 Posner, supra note 55, at 1-3. 
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aspects of primitive societies. He also examines in detail certain aspects of the legal 
system (property, marriage and family law, etc.) in terms of economic incentives. 
Included in this analysis, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, are 
considerations of disputes and the way that primitive societies resolve disputes.156  
The most important characteristic of primitive societies -- the one which Posner 
addresses first, is information. Posner uses several different terms relating to 
information, but this discussion will treat the matter in a more general fashion. 
Information in primitive societies is different from information in modern ones. For one 
thing, there is a lack of technical or scientific information. The cause of illness or 
disease, for example, may be blamed on witchcraft or other supernatural forces. Another 
difference is that information is limited, in most situations, to oral communication and 
memory. Posner notes that government bureaucracy and other aspects of more complex 
societies (even ancient ones, such as the Egyptians) is absent. The other important 
difference in the information of primitive societies is that there is little or no privacy. 
Closely shared living space, group community activities, and the lack of privacy in 
general means that there are few secrets. The result is that there are no intellectual 
property rights, and that each person's deeds and behaviors are common knowledge 
throughout the community.157  
Overall, primitive societies have a broad base of shared information about each 
of its members, but there are high information costs associated with any other type of 
                                                 
156 Id at 28-32. 
157 Id at 5-8. 
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information. Typical attributes of these societies, then, include weak government (as 
modern mankind would view it). The family/kin/village relationships substitute for 
government: forming and enforcing the rights and duties of each member. Production is 
quite limited, and is usually confined to a primary food source which is perishable. Since 
technical and scientific knowledge is practically nonexistent and there is no intellectual 
property, the specialization of labor is also limited. Along with limited production of 
perishable food, there are few markets in the ordinary sense, and few opportunities to 
trade.158  
From these aspects Posner derives a few guiding principles. One of these is the 
need for insurance, or protection from a failure in production. The insurance motive is 
the reason underlying many of the "legal" features of primitive societies. Gift giving, for 
example, is one way of purchasing insurance (Posner notes it is an effective method of 
smoothing consumption as well as providing redistribution). Gift giving supplants the 
usual sort of trading of more developed societies. Gift giving ensures6 that, in lean times, 
the individual can expect to receive gifts as a form of reciprocity or insurance. This 
feature is so vital to these societies that gift giving rises to the level of duty in many 
respects. Pozner points out that, in at least some societies, a wealthy member who 
refuses to redistribute his wealth by gift giving may face severe penalties -- even 
death.159  With limited trading opportunities and perishable wealth, it makes sense to 
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give away the production you don't need -- the opportunity cost is nil, and the benefit is 
insurance for rainy days.  
Gift giving is largely confined to one's kin or group, since these are the reliable 
sources of reciprocal gifts if the need arises. Exceptions are notable -- a gift (the bride 
price) for a wife, for example. Since most societies prefer matrimonial links outside of 
the closest kin, many brides come from a neighboring village. Those gifts/bride prices, 
stand out as the most significant exchanges of wealth outside of the usual gift giving 
within one's own group. On the matter of brides, Posner observes that a woman 
(childbearing age, one assumes) is a capital good. She performs services, is often a 
significant provider of food (working the fields, etc.), as well as producing children 
(especially males, who serve as a retirement fund).160  
There are other facets of primitive societies that Posner examines and finds 
consistent with an insurance or other economic function, but this discussion turns now to 
the dispute and dispute resolution theory of primitive societies. Posner addresses both 
aspects of the law: rulemaking and enforcement. Rulemaking is relatively 
straightforward -- since there is no formal legislature, rules are by custom. Custom 
establishes the boundaries of behavior and the punishment for any transgression, often 
with great precision. Custom may also prescribe bride prices, gift giving, contract and 
property rights, and other necessary relationships with great specificity. In a primitive 
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society change (other than the vagaries of harvest and so forth) is rare, so there is little 
need for flexibility or room for negotiations.161  
Custom is the source of the law and dispute resolution is an integral part of its 
implementation. Observe that, without government, there is no formal separation of civil 
and criminal procedure as in modern systems. Almost all transgressions, then, are 
wrongs against individuals -- a dispute resolution matter. But each individual is a 
member of a group, and a wrong against an individual is a wrong against his group, too. 
The group, after all, has invested in their member and rely on him as an insurer. The 
group has a strong incentive to punish (deter) and/or recover the harm done. Again, the 
group (family/kin) substitutes for government. The default remedy in many cases is 
retribution. The family and kin of the wronged individual expect him to exact justice, if 
he is able, and they will be ready to assist him if he needs it. The importance of each 
group member in terms of production/insurance acts as the incentive for his group to 
demand justice.162  
These detailed characteristics of primitive societies form the basis of how these 
societies resolve disputes.  There is substantial variation in the exact nature of the 
dispute resolution process, and some form of third-party intervention is usually involved, 
even in relatively minor matters. This is consistent with the nature of the information: a 
victim would want others to know the situation before he acts to recoup his losses. 
Otherwise, he may be considered the wrong-doer. And making sure that everyone knows 
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that the victim exacted justice is the best deterrence of future misbehavior against that 
individual. The dispute resolution process also varies according to the family/kin 
relationship between the two disputants. The choice of the third party, the flexibility 
allowed to deviate from the prescribed penalty, and the need for rebuilding relationships 
are all germane to the dispute resolution.163  
Posner has extended the principles of economic analysis to the “law,” an area not 
traditionally considered to be within the realm of economics. Posner believes that the 
economic concepts of rationality and the maximization of satisfaction can be applied to 
other fields, including decisions that may have an emotional component. Posner’s view 
is that the economic analysis can be applied and the results evaluated to see if economics 
can help explain the activity.164 In developing his own norm, wealth maximization, 
Posner reviews some of the legal scholars of the past: Blackstone, who examined the 
actual operation of the legal system in England, and Bentham, Blackstone’s critic, who 
used the principle of the greatest happiness to promote his views of legal and social 
reform.  Posner's solution is a general principle of wealth maximization, which he is 
careful to distinguish from utilitarianism. Wealth maximization, he claims, is sufficient 
for an ethical norm: that of efficiency. But there is an important element that must be 
added -- the consensual basis of efficiency.165   
                                                 
163 Id. at 29. 
164 R. A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18-21 (2nd ed., 1977). 
165 R. A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 13-99 (1981). 
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The law and economics approach simplifies the problem enough so that 
economic principles can be applied to the dispute. Efficiency supplants the dual nature 
of a "just" outcome that would be prescribed by earlier theorists. Other modern thinkers 
outside of the law and economics approach have continued their concept of justice as 
being more than one concept. Posner relies on Rawls definition of justice, at least as 
expressed by Posner, as “the basic structure of society or the way that society determines 
the duties and rights of its members as well as the division of advantages from social 
Corporation,"166  but finds the dual nature of previous theorists intractable. Modern 
theorists may claim to be dealing with questions and concepts,167 but Posner stipulates 
that his standard of theory is that it must be testable.168 The current quantitative methods 
available, however, are limited. For law and economics, then, efficiency is the objective 
of litigation and, more broadly, dispute resolution.  
Before proceeding to discuss what scholars term “the basic theory of litigation,” 
a few clarifications of terminology will be noted in an attempt to avoid confusion.  
 The terms litigation, lawsuit, filing, suit, or some other indication of the start of 
legal action are considered synonymous. Shavell includes the hiring of an 
attorney in contemplation of filing litigation, for example, in his definition of 
litigation. So these terms should be understood to be loosely defined and to mean 
the filing of a lawsuit. 
 A plaintiff is the disputant who is assumed to be the wronged party, and the one 
who initiates some type of action (litigation, ADR, or settlement negotiation).  
 The defendant is the transgressor. 
 In regards to “expected,” “expected benefit,” etc., this discussion will use the 
term "expected” when risk-neutrality is assumed and "anticipated" when risk-
neutrality is not assumed.  
                                                 
166 Posner (1977), supra note 164, at vii. 
167 B. BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 4 (1996). 
168 Posner (1981), supra note 165, at 5. 
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 A benefit is the value, or payment, or award bestowed by trial or the dispute 
resolution process.   
 Settlement (or settle) will mean the result of negotiations between disputants 
without the involvement of third-parties (usually done via negotiations between 
the disputants' lawyers).  Some literature and many ADR practitioners use the 
term settlement to refer, too, to the successful result (an agreement) from ADR.  
The literature and legal practice also use settlement to refer to the benefit, or the 
amount of an award.   
 External ADR is the voluntary use of ADR by the disputants and unconnected to 
the court. It is often called private ADR, and only the disputants know the results. 
 Court-connected ADR is usually called court-annexed ADR in the literature. It is 
ADR that is mandated or somehow related to the court.  
 
Shavell’s works are the most comprehensive body of theory on litigation and 
ADR to date.169  Shavell uses three stages in his basic theory of litigation: 
 The decision to litigate, 
 The decision to settle, 
 Trial. 
 
The first stage, the decision to start litigation, (Shavell uses the term suit) is 
defined in general terms. It may be considered as the initiation of a lawsuit by filing (the 
filing of a lawsuit with a court) or some other action that involves a cost. The decision 
by the disputant is made on a cost-benefit basis: the benefits must outweigh the costs.170 
In general, the benefit is usually considered to be an expected benefit, and risk neutrality 
is assumed.  
The second stage, the decision to settle, also uses a cost-benefit analysis. The key 
to the settlement decision is that some costs can be avoided: namely, the cost of trial. 
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Note that the settlement decision varies from the litigation decision in a significant way. 
The settlement decision requires that both disputants determine a net benefit as 
compared with the outcome from trial.  The third step, of course, is trial. It is the default 
result: the "stick" that drives the settlement decision.  
Shavell notes four fundamental factors that must be considered in the litigation 
decision:171  
 Risk aversion -- as the risk aversion increases, the more likely a decision to 
litigate will be made. 
 The probability of winning -- as the probability of winning the lawsuit increases 
the probability of litigation also increases. 
 The cost of litigation -- the probability of litigation is inversely related to the cost 
of litigation. 
 The size (amount) of the award (benefit) is positively related to the probability of 
litigation. 
 
Each factor will be addressed, starting with cost. The cost of trial (really, the cost 
of continuing the litigation) that is avoidable by settling becomes the litigation cost that 
is relevant for the settlement decision. Costs already incurred (sunk costs), however 
substantial, are not pertinent to the decision to settle. The fundamental condition for 
settlement incorporates the costs and benefits for both disputants. The decision rule can 
be expressed as follows: if the plaintiff’s minimum acceptable amount is less than the 
defendant’s maximum acceptable amount, a mutually beneficial settlement is possible.172  
The minimum acceptable amount for the plaintiff is his expected benefit from trial less 
the costs of litigation that can be avoided. Likewise for the defendant. Thus, any figure 
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between the two amounts would be preferred by both disputants. The sum of the 
avoidable costs becomes an important factor in settlement negotiations, then, since 
settlement is feasible only if the difference between the disputants' expectations of a trial 
award is less than their avoidable costs.  
The basic theory described so far assumes risk neutrality, fixed (or exogenous) 
costs, and some estimate by each disputant of the probability of an award after trial and 
an estimate of that award. If the assumption of risk neutrality and fixed cost (assumed to 
be known) are true, and the estimates of the probabilities of an award and the amount of 
the award are the same for both litigants, then the result is straightforward. All disputes 
would settle and there would be no trials. The disputants would always choose to avoid 
the costs of litigation. An example of this is a situation involving no factual dispute, 
strict liability on the part of the defendant, and an award that is prescribed. A defective 
product, for instance -- litigation is rarely instituted. The seller (or manufacture) of the 
product refunds the purchase price to the disappointed buyer. These types of disputes 
arise but seldom reach the point where a lawsuit is filed or an attorney is consulted. In 
this sense, the existence of a legal system with well-defined rights serves as an incentive 
for disputants to settle their disputes early and at low cost. For such simple disputes, the 
system provides a broad benefit to society and the economic system as a whole.  
Cost is an important consideration, but instead of assuming that costs are 
immutable, each disputant can be allowed to control at least a portion of the litigation 
expense. Shavell notes the disputants' decision as to how much to spend on litigation 
depends on the relationship between spending and the anticipated return from settlement 
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or trial (or the loss for the defendant). Although each disputant makes his own decision 
about expenses, the impact of the spending will depend, too, on the spending of the other 
disputant, so that spending may resemble a contest, of sorts, of who spends more. 
Most commentators use the cost word in broad terms, although they are usually 
much more specific when they address the different types of costs involved in dispute 
resolution. Posner, however, divides cost into two components: direct costs and error 
costs.  Posner's direct costs are equivalent to the out-of-pocket legal and court fees. 
Posner's other cost, the error costs, is “the social costs generated when a judicial system 
fails to carry out the allocation or other social function assigned to it”.173 This means that 
any deviation from the correct value (risk) is a type of cost for Posner. Since his aim is 
the application of economic principles to law, this simplifies the analysis. Instead of 
having to treat risk as a separate item, it can be viewed as a type of cost, just like out-of-
pocket expenses and opportunity costs are treated. Posner's point is noted: risk can be 
converted into a cost.  
As noted, a dispute will proceed through the litigation process only in the event 
that the disputants differ somehow in their beliefs. Most scholars, when discussing 
theory, do not offer detailed explanations for a difference in beliefs, but there is some 
work on the nature of this difference. Two relevant theories are asymmetric information 
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(AI) and divergent expectations (DE).174  The DE theory proposes that each disputant 
estimates the probability of award, but the estimate is not accurate because of error (error 
as in risk). One way to conceptualize this is that each disputant takes a random draw 
from a known distribution. Accordingly, about half of these draws result in a plaintiff's 
estimate being less than a defendant's estimate, and these disputes are the ones that are 
settled quickly -- perhaps before litigation is formally started. In a fraction of the 
remaining cases, those in which the plaintiff's estimate is greater than the defendants, the 
estimates are relatively close. Close enough that the difference between the values is less 
than the sum of the litigation expense. These, too, will settle. This leaves the rest of the 
draws: the plaintiff's estimate is significantly more than the defendant’s. It is these draws 
that are litigated.175 
A second theory for the difference in disputants' estimates is the asymmetric 
information theory. In AI, one of the disputants has better information than the other. 
The key is obvious: the results depend on which party is better informed. If the dispute 
goes to trial, the better-informed party will win, and in settlement negotiations the better-
informed party will get the better bargain.176  
There are several extensions to the basic theory that scholars have noted.  A 
nuisance lawsuit is one of the extensions to the basic theory. A nuisance suit is defined 
                                                 
174 J. Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 
No 6409, NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 1 (1998), available at 
http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6409. 
175 Id. at 3-5. 
176 Id. at 5-6. 
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as one with a negative anticipated value: the cost is greater than the award.177  Kaplow 
and Shavell point out that if the social incentives are taken into account, some nuisance 
lawsuits may be desirable. These would be instances where the benefit to the plaintiff is 
relatively small but the social benefit (changing the defendant’s behavior in a socially 
desirable way) may be substantial. This has already been discussed. The primary 
concern, however, is why nuisance suits are filed. There are three possible reasons 
according to Kaplow and Shavell. The first explanation is that of asymmetry of 
information. Another reason for nuisance suits is that a plaintiff may have low costs and 
the defendant has high costs, which is the scenario outlined in the construction situation 
earlier noted. Another reason is that the cost of litigation is spread out over time, and, as 
the suit progresses, the anticipated awards are likely to be greater than the additional 
costs of continuing the suit.178  
Discovery, or the disclosure of information to the other disputant is an aspect of 
the asymmetry of information and is discussed in the literature section. Kaplow and 
Shavell say that discovery has the general effect of increasing settlement and reducing 
trial. This is the common belief in the legal community, and it is one of the purposes of 
discovery (as already noted).  They observe that there may be a voluntary sharing of 
information which would render compulsory discovery unnecessary. They also note that 
                                                 
177 L. Kaplow & S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, No 6960, NBER Working Papers, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 52-53 (1999) available at 
http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6960. 
178 Id. 
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discovery can be abused -- it may be used strategically, as they put it, because it allows 
one disputant to increase the litigation costs of the other disputant.179 
Scholars do not go into great depth as to why discovery increases settlement 
beyond the increased sharing of information (and reducing the asymmetry of 
information). Since the asymmetry of information is one reason disputants do not settle, 
discovery should bring the disputants’ estimates closer together. The same logic is often 
used as a justification of mediation -- it brings the parties' knowledge and expectations in 
alignment with reality. Discovery has evolved quite a bit over the years, but the basic 
rules of civil procedure, the rules that encompass discovery, were one of the reforms 
prompted by Roscoe Pound's 1906 speech.  
Texas ADR Theory 
The criteria for a theory for Texas ADR must be established. The following 
criteria will be adopted: 
 The theory should be broad enough to include all relevant decision-making and 
the data to be analyzed. 
 The theory should be as simple as possible. 
 The theory should be consistent with current theoretical work. 
 The theory should be consistent with how ADR is practiced in Texas. 
 
The first criteria is necessary because of completeness concerns. It must be 
comprehensive enough to include all the major aspects of the process that are needed to 
understand the whole. This is in keeping with the theoretical foundations that each part 
of a legal system should be viewed in context and how that part relates to the overall 
                                                 
179 Id. at 55-57. 
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framework (consistent with the framework of analysis established by Damaska).  For 
Texas ADR, the full range of decisions includes the decisions/legislation by the state 
regarding ADR plus the decisions of the individual disputants.  Individuals may decide 
not to pursue redress (do nothing), to settle, to use ADR to resolve the dispute, or to go 
to trial. A theory should be broad enough to cover all alternatives. 
The second and third criteria are consistent with the general scientific method: 
advancement in incremental steps. The third criterion is especially appropriate for a 
study that is an initial or early analysis of novel data -- established or conventional 
theory should be used.  The third criterion is also consistent with the limited scope of 
this research. The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the data supports the 
claim (or assumption) that ADR relieves court congestion. Since this claim is widely 
shared, the prevailing thought should be used unless there is a compelling reason to do 
otherwise.  
The fourth criterion is similar to the first. It may appear superfluous, but the first 
criterion is concerned with scope, and the fourth is concerned with practicum and 
procedure.  The decision-making is done within the framework that has been created, 
either by the state, professional practice, or otherwise.   
A reminder, at this point is that the broad topic of this research is ADR, but the 
reality is that in Texas, and in many other jurisdictions, the dominate form of ADR is 
mediation. As noted at the beginning of this research, the characteristics of mediation are 
the ones that are most relevant even though other ADR processes may be used.  
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A review of the advantages of mediation is that disputants’ advantages are: 1) 
lower cost, 2) less delay, 3) greater control of the outcome, and 4) better relationships.  
The state’s advantages are: 1) less court congestion, 2) reduction in court system costs, 
3) better access to justice, and 4) better quality of justice. Starting at the top of the list 
and working down, the first advantage is cost. Cost has been discussed extensively and 
is, clearly, a major factor in the individual's choice of litigation, ADR, settlement, or no 
action.  The plaintiff, will make his choice based on a cost-benefit analysis.  Texas ADR 
theory will continue this basic assumption but will assume that costs are independent of 
the gross benefit (the award, either from trial, settlement, or ADR) to simplify the 
analysis.  
Delay is usually noted as a factor separate from the others, although it could be 
considered as just another type of cost. Texas ADR theory will accept, for simplification, 
that delay can be aggregated with other costs.  Delay, though, can also be viewed as 
relating to satisfaction and justice. This concept is concisely summarized by the familiar 
quotation “Justice delayed, is justice denied."180  Some length of time is always required 
by dispute resolution processes -- the idea of delay as an important factor would be 
better described as excessive delay.  It is recognized that delay can be one of the tactical 
activities which disputants may use to gain an advantage (real or not) in the dispute 
resolution process, or to exact some sort of external benefit (external in terms of external 
to the issue of the dispute).  The notion of excessive delay carries with it a connotation 
                                                 
180 Commonly attributed to William Gladstone. 
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of the abuse of the process or a fault of the process (if delay is due to other reasons such 
as court congestion).  But excessive delay is difficult to measure because that would 
entail determining when the dispute is ready (should be ready) for trial, settlement, or the 
actual ADR session. The length of time from that point to the start of the process is the 
unnecessary delay. However, litigation and ADR studies typically use the length of time 
of filing to the time that the trial or other process formally begins, however misleading 
this may be.  So the extent of excessive delay remains anecdotal and questionable.  Note 
that caseload management, which has been widely adopted by the courts, is usually 
considered to be effective in preventing undue delay.181 
Control is the power of the disputants to affect the process and determine the 
nature as well as the amount of the award.  Control may be very important to disputants, 
especially for non-economic issues (child custody), matters that disputants consider 
confidential, and other concerns, depending on the nature of the dispute.  Control is a 
factor that is not addressed in detail by any theorists.  It is, however, emphasized in 
much of the ADR literature.  Although Shavell’s theory is that disputants should have 
the incentive to be precise and cautious in crafting their agreements, but that is 
impossible in many disputes.  The remedy sought cannot be negotiated ex ante.  Texas 
ADR theory accepts that the control that accompanies mediation (and, to a certain 
                                                 
181 Delay is often confused with undue delay.  See D. Steelman, What Have We Learned About Court 
Delay, "Local Legal Culture," and Caseflow Management Since the Late 1970s?, 19 JUSTICE SYSTEM 
J. 145 (1997). 
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extent, other ADR processes) can be of significant value.  The more control that a 
disputant has, then, the more likely that the disputant will prefer that forum/process.  
The next factor is the issue of ongoing relationships. Posner's discussion of 
primitive societies noted that the dispute resolution process may be flexible yet complex 
with disputants who are closely related.  This makes sense because the smaller the 
group, the more important each person's contributions are to that group in relative terms. 
Peachey notes that the closeness or relationship between disputants affected the injured 
party's view of the appropriate punishment.182  Bush and Folgers explain that 
transformation mediation can strengthen damaged relationships: the goal of improving 
that relationship as a means of improving the functioning of the group is, by definition, a 
social incentive.  Texas ADR theory acknowledges this as an important factor and 
assumes that disputes which involve ongoing relationships will be drawn to mediation 
instead of litigation. 
The first two advantages to the state are linked.  Court congestion and judicial 
system funding are two sides of the same coin.  Reducing the number of court cases also 
reduces the number of courts that have to be provided by the state.  Court congestion 
also relates to the satisfaction/justice issue.  Disputants who use the court system are 
more likely to be satisfied and feel that the procedural justice was fair if they perceive 
                                                 
182 D. Peachey, What People Want from Mediation, 300, 308 in KRESSEL, K.  & PRUITT, D, 
MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY 
INTERVENTION (1989). 
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that the court was attentive.  The more congested the court, the less attention that can be 
devoted to individual disputants.  
The last two advantages to the state concern justice. Justice is an ephemeral 
concept for policymakers. Most commentators and theorists consider two types of 
justice: the process and the result.  Procedural justice relates to whether the disputant 
gets a “fair” treatment.  The issue is whether ADR results in a “fair” process as 
compared to the traditional litigation system.  It can work both ways, however, 
depending on the situation.  Given the strictures of trial, some disputants may view that 
process as the most fair, especially if they view the other disputant as having excessive 
power.  Conversely, the flexibility available with mediation may be viewed as more fair 
than trial because certain matters could be raised in mediation that would could not be 
introduced at trial.   
The other prong of justice is the outcome.  Was the result “correct?”  Recall that 
Pound was concerned that all parties acquiesce in the decision – fairness of the 
result.  Unfortunately, justice, like satisfaction, depends on the point of view.  There are 
some disputes that are difficult to resolve.  The access to justice and the quality of justice 
are similar to the traditional bifurcation of process and result.  Quality of justice may be 
synonymous with the outcome or result. Access to justice, though, concerns the ability 
of individuals to avail themselves of court services.   
Access to justice can be seen as a cost issue rather than a process issue.  Lower 
income and less sophisticated disputants are assumed to be under-served by the court 
system because of the legal fees and court fees.  This was a concern in Pound’s speech in 
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1906, and the small claims court movement was started as a reform to address these 
problems. The issue continues, however, and some critics have charged that small claims 
court makes it easier (cheap and faster) for the powerful to press their claims against 
lower income and unsophisticated defendants.  Since mediation does not require an 
attorney (and, if a disputant hires one, legal fees should be much lower than for 
traditional litigation), and scheduling is much more flexible that in a court, the 
assumption is that mediation will significantly improve access to justice. 
The model for Texas ADR for purposes of this research varies from Shavell's 
models in some respect. Shavell has three models: the basic one without ADR, one with 
voluntary ADR, and one with mandatory ADR. His purpose is to show how the 
incentives for the disputants and the incentives for the state varied. This research is more 
limited, and a single model is needed. The model for Texas ADR is shown, below, in 
figure 1. 
no action drop 
Event 
(injury) 
file (litigate) trial 
settle settle 
ADR (successful) ADR 
FIGURE 1: MODEL OF TEXAS ADR/MEDIATION 
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This model differs in that the plaintiffs now have four alternatives: no legal 
action, settling, ADR, and filing (traditional litigation). This set of choices is necessary 
to exhaustively explain plaintiffs' behavior. The assumption remains that unsuccessful 
ADR cases may eventually be filed, but many disputes will reach resolution and avoid 
the courts, at least according to the theory. 
The model captures, in a comprehensive manner, all of the possible outcomes. If 
the dispute is dropped, the implication is that no action is taken by the injured party 
because there is a negative net benefit from settling, ADR, or filing: the loss-minimizing 
action is to do nothing.  The second result is a settlement – an agreement by the 
disputants. The defective product dispute mentioned earlier is a simple example, or a 
situation where the defendant has better information and knows that the correct award is 
higher than the plaintiff's demand. Settlement also will occur if the total cost exceeds the 
difference between the disputants' anticipated awards, as discussed earlier. Settlement 
can occur at any time: before or after filing. 
The third outcome is ADR resolution: an award that results from ADR. (Note 
that this is often called a settlement in the literature.)  There is the possibility that the 
award becomes zero, especially in the case of transformative mediation. Or, if the award 
is non-monetary, as may be the case with child custody, a custody sharing agreement 
may be the result. Again, this outcome may occur before or after filing. It may be 
external ADR or court connected. 
The last outcome is trial. This result describes only a small percentage of 
disputes, but it is the award against which all the other results are compared.  
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The impact of ADR as a substitute service, then, is to divert disputes. ADR is 
cheaper than court, so the disputants use ADR rather than filing. ADR may also divert 
some disputes from being dropped or settled in the traditional way, but this would 
require that one of the advantages of ADR is worth the extra cost of ADR.  ADR is the 
better service in the market for dispute resolution.  
It is reasonable that the general theory that has been discussed applies to Texas 
ADR. There remains one issue, though, of how ADR has been implemented in the Lone 
Star State. Using Damaska's basic framework, Texas's legal system is primarily a 
reactive state with an emphasis on co-ordinate authority. This helps to explain the way 
that Texas adopted ADR.  Although the state court system uses the typical hierarchical 
structure of trial and appellate courts, courts in Texas have elected judges, bifurcated 
appeals for criminal and civil disputes, and several courts of limited jurisdiction, such as 
probate courts. The overlap of the lower-level courts is controlled, but the point is that 
while the courts are bureaucratic/professional, there is a substantial degree of horizontal 
authority, including a strong emphasis on the jury system. Texas is reactive in that the 
framework is established, but much of the responsibility of management is left in lower 
levels of the court structure. 
The implementation of ADR in Texas followed these principles. Instead of a 
state wide mandate, it was a statewide acknowledgment: the legislature extended the 
authority to the individual counties to establish dispute resolution programs by using 
court filing fees (essentially, public funds). Note that some counties, through local bars 
and community leaders, had already created dispute resolution centers. After public 
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funding became available in 1983, several additional counties created ADR programs, 
but on their own time schedule. 
The comprehensive 1987 legislation also fell far short of mandating ADR – but it 
recognized its authority. The 1987 statute is best characterized as a reactive state action 
since it establishes assurances that, if the dispute resolution process met certain 
standards, the participants were assured that the outcome would be honored statewide 
and given full legal effect. 
At this point the structure of state authority must be considered. The structure of 
state authority relates to how Texas has implemented ADR – the fourth criterion. The 
adoption of ADR was piecemeal, county by county, and gradual. Adoption was 
piecemeal in that it was not homogenous statewide. Different counties established 
dispute resolution centers at different times – starting in 1980 and continuing thereafter. 
This research assumes that the creation of dispute resolution centers by a county reflects 
the growth of ADR in that county, if only because of the availability of an organized 
ADR provider. 
In addition to being piecemeal, the adoption was gradual. Few in the legal 
profession knew much about mediation in 1980, and the general public – the pool of 
actual and potential disputants – knew even less. There was a learning curve, much like 
that of the introduction of a new product or service in the market. In some counties the 
learning curve might have been steeper than in others. The nature of the learning curve 
probably depended on the general knowledge and awareness in the legal profession as 
well as the presence or absence of a dispute resolution center. A reasonable conclusion, 
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therefore, is that there was a period of time during which more and more disputants 
became informed about ADR – and started to consider its use as a substitute for 
traditional litigation. The data analysis must incorporate this practical consideration. 
This is reasonable: as awareness and knowledge of ADR grew, the choices made by 
disputants changed, and ADR use developed. After a sufficient period of time, it is also 
reasonable to assume that a relatively stable level was reached: a mature market for 
dispute resolution services. This pattern of change in the filings and dispositions over 
time should reflect a shift to a new, stable level of litigation, but a stable level of filings 
that is less than the level before ADR. 
Since the assumption is that ADR spread to different counties at different times, 
the counties that were slow to adopt ADR and counties that never did adopt ADR to a 
significant degree will serve as controls. In these counties the pattern will be delayed 
and/or slowed if the counties were late or weak in their embrace of ADR. For counties 
that never did adopt ADR to any significant degree, the pattern should be weak or 
nonexistent.  
One more implementation consideration is appropriate. So far this discussion has 
treated the disputes generically. But the data is organized by categories of disputes. Each 
of these categories of dispute varies in terms of how well the disputes fit with the 
advantages of ADR. In looking at the particular categories in Texas, one can see that 
there are three general types of dispute categories, at least in terms of mediation/ADR 
characteristics. As discussed in the data, two categories were removed from 
consideration because of changes in the law. Workers compensation disputes and 
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URESA disputes were deleted from the data to be analyzed. The remaining categories 
are: 
 personal injury, auto 
 personal injuries, non-auto 
 tax 
 condemnation 
 accounts, contracts, notes 
 divorce 
 family 
 other disputes  
 
The first two categories are personal injury -- often referred to as torts. One 
major characteristic of this category is that, in most of these disputes, it is reasonable to 
assume that at least one of the parties is, or is represented by, an insurance company. 
Insurance companies are repeat players in that they are engaged in multiple disputes over 
time and at the same time. Insurance companies have a high level of sophistication, their 
cost structure (litigation cost) is different as compared to an individual disputant, and the 
incentives and cost-benefit analysis are different. The cost advantages of ADR should 
become well-known to insurance companies, but the marginal cost of litigating one more 
(or less) dispute may be quite small. Although the marginal cost may be relatively small 
due to the volume of disputes (economies of scale), the cost-benefit analysis of one 
particular dispute may be based on an average cost rather than the marginal cost. It is 
likely that, for ordinary disputes, there is a range of settlement values that have been 
established by the insurance company's overall experience.  
The incentives for settlement may be more or less flexible than the incentives for 
an individual disputant, depending on the settlement practices. The insurance company's 
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additional concerns are relevant, too: strategic concerns about its reputation in the legal 
field as to how it deals with litigation. An insurance company may be an aggressive 
litigator in order to deter frivolous or nuisance lawsuits. It may be a tough negotiator 
when it comes to settlement offers because the insurance company knows the 
distribution of the awards. 
Risk for an insurance company is also an issue. The risk associated with one 
dispute will be a factor, but the risk profile of insurance companies is likely to be much 
less risk-averse than the plaintiff's if the plaintiff is a one-shot player with a relatively 
large benefit/loss that depends on the outcome of the particular dispute. Delay may also 
be less of a factor for insurance companies than for individual plaintiffs. A delay in 
paying an award in a particular dispute may be preferred by an insurance company and 
dreaded by a cash-strapped individual.  The information asymmetry between insurance 
companies and individual plaintiffs may be pronounced. The insurance company is 
likely to have much better information about some matters (procedural, anticipated 
award amounts, etc.), so it makes sense that advertising by attorneys ("Have you been 
involved in an accident? Then call...") is a reference to this asymmetry of information. 
An experienced plaintiff's attorney may reduce the asymmetry, but it may not eliminate 
it. Overall, the incentives for insurance companies to make a settlement offer or 
participate in ADR are real, but the incentives may not be strong ones. Even so, 
settlement negotiations or ADR are viable options either before filing or after for 
insurance companies.  They may be quick to offer a settlement once they receive notice 
of a claim. 
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For tax and condemnation disputes, the plaintiff will be a government entity, a 
sophisticated repeat player. The observations made of insurance companies are also 
applicable to government entities. Delay in tax and condemnation disputes may be more 
important to the repeat player than in personal injury disputes, however. Delay may be 
restricted to some degree because of statutory provisions or other government policies 
that relate to the length of time allowed to resolve the tax or condemnation dispute. For 
these disputes, then, one might expect delay to be preferred by the individuals/defendant. 
For one thing, tax disputes may involve an individual or business with limited resources 
with which to pay the award. Default judgments, too, may be more common outcomes. 
Another outcome that is likely for tax disputes is some sort of settlement or agreed 
judgment if the defendant is able to negotiate a payment schedule. Condemnation, on the 
other hand, is indivisible in the sense that the transfer of property cannot be spread over 
time. In both types of disputes, settlement or ADR resolution is feasible before the 
dispute is filed: ADR as an alternative should have an impact on the number of disputes 
filed. 
The next main category, accounts, contracts, notes, (CAN) is the most distinctive 
category. The contractual nature of the dispute is an important consideration. The terms 
will tend to be very detailed. The remedy for any transgression (breach of the agreement) 
is usually quite specific: the magnitude of the award is known. The risk of collection, 
even if there is secured property, may be an incentive for some negotiation flexibility in 
settlement negotiations or ADR. In many instances the CAN disputes involve disputants 
who may have an ongoing relationship: vendor/buyer, landlord/tenant, creditor/debtor, 
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etc. Since one of the advantages of mediation is the improvement of an ongoing 
relationship, ADR should be an attractive alternative to many disputants. 
Divorce and family law matters also have certain characteristics. First, most of 
the disputes are ones which cannot be resolved without filing and some sort of judgment 
(agreed or final). There are no privately obtained divorces or adoptions. This means that 
ADR should not have an impact on the filings. Any impact will be limited to whether 
there are more agreed judgments -- whether ADR has diverted final judgments (trials) to 
ADR resolution (agreed judgments). These categories, too, are likely to involve ongoing 
relationships such as shared custody of children. Mediation of divorce and family law 
disputes comprises a significant portion of mediation cases; a lot of ADR activity 
reported by the dispute resolution centers is in these categories. 
The last category is "Other." It is a catch-all category. The exact nature of many 
of these disputes is not public information because the records are "sealed" by the court: 
the records are inaccessible to anyone except the parties and lawyers involved. The 
reason is that many of these disputes involve things like involuntary confinement, 
commitment to an institution, employment matters that deal with sensitive information, 
etc. The important point is that, like divorce and family, ADR does not divert any 
significant number of these disputes before filing, and, contrary to divorce and family 
law, there may be little diversion to agreed judgment that can be expected after filing. 
To summarize, ADR should have different effects on the dispute categories. The 
anticipated impact of mediation/ADR is listed in Table 4, below. 
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TABLE 4: IMPACT OF MEDIATION BY CATEGORY OF DISPUTE 
 
CATEGORY OF DISPUTE IMPACT OF MEDIATION/ADR 
CAN (accounts, contracts, notes) High Impact - decrease NCF (filings per capita) 
High Impact - increase Agreed Judgments 
High Impact - decrease Final Judgments 
High Impact - decrease Default and Dismissed 
MA (mediation amenable disputes) Moderate Impact - decrease NCF (filings per capita) 
Moderate Impact - increase Agreed Judgments 
Moderate Impact - decrease Final Judgments 
Moderate Impact - decrease Default and Dismissed 
NA (non-amenable disputes) No change in NCF (filings per capita) 
Some impact in Divorce, Agreed Judgments  
Some impact in Divorce, Final Judgments 
No change in Default and Dismissed 
 
 
Using this theoretic framework allows for the construction of expected outcomes 
of NCF and dispositions for the graphical analysis.  Detailed computation and reasoning 
is provided in the Appendix, but the expected patterns of impact are now provided.  The 
first expectation is that NCF will decrease to a lower, stable level.  Assuming that other 
factors are constant, then, a graph for a hypothetical county (Mediation County) that 
adopts mediations is presented in figure 2, below. 
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FIGURE 2: MEDIATION COUNTY, NCF PER CAPITA 
 
 
The graph of the per capita case filings with ADR shows a slight decline in the 
early 1980s, a steeper decline beginning about 1988, and then a tapering off. This 
corresponds with the assumptions of how ADR was adopted.  At some point, there will 
be a flattening out of filings: disputes that are not appropriate for mediation and 
“belong” in the court system. 
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FIGURE 3: MEDIATION COUNTY, DEFAULT & AGREED J. 
 
 
In the matter of dispositions, as more cases are diverted from trial to agreement, 
the percentage of default and agreed judgment (D&A) will increase, as shown by figure 
3, above. Corresponding to the pattern described for NCF, the increase will be slow at 
first, with a higher rate as mediation becomes more widely accepted.  After some period 
of time, the disputes that can be resolved by mediation are all diverted to D&A.  D&A 
percentages, then, plateau at a higher level than before mediation was implemented.   
For final judgments (traditional trial/adjudication), the mirror image of the D&A 
pattern should be seen.  A smaller percentage of disputes are tried as cases divert to 
D&A, as indicated by figure 4.  
 
 
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
0.2000000
0.2100000
0.2200000
0.2300000
0.2400000
0.2500000
0.2600000
0.2700000
0.2800000
MEDIATION COUNTY DEFAULT & AGREED J. %
before
after
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FIGURE 4: MEDIATION COUNTY FINAL J. 
 
The patterns, above, are for the hypothetical Mediation County for generic 
disputes, some of which can be mediated and some which will have to be adjudicated by 
traditional means.  This expected pattern will vary, though, depending on the exact 
nature of the disputes.   
 
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
0.3100000
0.3200000
0.3300000
0.3400000
0.3500000
0.3600000
0.3700000
0.3800000
0.3900000
MEDIATION COUNTY FINAL J. %
before
after
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V. METHOD 
Comparisons 
This analysis will use the published data from the Office of Court Administration 
(OCA), which is described in the data section of this paper. New case filings per capita 
will be computed from the docket data to measure new litigation.  The detailed docket 
data on dispositions will be used to compute each type of disposition as a percentage of 
total dispositions to measure the relative change in dispositions.  Four groupings of 
counties with active ADR programs and seven groupings of selected control counties 
will be constructed.  An additional control group will consist of all of the counties that 
are not selected as active counties.  The selection of active counties will be based on the 
dispute resolution center (DRC) information given in some of the reports. 
The counties with active ADR programs will be subdivided into groups by the 
level of activity and by the approximate year that the county's DRC was established. The 
OCA reports show that there are 15 counties that have consistently demonstrated a 
significant level of ADR activity based on the number of disputes handled by their 
DRCs. (Note that the 15 active counties comprise about half of the total population in 
state.) The control groups will be constructed based on population levels, and each 
control group will consist of several counties. 
The active counties and subdivisions are:183 
 15 active counties 
 Dallas & Harris Counties 
 Dallas, Harris, Bexar, and Tarrant Counties 
                                                 
183 See the Appendix for more information on the active county groups and the control county groups. 
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 Nine of the remaining counties (excluding Brazos and Collin)  
 
Since the assumption is that the spread of mediation was gradual, it may not be 
the case that a bright line can be drawn in terms of when the impact of ADR on the court 
data would be noticeable. Using the four groupings of counties (listed, above) recognizes 
that the pattern of change in the data may be discernible soon after the counties adopted 
ADR or, later, after the 1987 statute. Dallas and Harris, for example, may show an 
impact before 1987.  
The data will also be organized by the fit between ADR and the category of 
dispute. The eight specific categories will be reduced to three, broad case categories 
relating to the kind of disputes in which mediation is likely to be used -- either before or 
after filing. The first broad category is called mediation-amenable (MA) disputes. This 
includes the two personal injury categories, auto and non-auto, plus the tax and 
condemnation categories. In these four categories of dispute, mediation is likely to be an 
attractive option for disputants, and so there should be a significant diversion of disputes 
away from traditional court litigation. 
A separate category will consist of the one category of accounts, contracts, notes 
(CAN) disputes. Since the CAN disputes, by definition, involve disputants that have 
some sort of pre-existing relationship, many of these relationships may be ongoing. If so, 
mediation will be an especially attractive option for the disputants. The diversion away 
from litigation and trial should be of even greater magnitude. 
The third broad category consists of disputes that mediation will not divert before 
filing. These disputes (divorce, family, and other) are called non-amenable (NA) 
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disputes. Still, there may be diversion of disputes after filing – disputes that would go 
from trial into agreed judgments, especially for divorce disputes.  
Using the different groupings of counties and categories means that the groups 
can serve as controls for one another: mediation should affect the active groups at 
different times. The analysis will examine each group over time and compare the pattern 
or timing with other groups. Each of the broad categories of disputes -- MA, CAN, and 
NA -- can be analyzed over time and compared with one another for each county group 
and among county groups.  Table 5, below, shows the general scheme of comparison. 
 
TABLE 5: METHOD – COMPARISONS 
 
COUNTY CATEGORY ACTION 
Active groups 
Active v. control 
 
CAN 
MA 
NA 
NCF (filings) 
Dispositions: (D&A, etc.) 
 
 
 
If mediation has made an impact on court congestion, one might expect that, 
prior to 1987, the number of CAN filings (new case filings, or NCF on a per capita 
basis) was about the same in the 15 counties compared to the rest of the state. After 
1987, though, the NCF in the 15 counties should start to decrease, slowly at first and in a 
more pronounced manner as mediation spreads and diverts more and more disputes. At 
some time, the decrease should taper off as maturity sets in, but the new, stable level of 
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NCF should be lower in the 15 counties with active ADR programs. The decrease that 
should be discernible in the 15 active counties, therefore, is a decrease relative to the 
control counties. This serves to control for other, unknown factors that might affect the 
filing rate but that can be assumed to have a relatively homogenous impact statewide. 
Quantitative Methods 
Simple graphical analysis should show the impact of mediation on the court data 
if proponents of ADR are correct in that mediation will relieve court congestion. 
Graphing the new case filings per capita, agreed judgment, etc. by county group and 
category group should reveal any major changes. More importantly, since the exact 
nature of the pattern of change is not known, simple graphing should allow one to 
identify any patterns that may be associated with ADR. Finding these patterns of change 
in the expected time periods and groups will be strong evidence of the effectiveness of 
mediation.  
Graphing the data also has other advantages.184 A graph may reveal changes that 
may or may not have been anticipated. A graph of workers compensation and URESA 
disputes, for example, over the 1980 -- 2010 time period is a clear signal that something 
in those two categories of dispute radically changed.  Another advantage relates to the 
assumptions that have been made in forming the expectations.  Graphing may provide a 
relatively simple way to confirm the assumptions of other data parameters that are not 
directly related to the hypotheses. An example of this is the "other disputes" category. A 
                                                 
184See F. J. Anscombe, Graphs in Statistical Analysis, 27 AM. STATISTICIAN 17 (2012). 
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graph of other disputes should show a relatively constant filing rate across all counties. 
This would mean that the fundamental factors involved are the same and do not change. 
This assumption may be questioned given the changes in law and society over the 31 
years at issue. If, however, the graph of other disputes in the 15 active counties is similar 
to the graph of other disputes in the control groups, then this lends support to the 
assumption that the other factors (other than mediation) were relatively consistent 
statewide.  
Other quantitative methods such as time series analysis and segmented regression 
have been successfully used in similar, natural experiment studies, but preliminary 
investigation of these methods show that the number of observations available from the 
data presents a major obstacle to using these methods. Application of segmented 
regression or time series analysis produces inconsistent results. In short, graphical 
analysis is the best method for the data that is available. 
The expected outcome of the research is that there is little evidence that 
mediation/ADR has a significant impact on court congestion in Texas. The research will 
discuss the implications and possible reasons, theoretical considerations, as well as 
recommendations for further research. 
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VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
It would be natural to assume that the best data for evaluating the impact of 
mediation would be statewide filings. If filings (per capita) decline, the implication is 
that disputants are choosing alternative means to settle disputes. The predictions of 
mediation advocates, if valid, would also specify when this would start to occur: total 
filings in the state would start to decline after ADR becomes available. The use of 
mediation may take some time to spread, but the impact should be discernible within the 
time period covered by the data. 
 
 
FIGURE 5: STATEWIDE NEW CASES FILED 
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As figure 5 (above) shows, statewide new case filings show an over-all reduction 
in total filings beginning around 1988.  The top series, total filings per capita, went from 
0.0212 in 1988 to 0.0183 in 2010.  With this general trend as the only information, an 
observer could conclude that ADR has been successful in reducing court congestion by 
about 13-14% (2010's 0.0183 compared with 1980's 0.0212 filings per capita). 
If mediation/ADR is responsible for the decline in filings for the statewide data, 
then the disaggregated data should show the impact of ADR, too. Since the data reports 
are by case category and county, as well as by year, this means that the impact of 
mediation can be evaluated at these levels, too.  The data for the three main case 
categories (contracts, accounts, and notes, or CAN; mediation amenable, or MA; and 
non-amenable, or NA, plotted below the total, illustrate that there were differences 
among the categories.  
Filings for the MA category increase for eight years -- a moderate increase for 
the first six years, and a larger increase for years seven and eight.  During these first 
several years, CAN cases also increased, with a decline in CAN filings beginning after 
1987.  Given the assumptions that the impact of mediation would not be very significant 
until after the 1987 legislation, the CAN and mediation amenable cases seem to follow 
the expected pattern.   
Non amenable filings decrease during the first several years.  If the non-
amenable category is a control, then, the increase in filings for the mediation amenable 
and CAN categories is understated.  After the first several years, NA filings rise, but 
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only to about the same level they were in 1980.  Also of note is that the NA filings do 
not display much variability.  They remain in the .012 to 0.014 range. 
 Overall, the three case categories are not grossly inconsistent with expectations.  
The rise in CAN filings in the later years is a concern, but even with the increase, rates 
remain below the level of 1987.  The MA filings could be the poster-board picture for 
ADR: at first, filings are rising and court congestion is worsening, but with the passage 
of ADR legislation, the filing rates drop. 
 
 
FIGURE 6: ACTIVE 15 COUNTIES NCF 
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If mediation is producing results at the state level, filings at the county level 
should show an even greater impact in the counties that have active ADR programs.  
However, as figure 6, above, shows, the patterns seen at the statewide level are also 
observed in the 15 active counties. 
The most striking similarities in the graphs are the increase in CAN and MA 
filings for the first several years, a rather prominent peak in MA filings in 1988, and the 
same troubling increase in CAN filings after 2000.  The lack of significant differences in 
the active county filings suggests that more extensive analysis is warranted. 
The filings for MA cases show an increase and then a decrease at the statewide 
level and for the active counties.  The change from an increase to decrease was about the 
right time, so the question arises as to what happened in counties without active ADR 
programs: the control counties.  As figure 7, below, shows, there was a difference.  The 
problem is that the difference does not support the expectations.  The increase in MA 
filings for the control groups is still evident, but it is a much less pronounced increase in 
comparison with the active counties.  The years 1983-1990 were anomalous for the 
active counties: the early increase in filings was the biggest difference compared to the 
control counties.  Three things can be inferred from this anomaly: 1) the active counties 
experienced a litigation explosion that the control counties did not, 2) unknown, major 
litigation factors are the cause, or 3) natural variation is the cause.  The implication of 
the first alternative is that the larger counties (recall that the active counties are mainly 
the more populous ones) were victims of the litigation explosion, and smaller counties 
somehow avoided the full effect.  The fact that filing rates and patterns between the 
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active counties and the controls were basically the same for the rest of the time period 
could suggest that ADR had an impact just on the “large county explosion” and no 
impact on litigation, generally. The second alternative, different factors, is also a stretch 
given that the patterns and rates are so similar in the other years.  The third possibility, 
natural variation, may be at least one of the causes. Regardless of which alternative (or 
combination) is valid, ADR does not seem to be a cause, at least according to the 
expectations. 
 
 
FIGURE 7: MA, 15 ACTIVE AND CONTROLS 
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Another way to test for ADR is to look at the time differential between the 
counties that were early adopters of ADR and the counties that established active 
programs later.  If the use of ADR is implemented at different times but there is a similar 
impact, then there should be evidence of a time shift in CAN and MA filing patterns.  As 
figure 8, below, shows, there were some differences in the pattern of filings during the 
first several years for DH and the Large 9 (L9).  Most of the difference was from about 
the time of the 1987 legislation and for a few years afterward.  The Large 9 group did 
experience higher litigation rates, but after 1990 the two groups’ filing rates are very 
similar.  On the whole, then, finding that ADR was responsible for the three or four 
years of elevated filings in DH (for 1987-1989) is contrary to expectations.  
  
 
FIGURE 8: MA, NCF FOR DH AND L9 
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Some insight might be gleaned from additional comparison with the control 
counties.  In figure 9, below, two control groups (the largest county control groups) are 
added. The prominence of 1987-1989 for the L9 group remains notable, but a curious 
dip in filings for the P4 group, the largest counties that were not included in the active 
group, is also prominent.  The dip for P4 for two years indicates that some substantial 
variation in the filing rates can appear, at least over the two years (1983-1984).  This 
observation means that it is likely that both anomalies, the dip in the P4 and the hump in 
the L9, are unrelated to ADR, but are instances of natural variability.  Overall, the 
evidence from MA filings of a shift in filing rates is very weak. 
FIGURE 9: MA, NCF, DH & L9 WITH CONTROLS 
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The category most impacted by mediation, according to expectations, is CAN.  If 
ADR is most attractive to parties in a continuing relationship, then CAN is the one 
category in which most disputes are between parties with established relationships.  
Many of these, it is reasonable to conclude, will be on-going relationships.  Figure 10, 
below, of CAN filings reveals several notable relationships. 
FIGURE 10: CAN, NCF, ACTIVE AND CONTROLS 
The graph shows a rise in CAN filings in all groups up through about 1987, a 
strong decline through about 1990, then a weaker decline until about 1996, and then an 
increase through 2010. Taking each of these aspects in order, the early rise is not 
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necessarily inconsistent with expectations because litigation may have been increasing 
up until the 1987 legislation.  The increase from 1980 until about 1986 is notable in that 
the patterns are very similar, as shown by the slopes. The sharp decline in filings at 
about the same time is also suspect as being the result of ADR because the same decline 
is evident in the control groups. There is no time shift between the two ADR groups nor 
is there any shift when comparing with the control groups. Also, the rates quickly 
converge—much too quickly if ADR spreads gradually.  The later rise is inconsistent, 
too, with expectations and is observed in both the active and control groups.  The CAN 
graphs are remarkable for their similarity -- the assumptions and expectations are 
contradicted by the data.  A reasonable conclusion, then, is that ADR has an insignificant 
impact on CAN disputes. 
Another way that ADR could affect court congestion is its impact after filing.  If 
disputes are more likely to settle, especially with reduced involvement on the part of 
court personnel, then this would show ADR can be effective.  The way the data is 
reported means that any significant impact of ADR should be discernable in the default 
and agreed (D&A) type of disposition.  Since the dispositions are, like filings, reported 
by year, county, and category of dispute, this allows comparison in much the same way 
as done with filings.  One difference, though, is that the expectation for filings was that a 
decrease would be consistent with ADR effectiveness.   For dispositions, an increase in 
D&A dispositions is the expected outcome.  Additionally, the disposition data must be 
transformed in a way that allows valid comparison over time.  The percentage of D&A 
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dispositions, as compared to total dispositions, will fulfill this need.   If ADR is 
increasing the settlement rate, then the D&A disposition percentage should increase. 
 
 
FIGURE 11: ACTIVE D&A 
 
 
The graph of D&A disposition rates for the active 15 counties is shown in figure 
11, above.  The revised total (RT) rate is the average of D&A dispositions overall, so it 
provides a benchmark.  The RT rate increases sharply during the early 1990s, which 
means that D&A dispositions, in general, increased during that time.  Standing on its 
own, an increase in the percentage of dispositions that are D&A would be consistent 
with expectations.   
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Looking at the categories, however, gives a different picture.  The D&A 
percentages increase from 1980 through about 1993 for the NA disputes and then are 
relatively stable.  The NA disputes, recall, include divorce and family law matters.  If 
mediation is responsible for more divorces being “agreed,” then that would be consistent 
with expectations, except for the fact that the impact is observed over just a few years.  
After 1993, the NA rates do not increase. 
For MA disputes, the D&A rates actually decline until about 2000.  This is 
contrary to expectations that mediation/ADR, whether court-connected or not, will result 
in increased settlements.  The CAN disputes also decline, reaching their lowest point 
around 1991.  After 1991, the percentages increase, but only slightly until about 2005.  
The increase in D&A dispositions is too late to be credited to ADR.   
If D&A dispositions increase as a result of ADR, the expectation is that this 
increase would be accompanied by a decrease in trials.  Trials, in this sense, and in the 
way the term is used by the literature, is a broad term.  Trial by jury happens to be 
relatively rare.  (The Annual Report for 2010 shows that there were 1,501 final 
judgments as the result of trial by jury; this is a small fraction of the total of 272,744 of 
all final judgments for that year.)  Trials, for the purposes of this research, should be 
broadly construed to mean final adjudication by the court.   This definition would 
include jury trial, trial without a jury (a “bench” trial), and summary judgments.  This 
definition comports with the final judgment dispositions reported in the data.  It is “final 
judgments,” then, that would decline in response to ADR.  
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Figure 12, below, shows the final judgment dispositions (FJ) for the active 15 
county group.  Final judgments do decline, but for the NA cases.  From 1988 to 2002, 
CAN cases do show a slight decline in FJ, but MA cases show a slight increase. After 
2003, FJ appears to remain relatively constant, with some variation.  The patterns in FJ 
are consistent with the D&A trends, but both are inconsistent with expectations.    
 
 
FIGURE 12: ACTIVE 15 FINAL J. 
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law developments in “final judgment” status.185   Like the change in the law that 
required WC and reciprocals to be dropped from this analysis, this jump in FJ must also 
be ignored.   
Additional graphs and analysis are contained in the appendix.  The best tests for 
the impact of ADR/mediation, those examined above, show that the data can be 
construed as consistent with expectations on a gross level, but when the data is analyzed 
more closely, the evidence is weak in some cases and contradictory in others.  On the 
whole, there is no consistent evidence that ADR/mediation has made a significant 
reduction in court congestion.  The specific results are: 
 the first null hypothesis, ADR does not reduce filings, is not rejected,  
 the second null hypothesis, ADR does not increase settlement after filing, 
is not rejected, 
 and the third hypothesis, ADR does not reduce the number of trials, is not 
rejected.  
 
                                                 
185 The reason for the jump requires a short explanation.  A decision by a court resolving a dispute is not 
necessarily a final judgment.  Orders (or decrees) by a court may dispose of certain legal issues in a 
dispute, but for the court decree to become “appealable” to a higher court, the decree must be “final” in 
that it disposes of the entire dispute.  The actual way this is accomplished is that the judge will sign a 
decree that is prepared by one of the parties (usually the prevailing party).  The problem is that the party 
who prepares the “final order” is not allowed to appeal it, unless certain language is included.  These are 
legal technicalities, and the exact law on these matters varied amongst the courts of appeal.  A series of 
case decisions culminated, however, into a general consensus on how orders could be requested and still 
preserve the right to appeal.  Attorneys and judges (and perhaps court clerks) became more conscientious 
and consistent in how decrees were drafted and entered into the record. 
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VII.  DISCUSSION 
The result of the analysis has shown that, despite a general decline in the 
litigation rate per capita statewide, there is scant evidence that ADR has been the cause.  
The characteristics of the data used in this analysis differentiates this research from other 
empirical studies.  The first distinguishing characteristic is time.  The use of 31 years of 
court filings and dispositions allows for the impact of ADR to become evident over the 
course of that period of time during which ADR was implemented.  This is in contrast to 
other empirical studies which looked at results from relatively short time periods.   
The second distinctive aspect of this research is that it involved an entire state 
and not just particular districts, courts, or programs. It is conceivable that ADR could 
have a positive impact on court congestion in a limited setting, such as a court or 
program, but establishing a causal link between ADR and a general decline in litigation 
requires examination of ADR against a much broader backdrop.  A particular court-
connected program may tell something about settlement in that court-connected ADR, 
but it will not speak to the impact of ADR on the filing of litigation.  Only a broad-based 
analysis can investigate a causal link between ADR and a decrease in litigation filings.   
A third aspect is that by using data from the entire state, the research uses the 
natural experiment approach.  The DRC data indicates that ADR was not implemented at 
the same time or same rate in the various counties of the state: a natural experiment.  The 
counties that adopted ADR later versus earlier is one way to use this natural experiment, 
and counties that failed to implement strong ADR programs at all is another method of a 
natural control. 
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A fourth aspect is the reporting scheme that happens to segregate the data into 
categories that should be affected by ADR in different ways.  The CAN disputes, 
according to ADR assumptions, should show the greatest reduction in filings and the 
greatest increase in ADR-induced agreements (or settlements) after filing.  The 
categories of disputes that are amenable to mediation before filings, the MA disputes, 
should show some reduction in filings and some increase in post-filing agreements.  The 
non-amenable disputes, however, will have filing rates that are unaffected by ADR, 
although there may be an increase of post-filing agreement.  
The lack of evidence of a significant impact on filing rates is, perhaps 
unfortunately, consistent with the little research that has been reported.  This raises 
questions, however.  The first question pertains to the overall decline in litigation rates.  
Was this a coincidence?  Perhaps it was.  The literature and theory on litigation indicates 
that there are many factors involved in litigation rates.  Factors, like those proposed by 
Munger and Jacobi, may include general economic or political conditions.  The task of 
identifying specific factors and estimating the impact of any one factor may be beyond 
the available data and analytical tools. 
 One idea that may be relevant is the observation that reducing the costs of 
dispute resolution will increase the number of disputes (as noted by Shavell).  This is 
Jevon’s “paradox.”186  As the cost of a limiting resource declines, more of that resource 
                                                 
186 See W. S. JEVONS & A. W. FLUX, THE COAL QUESTION: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE 
PROGRESS OF THE NATION, AND THE PROBABLE EXHAUSTION OF OUR COAL-MINES 
(1965). 
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will be demanded. This “paradox” is a fundamental principle of economics – the law of 
demand.  As Posner astutely observes, dispute resolution (either ADR or traditional 
litigation) can be viewed as a service, and basic economic principles are applicable.   
Another possibility is that ADR was a temporary fad.  There was a shift to ADR 
in response to the court congestion problems of the 1980s, but as the congestion waned, 
there was a shift back (at least by some) to the traditional court system.  This concept has 
support. Research shows that consumers may seek a change, for the sake of novelty or 
variety, even if the product (or service) is considered to be of lower quality.187   
Still another possibility is that ADR is nothing more than a placebo.  The term 
“placebo” originates from Latin “I will please,” and placebos received approving 
comments by Thomas Jefferson and close scientific scrutiny by Benjamin Franklin.188  A 
related concept, the halo effect, could also be credited.  The halo effect is often limited to 
applications of personal attributes, but applies to the cognitive process that facilitate all 
judgements and inferences.189  It has also been applied to business management.190  The 
concept could also be applicable to ADR.  Parties are more likely to settle if their beliefs 
change, including their beliefs about the probability of settlement. 
The halo effect is just one of the phenomena that cognitive error embraces.  
                                                 
187 See R. K. Ratner, B. E. Kahn, & D. Kahneman, Choosing Less Preferred Experiences For the Sake of 
Variety, 26 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 1 (1999). 
188 M. Specter, The Power of Nothing Do Placebos Work?, THE NEW YORKER MAGAZINE Dec. 12, 
2011 (available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/12/12/the-power-of-nothing). 
189 See R. E. Nisbett & T. D. Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of Judgments, 
35 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 250, 251 (1977). 
190 See P. ROSENZWEIG, THE HALO EFFECT-- AND THE EIGHT OTHER BUSINESS DELUSIONS 
THAT DECEIVE MANAGERS (2007). 
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Cognitive errors in ascribing an incorrect causal relationship is well known.  In the 
medical field, the tendency for physicians to seize upon a particular cause for a patient’s 
condition and stop looking for any other potential cause is common: search satisficing.191 
It may be that the legal community has committed the same cognitive error – assuming 
that the spread of ADR deserves credit for reducing litigation.  
So there are several possibilities to explain why the data and the general belief do 
not match.  Surveys show that the majority of judges believe that ADR reduces court 
caseloads, although some opine that the impact “is almost imperceptible.”192  Perhaps 
there is a cognition error, but if ADR is no more than a placebo, is there any harm in 
that?  Considering that ADR does involve some diversion of resources (court funds, 
personnel, etc.), there is an efficiency concern.  It may be a squander of precious 
resources to continue ADR programs in the court system.  If the discussion ends with 
this point, though, the same cognitive error (satisficing) may be made.  A possibility – 
the placebo effect – is identified and a negative outcome from that (waste of resources) 
is noted, so the diagnosis is complete: the search ends. 
To avoid making that error, the investigation should be continued.  One 
additional comment about the allocation of resources is apparent.  This efficiency issue, 
the optimal allocation of resources, is noted by law and economics scholars.  Shavell 
observes that ex ante ADR agreements deserve public support because they provide 
                                                 
191 J. GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 169 (Mariner 2008).    
192 B. McAdoo, All Rise, the Court Is in Session: What Judges Say About Court-Connected Mediation, 22 
J. DISP. RESOL. 377, 386-387 (2007).  
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incentives for parties to choose the dispute resolution process before the dispute occurs.  
This increases social welfare and should, therefore, be encouraged. In contrast, ex post 
ADR agreements do not need to be encouraged – the cost/benefit analysis of the 
particular dispute drives the decision.  There is no clear argument for ADR.193  Do these 
same social benefits occur if ADR is a placebo?  Do they, perhaps, offset the extra 
resources allocated by the court system?  That might be. 
Shavell’s analysis is representative of the law and economics perspective towards 
the legal system and ADR.  ADR is considered to be a substitute for a trial, or, to put it 
another way, an arbitrator is a substitute for a judge.  The arbitrator, though, can be 
superior to a judge in terms of increased accuracy or risk reduction.  The simplification 
of the model may distort the true character of the processes, however.  The arbitrator (or 
ADR process), by reducing asymmetry, reduces risk, and can become preferable to a 
judge and trial.  Economic principles teach that there is a cost to everything, though, 
including the additional information that is necessary to reduce asymmetry.  How this 
extra, implicit cost is incorporated into the economic model is not tackled by the 
literature.  Indeed, a better conceptual approach is to compare the processes and not the 
decision-makers. 
The problem inherent in comparing an arbitrator (or any other third-party, such 
as a mediator, who may decide or influence the dispute resolution) is that the judge in 
the traditional system of litigation is not supposed to be an expert on the matters in 
                                                 
193 Shavell, supra note 123, at 20-21. 
 120 
 
dispute.  He is supposed to be a neutral observer of the adversarial process.  The judge 
comes to court with little preparation and little detailed knowledge of the facts or legal 
arguments of the dispute.194    It is the adversarial process of trial that is designed to 
reduce asymmetry – to get at the truth. 
The correct comparison, then, is between the processes.  Does ADR, with its less 
formal rules, do a better job of reducing asymmetry and risk than the discovery, 
testimony, and cross-examination of the traditional trial process?  That is an open 
question, especially considering the fact that many disputes involve emotional, non-
monetary, and cognitive issues.  It is valid to compare the results of trial with the results 
of ADR and to use the anticipated outcome of trial as the benchmark for settlement 
considerations, but to focus on the judge – only one aspect of the traditional process, is a 
mistake.  Posner’s view of competing services is apt. Even so, the traditional process and 
ADR are not perfect substitutes, just as other competing services are often not perfect 
substitutes. 
Recall the advantages of ADR.  One is to improve the satisfaction, or justice, by 
addressing the needs or desires of the parties that are not well-served by traditional 
litigation.  A trial is constrained in terms of its scope.  Issues that are legally recognized, 
such as actual damages and legal precepts, are admissible.  In ADR, other issues may be 
included.  Instead of perfect substitutes, then, the addition of ADR constitutes an 
expansion of the services available.  Ignoring costs, then, some disputes will be attracted 
                                                 
194 R. A. Posner, A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L. J. 1807, 1816 (2009).  
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to the greater flexibility of ADR.  The services available in the market has expanded, and 
economics would claim that, with a greater variety of services available, the demand can 
only increase. In terms of costs, it is not clear that ADR costs are lower.  Studies have 
produced mixed results in terms of lower costs for ADR.  Part of the reason may lie in 
that some studies find that there is not a significant difference in terms of motions, 
discovery, and attorney hours between mediation cases and non-mediation cases.195 If 
costs are not that different, this is consistent with the notion that ADR is providing a 
service different from litigation and trial. 
If ADR is a different service than trial, one way that it is different may be the 
emotional and other aspects of disputes that are not within the scope of traditional 
litigation.  As noted, law and economics has difficulty addressing these issues, but there 
is overwhelming evidence that emotional and related aspects are important in dispute 
resolution.  Some recent research shows that some emotional component is requisite for 
making good decisions, even if the decisions are relatively simple business or economic 
choices.196   
Another issue that law and economics ignores is a fundamental criticism that has 
been part of the ADR debate since its inception.  It is relevant, too, to all forms of 
dispute resolution.  It is the issue of justice: that concept that has preoccupied the finest 
minds through the centuries.  The fear is that ADR does not advance justice, it frustrates 
it.  The critics point out that many of the improvements in justice were those legal 
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developments in the 1950s-1970s that led to the alleged explosion in litigation.  The 
“have-nots” made some gains, and ADR takes those away.197   
These concerns about justice come from too many eminent scholars to dismiss 
lightly.  Some in Pound’s audience in 1906 might have felt that his criticisms were 
undeserved, but in retrospect they can be seen as insightful as well as prescient.  This 
basic issue of justice deserves attention in this research; a broad examination of ADR 
would be lacking if it did not address the issue of justice.  
The question, then, is how these results comport with basic theories of law and 
justice.  As previously noted, there are multiple layers of law, according to theorists.  
The assumption is that human law will gradually develop to be in closer accord with the 
higher levels, whether that higher level be termed the natural law or something else.  The 
key idea is that law (and, by extension, the legal process) will change.  Potential 
criticism of any change, though, could be made that the law is moving away from a 
rational basis, and so the change is detrimental.  This criticism is implicit in Olson’s list 
of ills – the move to fuzzy rules, for example, invites arbitrary results and encourages 
litigation.  The increase in litigation, as has just been explained, is not necessarily an 
indication that the laws or legal process produces less “justice;” it is consistent with 
providing more “justice.” 
Returning to the basic tenets of economics, there is more to be addressed than the 
simple efficiency discussed, above.  The increase in dispute resolution services and 
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resulting increase in demand may not seem to matter that much in an economic analysis.  
It may, in fact, matter a great deal.  Entrepreneurship is one of the four fundamental 
factors of production.  Entrepreneurship is considered to be the way that the other three 
factors (land, labor, and capital) are combined.  Posner notes that economic development 
is highly dependent on property laws, the protection of rights, and other aspects of the 
legal system.198  These laws are important in that they provide the incentives for 
economic activity.   
Economic history usually addresses entrepreneurship as a person, but there are 
different views of the nature and role that the entrepreneurship has.  The core meaning of 
entrepreneurship comes from the work of Irish economist Richard Cantillon (who coined 
the term entrepreneur in the early 1700s) as one who participates in the market and 
accepts the risk with the purpose of making a profit.199  The nature of entrepreneurship is 
a core of economics, yet the functions of the entrepreneur have not been fully discussed. 
Instead of focusing on the person, it is more appropriate to focus on the broader concept 
of entrepreneurship.   
Jean Baptiste Say enlarged the meaning of entrepreneurship to include the 
organization of the factors of production.200  Entrepreneurship in this broader sense 
encompasses the organization and management of economic activity.  From that 
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perspective, entrepreneurship involves getting individuals to act together in a concerted 
way to produce the desired result: a complicated task.201    This involves providing the 
incentives that make it in the individuals’ self-interest to cooperate.  It also involves the 
management of change, so flexibility is a key consideration.202  The common thread is to 
obtain the maximum cooperation (or contribution) from the individuals involved.  The 
flexibility required to elicit the maximum effort is the key, then, to increase the 
productive potential of the organization.  
Consider, now, the organization to be an entire economy.  How does 
entrepreneurship obtain the maximum cooperation?  The legal infrastructure is the way 
that disputes are resolved, and for disputes to have a positive impact, the method of 
resolving disputes must be flexible.  Rigid rules are a bane to innovation.  The traditional 
legal system, however, is rigid.  It must be rigid, though, to reduce uncertainty – the risk 
that Olson, Ashenfelter, and other scholars so despise.  But uncertainty is also 
opportunity for entrepreneurial activities.  The entrepreneur takes the risk and adds to the 
social welfare.  This is the way that ADR, as an addition to the legal services market, can 
provide a boon to the economy, but the contribution of entrepreneurship in this way has 
been overlooked by the law and economics analysis.  Law and economics simplifies and 
reduces the number of variables in order to determine the impact of one particular 
aspect, or the change in one variable.  Entrepreneurship, in the most fundamental terms, 
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envisions change in the system: change in many variables.  
Most of the time, the management of change (an entrepreneurial function) is 
rather slow and deliberate. Complicated things will change in complicated ways, and the 
concern is to disrupt the existing cooperation in the least way.203  When major change 
occurs, though, more flexibility is required – more drastic changes in the system, 
incentives, etc. must be implemented, sometimes all at once and not piecemeal.  ADR 
has been a drastic change, but it was in response to major changes that presented 
opportunities.  The change that ADR instituted was not just a change in costs, which is 
the essential focus of the law and economics analysis.  It was much more drastic.  The 
original goals of ADR, as expressed in the proceedings of the Pound Conference, was 
more comprehensive than offering a cheaper alternative – a way of diverting disputes 
from the courts.  The goals of ADR were also to increase “justice,” or the satisfaction 
with the outcomes.204  If the outcomes are more satisfying, then this is a positive 
incentive for more entrepreneurial activity.  This is the benefit that law and economics 
has not incorporated in its analysis.  With good reason, too.  The positive benefits are 
complex, difficult to compute or estimate, and so challenging to evaluate. The benefits 
exist, though, regardless of whether they are tractable.  
General respect and acquiescence of the law can have a major macroeconomic 
impact. An example is Greece.  One important reason for the current fiscal crisis in 
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Greece is due to widespread tax noncompliance (one can call an avoidance or 
evasion).205  The fiscal problems have been greatly exacerbated by the fact that tax 
evasion is the national pastime.206  The situation becomes a vicious cycle: people are less 
willing to pay taxes because they don't trust the system, but that shifts the tax burden to 
fewer individuals, which increases the incentive to cheat. This further erodes the trust or 
respect for the system. 
Another example is crime.  Actions by the law-abiding citizens have an impact 
on the crime rate, but the civic duty of the noncriminal population comes at a cost: time, 
effort, safety, etc.207  These costs may fall, though, as the percentage of the law-abiding 
population who actively participate in their civic duty increases. If the percentage of 
participation by the good citizens falls too low, the sacrifice (cost) for each citizen may 
increase above the level of benefits accruing to each, so fewer citizens participate. This 
may result in a stable equilibrium where the total costs (the cost to the collective good 
citizens and the cost to the state in terms of police protection, etc.) rise to high levels -- 
the optimal level of resources devoted to fighting crime adjust to where crime is much 
more prevalent.208 The social norms, or respect for the law, operate to engage the good 
citizens as major factors in the reduction of crime. The general respect of the law 
matters. 
If these considerations are valid, the question remains: how does the 
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entrepreneurial aspect of ADR fit with basic theory?  Posner considers consent to be a 
fundamental principle of justice.  This parallels the consent that is articulated in the basic 
laws of this economy – the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.  The 
Declaration of Independence begins with a reference to natural law, and avows that the 
power of governments is based on the consent of the governed.  The Constitution, too, 
has consent as an explicit requirement: Article VII provides that ratification by nine 
states is required.  
Consent is also implicit in the entrepreneurial function of obtaining the maximum 
cooperation of individual members: incentives are established for willing, cooperative 
behavior.  Coercion is not as productive.  Cooperation is one of the suppositions that 
Rawls makes in his development of a theory of justice. A cooperative society will 
provide mutual advantages to its members. Rawls also postulates that a well-ordered 
society is one in which all members accept the principles of justice, and they know that 
other members of society accept the same principles.209  Consent is an explicit 
foundation.  Rawls also posits that the general welfare, or the greater good of the many, 
cannot justify hardship imposed on a few.  Establishing a legal system that minimizes 
total costs, then, will not justify the system if it fails to adequately serve some segments 
of society.  This basic fairness is necessary to “expect the willing cooperation” of all 
members.210  Rawls also notes that the problem of choosing the governing principles “is 
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extremely difficult.”211  Harmonizing these ideas with the current legal system suggest 
that ADR is a process that allows greater choice in the principles that are used to resolve 
disputes.  There may be several principles that can be applied, but, in the context of a 
specific dispute, the more flexible ADR process also addresses other principles, such as 
equitable concerns, that are not recognized by statute or precedent.  ADR can 
accommodate change (consistent with the entrepreneurial concept) and can still comport 
with the basic theory of justice.  
Llewellyn, too, believed that the law, in the interests of justice, should 
accommodate the particular circumstances of a dispute.  The legal philosophy of 
Llewellyn’s time, legal formalism, focused on the legal rules and sought to apply them 
to the specific cases.  Judges were more like oracles, pronouncing how the law applied to 
the dispute.  Instead, Llewelyn believed that the human aspect should be considered, as 
well.212   
Llewelyn was influenced by anthropology and sociology.  His interest in learning 
what these areas of study could add to legal theory led him to direct a famous study of 
the Cheyenne social structure and how it dealt with legal problems.  Applying the case-
study method to the Cheyenne disputes, Llewelyn determined that the Cheyenne had 
developed a highly-developed system of justice.  Disputes were handled on several 
different levels.  If the dispute involved family members, then the dispute was handled at 
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the family level.  If the dispute was among the warriors of the tribe (the younger men), 
then the warrior council handled the dispute.  If the dispute was between tribes, then it 
might have to be decided by the combined elders of the tribes, the Council of Forty-
Four.  In this way, the various factors involved in the dispute could be considered, and 
the outcome was respected by all levels of the society.213   
Llewelyn’s work with the Cheyenne system and other anthropology and 
sociology literature influenced his draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, which, in 
turn, has had a major influence on current law.  The insights from the Cheyenne are 
consistent, too, with the lessons learned by Posner and others from their studies of 
primitive societies.  Primitive cultures habitually dealt with disputes at different levels, 
and preferred that a third-party be involved in dispute resolution.  This avoids the private 
revenge solution which could result in an escalation of the dispute.  The key concept is 
that there is a general agreement of principles, an acknowledgment that all others in the 
society agree to the principles, and yet the flexibility to allow a choice of which 
principles would apply to the particular dispute, just as Rawls outlined. These same 
characteristics mark the use of ADR.  Instead of a fixed set of legal rules, ADR places 
the resolution process at the appropriate level and allows the choice of applicable 
principles. 
The theoretical framework of Damaska is relevant to the concept of ADR, as 
already noted.  One of Damaska’s polar extremes is that of policy implementation versus 
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dispute settling.  The scholars who are concerned about the relationship between justice 
and ADR (“justice critics”) are looking at policy.  Their apprehension is based on several 
issues.  The first of these is that ADR is a retrenchment of the old order.  The civil rights, 
gender rights, and other major developments in the legal field starting in the 1950s were 
regarded by many as long-overdue, hard-won, and of great significance to the 
advancement of societal interest.  Any potential threat to these gains, regardless of 
efficiency or expediency, will be scrutinized.  These concerns are valid.  For example, 
removing disputes dealing with race or gender discrimination from the courts, where the 
proceedings and results are open for all to witness, invites the suspicion that the cloak of 
ADR will be used to relax the anti-discrimination standards. 
Another, related issue pertains to any power imbalance that might exist between 
the parties.  An example of this is divorce and family law – disputes in which the female 
disputant is often at a disadvantage economically and in terms of legal sophistication.  
Many of these disputes may involve relationships in which the male dominated the 
female.  A trial court, with its procedures that have been established to address such 
power imbalances, is viewed as the best guarantee of a “just” procedure and outcome.  
ADR, with its relaxed rules, may not be as effective at controlling for the imbalance in 
power. 
These are but two of the issues that justice critics raise. In Damaska’s framework, 
ADR represents a movement from hierarchical authority, the traditional courts, to co-
ordinate authority, and policy implementation will become a secondary consideration.  
ADR will emphasize the settlement – solving the dispute – and retreat from advancing 
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the social policies.  In this regard, the justice critics have a point.  Damaska, though, 
formulated his polar extremes as a framework for analysis, and not as a normative tool.  
Borrowing the economic principle that there is a trade-off in everything, the issue can be 
re-phrased: what is the optimal level of policy/dispute and hierarchical/co-ordinate 
authority? 
For Posner, with the idea of justice based on consent, the consent of the 
disputants is the key consideration.  In this regard, the movement in legal field is still 
towards favoring ADR when consent can (plausibly?) be found.  ADR remains under the 
ultimate review of the courts.  And consent is a central matter in whether the courts 
continue to endorse ex ante ADR agreements.  In a recent case214   the U.S. Supreme 
Court took on the issue of an arbitration clause and a waiver of class action in the 
agreements between Italian Colors (a restaurant) and other businesses, as original 
plaintiffs, and American Express, the original defendant.  The holding of the court, that 
the mandatory arbitration provision and the waiver of class action would be enforced, 
allows corporations to shield themselves from substantial liability for small harms 
suffered by many.  The court turned a blind eye to the economics of class action: that an 
individual who wished to pursue an individual claim would incur legal costs far in 
excess of the harm suffered.  The court, in its reasoning, stressed that the public policy as 
expressed in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)215  superseded other policy concerns.  
The court specifically noted that the FAA was intended to confer full contractual effect 
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on arbitration agreements.216  Contracts, of course, explicitly embody the consent of the 
parties. 
Italian Colors is an expansion of the deference to the FAA that was prominently 
mentioned in a previous case that Italian Colors cited, AT&T Mobility.217  In AT&T 
Mobility, the original lawsuit was brought by a cell-phone customer who sued for the 
sales tax that he was charged for phones that AT&T had advertised for “free.”  The 
court’s decision noted that the FAA “was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”218  The only defenses available under the 
FAA were the common-law contractual defenses of duress, fraud, etc.  The consensual 
foundations of the basic contract were core to the public policy of the FAA, according to 
the court. 
The Italian Colors case illustrates the tension that exists between competing 
principles.  On the one hand, parties should be able to seek redress for a harm suffered in 
a contractual context even though the harm does not rise to the level of duress or fraud.  
On the other hand, the sanctity of contracts should be encouraged: this is how incentives 
are established for individuals to make optimal decisions regarding contracts.  And, as 
Shavell notes in his theory of ADR, public support depends on whether the ADR 
agreements are ex ante or ex post.    
One thing that Italian Colors makes clear, and that by providing a forum for the 
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review of ADR, the traditional courts can maintain the hierarchical/policy functions 
while allowing most of the disputes to be handled by the co-ordinate/settlement 
functions.  There may be room for both.  The bulk of the disagreement is, as usual, over 
the accuracy of the decision. 
Even within Damaska’s framework, then, co-existing systems of the traditional 
courts and ADR may combine in synergistic ways in the same way that an expansion of 
services available expands the market and social welfare.  Damaska provided the 
framework for analysis; he did not establish any limitations or prescriptions.  There is no 
requirement that only one system is available.  The same flexibility is seen in 
Llewellyn’s description of the Cheyenne method of dispute resolution (different levels) 
and Posner’s explanation of the dispute resolution mechanisms of primitive societies that 
he examines.  This flexible nature also comports with the ancient concepts of justice and 
law.  Aristotle concedes that the application of law is imperfect: “all laws are universal 
in statement but about some things it is not possible for a universal statement to be 
right.”219 Aquinas addressed the need for changes in the law for two reasons.  The first is 
the development of logic or wisdom.220  The second is for accommodating the changes 
in the human condition.  Consider, too, the usual changes in entrepreneurship: slow and 
deliberate.  Add to this the view that alternative dispute resolution was not as new as 
some may think.  Research in the history of ADR in the U.S. reveals that non-traditional 
                                                 
219 ARISTOTLE, supra note 146, at 98.   
220 AQUINAS, supra note 147, at 670 (“Change may occur with respect to reason, since it seems to be 
natural for reason to advance step-by-step from the imperfect to the perfect.”). 
 134 
 
dispute resolution (usually arbitration) was relatively common, as well as state sanctions 
of “private” dispute resolution.221 There were two systems of dispute resolution in many 
of the states, and the recent (after the Pound Conference) embrace of ADR has been, in 
effect, a merger of the two systems.  A broad view of the legal system, then, may 
conclude that the change has not been as drastic as believed.  It is a change, but a change 
in the process, which is what Frank Sander envisioned.222  If the traditional court system 
is a service, it was one that did not meet the needs of its customers. It was 
“incomprehensible” and riddled with “obfuscation and complexity.”223  Little wonder, 
then, that an alternative service was able to increase its market share.  There are still 
issues about how well the competing services do at providing “justice,” but it may be 
unreasonable to assume that any human system will be able to deliver a perfect service 
in this regard. 
Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas conceived justice as a duality: conformity to 
the law plus an aspect of benevolence.  The merger or overlap of the two, then, brings 
the law into greater conformity with the source of the law.  Law and economics has yet 
to develop the theory and tools to do this, but incorporating the consent, justice, and 
psychological/emotional aspects as parts of the entrepreneurial function can move the 
theory along, sometimes slowly, sometimes in leaps.  Additional research on ADR and 
how it fits into the legal system can take law and economics beyond the current, limited 
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focus.  That will be a complex, difficult task, but (like entrepreneurship) one that has 
great potential.  
Texas has been a leading jurisdiction in the area of ADR.  It is appropriate, 
therefore, that a study of Texas court data is useful for gauging the impact of ADR on 
court congestion.  Although the empirical analysis of this research is quite limited – 
whether ADR has reduced court congestion – this has provided the opportunity to 
explore the larger ramifications of ADR.  Although ADR has not been shown to produce 
significant savings in terms of reducing litigation, it can have macroeconomic benefits 
that have the potential to far outweigh the savings from reduced expenditures on the 
judicial system.      
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Little evidence for a reduction in court congestion as a result of ADR/mediation 
can be discerned in the district data. The basic assumptions that have been made are 
simple. The first, that some time would be required (a learning period) during which 
mediation would gradually develop, is reasonable given the fact that there was little 
awareness of mediation in the late 1970s. The assumption that mediation was 
implemented at different times in the different counties is reasonable in light of the DRC 
reports, the knowledge that counties have been free to implement ADR programs at their 
discretion, and the fact that the learning period may not be the same for each county. The 
assumption that ADR would have a significant impact on CAN disputes, a moderate 
impact on MA disputes, and no impact on NA disputes is based primarily on the claims 
of ADR proponents. The additional assumptions regarding the comparability of filing 
and disposition rates across counties also appear to be reasonable. Given these 
assumptions plus the depth and breadth of the data, any significant impact by mediation 
should have been unearthed.  
Each of the three formal hypotheses, then, have not been rejected. The first 
hypothesis (regarding the reduction in filings) would be rejected if the filings in active 
counties began to decrease after ADR was implemented. Comparison of active counties 
with control counties, however, failed to show a consistent, significant decrease in 
filings. Comparison among the active counties failed to show a consistent pattern that 
would indicate the early adoption counties were the first to see a decrease, with later-
adopting counties showing a decrease but at a later time.  
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The second hypothesis, that settlements would increase (using default & agreed 
dispositions) also failed to be rejected. The comparisons between the active and control 
counties failed to show consistent evidence of an increase that would be attributable to 
mediation. Comparison within the active counties failed to produce the time-shift 
evidence that mediation was responsible for an increase in settlements. Additionally, 
comparison between the categories of dispute failed to show consistent evidence of a 
difference due to mediation. 
The third hypothesis, the “trials” would be reduced, also failed. Any reduction in 
final judgment  was not closely linked with increases in D&A dispositions, did not show 
any time-shift among the active counties, and lacked evidence that the reduction in trials 
was true for the CAN and MA disputes but not the NA ones.  
Instead, the result of this research is consistent with the few studies that have 
looked into this issue. The other studies that have been published consist primarily of 
specific programs and limited time periods. No other study in the published record has 
come even close to examining an entire state for 31 years. This scope of this study is 
possible because Texas collected court data in a relatively consistent fashion for such a 
lengthy period of time. Moreover, the data was categorized in a fashion that meshes with 
some of the assumptions and characteristics of ADR. 
Additional research is warranted, given these results. Data from other states 
could be combined, or perhaps contrasted with the Texas data. Additionally, the costs 
and benefits of ADR may be an important issue since it appears that there is little cost 
savings (from a reduction in filings or final judgments) in the courts as a result of ADR. 
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Another issue for study is why ADR still enjoys so much support. ADR may be 
furthering other goals: “access to justice,” entrepreneurship, or something else.  As 
Shavell points out, reducing the cost of a process may have increased the use of the 
process – Jevon’s paradox – but that may not be the best answer. Other factors that may 
have reduced court congestion should also be studied. The increased use of caseload 
management, for example, may be responsible for keeping court congestion under 
control.224 
Going beyond the superficial conclusions that can be drawn entails more basic 
theoretical issues. The access to justice, or the increase in the use of the court system 
because of ADR's reduction in costs, are two possibilities. Explaining the results by 
claiming that reduced cost leads to an increase in litigation conforms to the simple 
model, but it is dismissive of the larger legal environment. ADR was adopted as a 
reform, specifically targeted at the explosion in litigation. As noted in the literature 
section, many factors that are claimed to be the causes of the explosion were, 
themselves, reforms of some sort. The process of reform is endless. 
A basic concept of law is rules backed by threats or sanctions. But legal theorists 
consider justice and law to be more complex than that. There are at least two levels that 
interact. One level is the controlling principles, which provide general guidance on 
policies. Another level, or perhaps consideration, concerns the method of changing the 
rules. Pound’s criticism is valid -- respect for the law is fundamental.  It matters.  
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Respect depends, however, on the proper functioning of the system at all levels.  The 
adoption of ADR can be viewed as a rare example of comprehensive changes in the 
system, and the challenges of implementing these fundamental changes – of formulating 
how the principles apply, also bring opportunities for substantial social benefits. ADR 
may be able to address the larger issues that accompany the human condition in ways 
that the traditional system could not.  These changes, or wholesale reforms, are 
consistent with basic theories of law and justice.  
Part of solving a problem is asking the right question. Instead of asking if there is 
too much litigation, the better question may be what is the appropriate level of litigation?  
This speaks directly to the issue of why parties litigate. Part of the answer may be that 
parties litigate when the rules need to be changed. This is another way of saying that, as 
conditions and circumstances become more complex, dispute resolution becomes more 
complex in a sense.  The Cheyenne and other primitive societies were able to develop 
relatively complex dispute resolution systems, and the U.S. system of dispute resolution 
appears to be moving in that direction. 
Better understanding of the theoretical framework of the judicial system requires 
a better understanding of the operations of the system. The lack of consistent, 
comprehensive court data hinders that understanding, and the need for pertinent data 
cannot be understated: periodic changes in the reporting scheme may serve some 
purposes, but it presents a problem for long-term analysis. This is also an area that 
should be of great concern to policymakers.  In summary, this research should not be 
viewed as an end; it raises more questions than it answers. 
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APPENDIX 
 
FIGURE A1: IMAGE OF PARTIAL PAGE FROM THE TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000 (Texas Judicial Council, 2000) 
 
 
 
The figure, above, shows the top part of a page from the 2000 report.225  The 
catalogue entries of the report titles and authors vary somewhat over the years.  One 
                                                 
225 TEXAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 140 at 182 (first two of six counties reported on 
that page). The Texas Judicial Council (created 1929) and Office of Court Administration 
(created 1977) are Texas government agencies charged with, among other duties, collecting and 
reporting judicial data. The reports are public information. (Texas Government Code Chapters 
71 and 72.) 
Reported Activity September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2000
C I V I L   C A S E S
Injury orInjury or All
DamageDamage Accounts, Other
Involvingher thanWorkers' Contracts Recip- Family Other
COUNTY Motor MotorCompen- TaxCondem- and rocals Law Civil Total
     POPULATION Vehicle Vehicle sation Cases nation Notes (UIFSA) Divorce Matters Cases Cases
Anderson Cases Pending   9/01/99 73 65 71 443 3 51 207 510 545 1,968
48,024 Docket Adjustments
New Cases Filed 81 84 1 203 47 234 37 140 827
Other Cases Added
Total Cases Added 81 84 1 203 47 234 37 140 827
Percent of Total A 9.8 10.2 0.1 24.5 0.0 5.7 0.0 28.3 4.5 16.9 100.0
Dispositions:
Default & Agreed Jud 13 15 44 15 119 10 51 267
Summary Judgments 2 3 1 6
Final Judgments 12 39 35 4 89 9 47 235
Dismissed 27 37 1 112 13 50 7 136 383
Other Dispositions 3 9 3 9 2 5 31
Total Disp 57 103 1 191 36 267 28 239 922
Percent o 6.2 11.2 0.1 20.7 0.0 3.9 0.0 29.0 3.0 25.9 100.0
Cases Pending   8/31/00 97 46 71 455 3 62 174 519 446 1,873
Percent of Total P 5.2 2.5 3.8 24.3 0.2 3.3 0.0 9.3 27.7 23.8 100.0
Disp. As % of Total Added 70.4 122.6 100.0 94.1 0.0 76.6 0.0 114.1 75.7 170.7 111.5
Andrews Cases Pending   9/01/99 38 39 1 205 93 2 46 102 98 624
14,338 Docket Adjustments
New Cases Filed 16 2 25 43 90 66 30 272
Other Cases Added 43 43
Total Cases Added 16 2 25 43 90 109 30 315
Percent of Total A 5.1 0.6 0.0 7.9 0.0 13.7 0.0 28.6 34.6 9.5 100.0
Dispositions:
Default & Agreed Judg. 1 22 1 24
Summary Judgments 1 1
Final Judgments 9 7 16 26 78 68 20 224
Dismissed 4 2 4 8 3 5 7 33
Other Dispositions 2 51 53
Total Disp 15 10 20 56 81 124 29 335
Percent o 4.5 3.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 24.2 37.0 8.7 100.0
Cases Pending   8/31/00 39 31 1 210 80 2 55 87 99 604
Percent of Total P 6.5 5.1 0.2 34.8 0.0 13.2 0.3 9.1 14.4 16.4 100.0
Disp. As % of Total Added 93.8 500.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 130.2 0.0 90.0 113.8 96.7 106.3
 149 
 
catalogue title is TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT OF STATISTICAL 
AND OTHER DATA FOR CALENDAR YEAR [year].  Another one is ANNUAL 
REPORT – TEXAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL. The authors listed in library catalogues also 
vary: Texas Judicial Council, Texas Civil Judicial Council (an early version), or Office 
of Court Administration.  Despite the differences in titles and authors, the reports cover 
the same court data. 
The composition of statewide new case filings changed somewhat over the 1980-
2010 period.  Figure A-2, below, illustrated the trends and levels for the four most 
common categories.  Divorce declined, but family law litigation rose by about the same 
amount.  Together, divorce and family law have constituted about half of all civil filings 
during 1980-2010.   
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FIGURE A2: FOUR TOP CATEGORIES OF FILINGS FOR 1980-2010 
 
The other six categories of filings are shown in Figure A-3, below.  The CAN 
series is obvious: its characteristic shape.  These graphs are based on the total statewide 
data, before any revision.  Worker’s compensation and Reciprocals are included, 
therefore, and decreased in response to the changes in those laws.  The category that is 
consistently the smallest in terms of filings is Condemnation cases.  
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FIGURE A3: REST OF THE CATEGORIES OF FILINGS FOR 1980-2010 
 
As noted in the Data section the Dispute Resolution Center reporting data 
included in the OCA Annual Reports was used to determine which counties had 
established significant, or “active,” ADR programs within a few years of the 1987 
legislation.  Example data on incoming disputes for the 15 counties selected as active in 
ADR is presented, below.   
 
TABLE A1: SELECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER ACTIVITY 
CENTER AND COUNTY 1999 1996 1990 1989 
Amarillo/Potter & Randall Counties 633 896 266  
Austin/Travis County   1680 1441 1400 
Beaumont/Jefferson County  2033 1865 1391 946 
Bryan/College Station/Brazos County      
Conroe/Montgomery County  445 304 286  
Corpus Christi/Nueces County  1255 1452 944 884 
Dallas/Dallas County 2447 1577 5109 5805 
Denton/Denton County   1838 1287 1002 
El Paso/El Paso County  1190 1092 894 836 
Fort Worth/Tarrant County  2653 3186 3016 3413 
Houston/Harris County  3649 4662 6442 5904 
Lubbock/Lubbock County  2714 1729 969 358 
Plano/Collin County  1004   
San Antonio/Bexar County  4972 6041 4359 3782 
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Some reports were not received in particular years.  Collin County, for example, 
often failed to file reports, as did Travis County in later years.   Also note that Brazos 
County did not begin significant operations until 2000.    
The 15 active counties are also among the most populous counties.  Table A-2, 
below, shows that the 15 active counties comprise 57% of the state’s population in 1980.  
DH, alone, account for 28% of the total population. The Large 9 counties make-up about 
15% of the population total. These percentages did not change much over the 31 years of 
the study.  
 
TABLE A2: ACTIVE COUNTY GROUPS – PERCENT POPULATION 
 POP % 1980 POP % 2010 
15 COUNTIES 0.5712 0.5972 
REST OF STATE 0.4288 0.4028 
DH 0.2788 0.2569 
BIG 4 0.4088 0.3971 
L9 0.1457 0.1613 
 
  
Using the remaining 239 counties as the control group (the “REST” of the state) 
would be tantamount to assuming that ADR spread to these counties at the same and 
rate.  Instead, the spread of ADR would likely be inconsistent.  Adoption would, 
however, be influenced by population: the greater the population, the more likely a 
county would create an ADR program.  With “REST” as the only control, differences in 
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the spread of ADR to these 239 counties is obscured, plus the consolidation of all other 
counties into one group is inconsistent with the construction of the active county groups.  
To address these concerns, additional control groups were constructed.  Besides 
population, the population growth rate for 1980-2010 was also considered in 
constructing the control groups: a mix of growth rates was preferred in the make-up of 
each control group.   Control groups for different population levels were formed 
according to the following scheme (smallest to largest): 
 Counties with population of at least 5K but in that range,  
 Counties with population in the 10K-15K range, 
 Counties with population in the 25K-40K range, 
 Counties with population in the 50K-80K range, 
 Counties with population in the 100K-190K range, 
 Counties with population over 200K. 
  
At least 10 counties were selected for each population control group (with the 
exception of the most populous, the 200K+, of which there were only four.  The top 51 
counties in terms of population were included in either the active group or one of the 
control groups.   A detailed list of the control groups is shown in the table.  “P4” is the 
group of four counties that are the most populous control group, and “P9” is the control 
group of small (around 5K) counties.   
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TABLE A3:  CONTROL GROUP P4 
GROUP COUNTIES 
RANK GROUP POP. RANGE 
POP. GROWTH SMALLEST LARGEST 
P4 Hidalgo Co. 7 14 218346 386777 
N=4 Cameron Co. 11 36     
  Fort Bend Co. 13 5     
  Galveston Co. 15 74     
 
 
TABLE A4:  CONTROL GROUP P5 
GROUP COUNTIES 
RANK GROUP POP. RANGE 
POP. GROWTH SMALLEST LARGEST 
P5 Brazoria Co. 16 40 95005 192586 
N=14 Bell Co. 17 34     
  McLennan Co. 18 84     
  Smith Co. 20 56     
  Williamson Co. 21 1     
  Webb Co. 22 18     
  Wichita Co. 23 152     
  Taylor Co. 25 125     
  Ector Co. 26 124     
  Midland Co. 27 54     
  Gregg Co. 28 119     
  Tom Green Co. 29 102     
  Johnson Co. 31 26     
  Grayson Co. 32 90     
 
 The counties in the P5 control group vary in their growth rates.  Williamson 
County has the highest growth rate of all the counties in Texas, and five of the counties 
have relatively low growth rates. 
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TABLE A5:  CONTROL GROUP P6 
GROUP COUNTIES 
RANK GROUP POP. RANGE 
POP. GROWTH SMALLEST LARGEST 
P6 Ellis Co. 34 19 50875 85387 
N=18 Bowie Co. 35 115     
  Orange Co. 36 178     
  Victoria Co. 37 108     
  Angelina Co. 38 88     
  Hays Co. 39 6     
  Parker Co. 40 16     
  Guadalupe Co. 41 13     
  Coryell Co. 42 98     
  Hunt Co. 43 64     
  San Patricio C 44 141     
  Henderson Co. 45 41     
  Harrison Co. 46 109     
  Nacogdoches Co 47 83     
  Liberty Co. 48 61     
  Kaufman Co. 49 15     
  Comal Co. 50 10     
  Walker Co. 51 58     
 
 The P6 control group has a large number of counties, 18, and a mix of growth 
rates.  These counties’ population runs from slightly more than 50,000 (2000 census) to 
about 85,000.  Hays County, which is ranked number 6 in growth, is south of Austin, 
which accounts for its rapid increase in population. 
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TABLE A6:  CONTROL GROUP P7 
GROUP COUNTIES 
RANK GROUP POP. RANGE 
POP. GROWTH SMALLEST LARGEST 
P7 Starr Co. 57 25 22676 40873 
N=15 Bastrop Co. 61 9     
  Wise Co. 67 27     
  Hood Co. 79 12     
  Hopkins Co. 80 80     
  Erath Co. 81 51     
  Medina Co. 82 33     
  Hill Co. 83 76     
  Caldwell Co. 84 59     
  Washington Co. 85 67     
  Rockwall Co. 86 3     
  Hutchinson Co. 87 217     
  Palo Pinto Co. 88 130     
  Wilson Co. 97 17     
  Burnet Co. 98 21     
 
The P7 control group has 15 counties, a county with a growth rate ranked 217, 
and a county with a growth rate ranked 3.  These counties’ population runs from slightly 
more than 22,000 to about 40,000.  Bastrop County, which is ranked number 9 in 
growth, is south of Austin.  
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TABLE A7:  CONTROL GROUP P8 
GROUP COUNTIES 
RANK GROUP POP. RANGE 
POP. GROWTH SMALLEST LARGEST 
P8 Tyler Co. 122 92 9326 16654 
N=13 Nolan Co. 123 208     
  San Jacinto Co 124 22     
  Jones Co. 125 128     
  Freestone Co. 126 95     
  Reeves Co. 127 209     
  Robertson Co. 128 136     
  Bosque Co. 129 87     
  Wilbarger Co. 130 216     
  Lamb Co. 131 232     
  Kendall Co. 132 8     
  Bandera Co. 157 11     
  Zapata Co. 166 29     
 
 
TABLE A8:  CONTROL GROUP P9 
GROUP COUNTIES 
RANK GROUP POP. RANGE 
POP. GROWTH SMALLEST LARGEST 
P9 Rains Co. 188 23 5092 6726 
N=11 Childress Co. 193 172     
  Hansford Co. 194 198     
  Wheeler Co. 195 230     
  Dallam Co. 196 165     
  San Saba Co. 197 160     
  La Salle Co. 198 111     
  Somervell Co. 199 32     
  Hardeman Co. 200 247     
  Garza Co. 201 122     
  Jim Hogg Co. 202 167     
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 The smallest two control groups in terms of population are P8 and P9. 
The graphical analysis of the data requires that some expectation of what the 
graphical impact should be.  Some detailed assumptions must be made to determine this 
set of expectations. 
Although mediation and arbitration promise positive benefits, these benefits 
would not materialize instantly after the enactment of legislation – implementing ADR 
would take time, as would be the case with implementing any new system. Instituting 
ADR must not be confused with a simple change in the law. When a statute or rule is 
enacted, a ruling is “handed down,” or some other change in the law occurs, the courts 
immediately substitute the new law for the old. Implementing ADR, however, requires 
more than just deciding what law is applied. The following rationale is for an example of 
ADR which occurs before litigation is begun, but the changes which must be made in the 
legal infrastructure are considerable. The scenario assumes that the results of ADR are 
effective (successful), thus the dispute is settled without court involvement. The impact 
on the judicial system, then, is to reduce “new case filings” (NCF), a main source of 
“court congestion.” [The rationale can be extended to cases which are already on the 
court docket (filed), but that scenario will be developed separately.] The terms “ADR,” 
“mediation,” and “arbitration” can be used interchangeably, it being understood that 
mediation is the prevailing form of ADR, so the example would be valid for all forms of 
ADR.  
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The first task of implementing ADR is one of education: getting the word out. 
Explaining ADR and the statutes, primarily to attorneys and potential litigants/disputants 
(the clients of the attorneys), but also to judges and others, including the general public. 
Persuading disputants that an alternative to their “day in court” is available, and that the 
process has nothing to do with sitting on the floor with crossed legs and chanting 
(meditation) can be difficult if the client has never heard of “mediation” beforehand. 
Practically speaking, there has to be a considerable amount of education – as with any 
change in the way of doing things, there is a 'learning curve.'  
The next task is to meet the statutory requirements. If the court refers a case to 
ADR, the “impartial third party” is required to have 40 hours of ADR training. If the 
case is a divorce/family law matter, then 24 additional hours of training is required. If 
these are the requirements imposed by the courts, then these requirements will also be 
deemed to apply to all ADR procedures, even those which are done in lieu of court 
litigation. The reason is simple: if the process is only partially successful, or the dispute 
winds up in court for any reason at all, meeting the statutory requirements for whatever 
partial agreement that may have been reached will be important if one party seeks to 
enforce the partial agreement in court. Also, disputants will have much greater 
confidence in the process if it meets the statutory requirements as opposed to failing to 
meet those requirements. Conforming to the statute becomes a guarantee of quality for 
the participants. So one can expect that attorneys who practice ADR will, for 
professional as well as practical reasons, make sure that the process meets the statutory 
standards.  
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The statutory requirements mean that, before the number of ADR processes 
significantly increases (and before the courts can start referring cases to ADR on a 
routine basis), there must be enough trained “impartials” (attorney mediators, mainly). It 
will take some time for the attorneys (or other interested parties) to acquire the necessary 
training. In addition, logistical concerns must be addressed. The attorneys (or the courts, 
for court referrals) will have to create a list of mediators, find facilities, develop 
procedures, etc.  
Counties which already had an operational ADR center when the 1987 statute 
was enacted should have been much more advanced than the counties that waited until 
1987 or later to start operational centers. For the counties with early operational centers, 
the legislation would have been a spur to even greater and faster development of ADR. 
For the counties without operational centers, the legislation would be a strong incentive 
to start a center. 
A reasonable scenario for the introduction and growth of ADR must also 
acknowledge that mediation and arbitration both have been practiced for many years. 
Considering the focus on ADR by the 1976 Pound conference, it is likely that mediation 
and arbitration became somewhat more common prior to the 1983 and 1987 legislation. 
Certainly some attorneys and firms were already acquainted with arbitration and 
mediation. In view of the advocacy of ADR generated by the Pound conference, the few 
attorneys and firms who had experience with mediation and arbitration were inclined to 
increase its use, given the appropriate client and dispute. These same attorneys and firms 
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probably were among the leaders in the legal field, with an influence far greater than 
their number.  
The influence of leading attorneys on other attorneys, firms, and clients in the 
geographical vicinity and areas of practice is a given, and the influence extends into 
several, related realms. Influence on other attorneys/firms would be transmitted via 
conferences, legal articles, etc. Many of their clients, (e.g. insurance companies) would 
be statewide or even national and would be influenced by new developments. Judges, 
who may even come from the ranks of the 'top' attorneys and firms, continue to be 
influenced by leading attorneys the same as they were before becoming judges. And, of 
course, legislators, many of whom are attorneys, are influenced. 
Although the development of mediation and arbitration was probably limited 
during the interim years of 1976 to 1983, this development should not be overlooked. 
The influence of these early practitioners was important in many ways, including the 
timing and the form of the legislation ultimately enacted. The practitioners' expertise 
also complemented the academic philosophy of ADR, which provided the framework for 
the impending ADR bloom. The development during the interim provided a core of 
expertise and advocacy to begin the journey up the learning curve once the 1983 and 
1987 legislation was enacted. The core had to educate and publicize, and it had to train 
the mediators (note that the American Arbitration Association already had a training 
program for arbitrators). The core had to take the lead in promoting by example: 
educating and persuading the large clients such as insurance companies to embrace 
ADR. If the advantages of ADR were realized by the client/disputants, then progress 
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along the learning curve was assured. This scenario provides the framework for 
developing an example of the growth of ADR: 
 The initial development of mediation and arbitration occurred over many years, 
 The 1976 Pound conference and the perceived problems in the legal system 
provided the triggering event for the additional development and spread of ADR, 
 After a short period, during which ADR experienced limited growth and 
development, the legislature enacted statutes to support the expansion of ADR, 
 There followed a period of time during which the infrastructure developed 
(training of mediators, education of significant clients, etc.) and ADR was 
nurtured by a core of advocates, 
 After a period of time, the general public/average disputant became comfortable 
with ADR, and ADR “bloomed.” 
 
In many aspects, the assumptions are comparable to the introduction and growth 
of a new technology, process, or product—a new product curve. One difference is that 
ADR was in use for many years before it experienced significant growth. But the 1976 
Pound conference could be characterized as the realization of a new use or application of 
an old technique. After the new use is discovered, there is a period of 
development/refinement, then early adopters begin to use it and spread the word, and 
finally the general public begins to use it. Thus, ADR is very similar to a new product 
curve/cycle. 
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TABLE A9: MEDIATION COUNTY ASSUMPTIONS 
Year Pop. NCF NCF pc attorneys
NCF 
per 
attn. 
1980 1000000 22200 0.0222 3000 7.4 
1981 1020000 22644 0.0222 3060 7.4 
1982 1040400 23097 0.0222 3121 7.4 
1983 1061208 23559 0.0222 3184 7.4 
1984 1082432 24030 0.0222 3247 7.4 
1985 1104081 24511 0.0222 3312 7.4 
1986 1126162 25001 0.0222 3378 7.4 
1987 1148686 25501 0.0222 3446 7.4 
1988 1171659 26011 0.0222 3515 7.4 
1989 1195093 26531 0.0222 3585 7.4 
1990 1218994 27062 0.0222 3657 7.4 
1991 1243374 27603 0.0222 3730 7.4 
1992 1268242 28155 0.0222 3805 7.4 
1993 1293607 28718 0.0222 3881 7.4 
1994 1319479 29292 0.0222 3958 7.4 
1995 1345868 29878 0.0222 4038 7.4 
1996 1372786 30476 0.0222 4118 7.4 
1997 1400241 31085 0.0222 4201 7.4 
1998 1428246 31707 0.0222 4285 7.4 
1999 1456811 32341 0.0222 4370 7.4 
2000 1485947 32988 0.0222 4458 7.4 
2001 1515666 33648 0.0222 4547 7.4 
2002 1545980 34321 0.0222 4638 7.4 
2003 1576899 35007 0.0222 4731 7.4 
2004 1608437 35707 0.0222 4825 7.4 
2005 1640606 36421 0.0222 4922 7.4 
2006 1673418 37150 0.0222 5020 7.4 
2007 1706886 37893 0.0222 5121 7.4 
2008 1741024 38651 0.0222 5223 7.4 
2009 1775845 39424 0.0222 5328 7.4 
2010 1811362 40212 0.0222 5434 7.4 
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Constructing hypothetical new case filings, consistent with the ADR 
assumptions, can be helpful. Starting with an assumed population in 1980 of one million, 
“Mediation County” would have a population of a nice, round number, and it would rank 
third in population (a slight bit larger than Bexar County's 988,971, but far behind Dallas 
County's 1,556,419 and Harris County's 2,409,547). For the growth in population of 
Mediation County, a rate of 2% annually approximates the statewide growth rate of 
1.916957 for 1980-2010 (during which time the state population went from 14,225,512 
to 25,145,561). Using the state average is appropriate since the growth rates for the 
different “ADR” counties varied from 0.048217% (Jefferson) to 5.7897% (Collin). The 
annual growth rate for the 15 “ADR” counties is 2.0684%, so Mediation Counties' 
growth rate is just slightly below the weighted average of those 15 counties. 
Mediation County's rate of “new cases filed” in 1980 is 2.22% per capita, which 
is selected to be between the averages for the state (2.123% in 1980) and for the 15 ADR 
counties (2.444% in 1980). And, in the absence of any ADR or other factors, the 
assumption is that the per capita rate of new cases filed will not change.  Adding in the 
number of attorneys in the county (3 per 1,000 population, or about the state average of 
“private, practicing” attorneys) fills in additional information. Attorney information 
comes from the STATE BAR OF TEXAS MEMBERSHIP: ATTORNEY 
STATISTICAL PROFILE (2011-12), from the State Bar of Texas Department of 
Research and Analysis. The 80,657 attorneys in the state with population of 25,674,681 
(US Census, 2011 estimate) equals 0.00314, or about three attorneys for every 1,000 
population.   
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By 2010, then, Mediation County population is 1,811,362, which would place it 
third in Texas (just ahead of Tarrant's 1,809,034 and behind Harris' 4,092,459 and 
Dallas' 2,368,139). A graph of “MEDIATION COUNTY, NEW CASES FILED” 
unadjusted for population would appear as shown. The number of cases would be going 
up, even though the per capita rate is fixed. 
 
 
FIGURE A4: MEDIATION COUNTY NCF WITHOUT ADR 
 
 
 
Adding the effects of ADR must maintain consistency with the scenario 
presented, above. Assume that in 1980 Mediation County had a small “core” of 10 (a 
small but round number out of a total of 3,000) attorneys experienced with 
mediation/arbitration, and these 10 averaged 3 mediation/arbitrations a year (or about 
one every 4 months, are enough to attain a proficiency with the process). Thirty 
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mediations/arbitrations per year represented a small fraction (about one-tenth of one 
percent) of the “new cases filed” during the year, but may have been a dramatic increase 
compared to the pre-1976 number of mediations/arbitrations. These attorneys spent most 
of their time on fields such as labor law, sports representation, or other fields in which 
mediation/arbitration was sometimes used. These attorneys were likely to be leaders in 
their respective fields as well as being influential proponents of ADR. And they would 
have been keenly aware of the 1976 Pound conference and related controversies. 
Accordingly, they would have been supportive of colleagues (especially in their own 
firms) acquiring some mediation/arbitration training. Therefore, five other attorneys 
from Mediation County took mediation/arbitration training by the end of 1980 (and it 
can be assumed that they will be doing mediations/arbitrations starting the following 
year).  
The following two years (1981 & 1982) follows the same pattern. Additional 
attorneys get training (7 and 8, respectively), the average number of 
mediations/arbitrations climbs to 4, and then to 5, but the 110 mediations/arbitrations in 
1982 represent less than one-half of one percent of the “new cases filed” in the county. 
In 1983, with the passage of the initial ADR legislation, the numbers expand a 
little more quickly in terms of attorneys who get training and the average 
mediations/arbitrations per attorney. The following table includes the numbers for the 
years up through 1989. 
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TABLE A10: MEDIATION COUNTY EXAMPLE: EARLY ADR GROWTH 
Year Pop NCF  NCF pc # attn 
# ADR 
attn 
# in 
training 
ADR/ 
prac. 
# 
ADR % NCF 
1980 1000000 22200 0.0222 3000 10 5 3 30 0.00135 
1981 1020000 22644 0.0222 3060 15 7 4 60 0.00265 
1982 1040400 23097 0.0222 3121 22 8 5 110 0.00476 
1983 1061208 23559 0.0222 3184 30 8 7.5 225 0.00955 
1984 1082432 24030 0.0222 3247 38 16 15 570 0.02372 
1985 1104081 24511 0.0222 3312 54 16 15 809 0.03300 
1986 1126162 25001 0.0222 3378 70 17 15 1052 0.04209 
1987 1148686 25501 0.0222 3446 87 17 15 1301 0.05101 
1988 1171659 26011 0.0222 3515 104 34 15 1554 0.05975 
1989 1195093 26531 0.0222 3585 138 42 15 2071 0.07806 
 
In 1983, eight attorneys get training, and the number of mediations/arbitrations, 
“ADR,” per practicing ADR attorney climbs 7.5, in part to the additional “buzz” 
generated by the new legislation. In 1984, there is an even greater impact from the 
previous year's legislation: there are 15 ADRs per (ADR) attorney, another doubling, but 
this number is only one mediation/arbitration every three weeks for the few (38, or 
1.117% of all attorneys) with ADR training. By the end of 1984, 16 attorneys get 
training, which is one-fourth of the number of new attorneys. Of course, the attorneys 
who go into training, at least at this stage of development, are the attorneys with 
experience, not the attorneys right out of law school. The “one-fourth” ratio is chosen for 
two reasons. First, the result is a doubling of the previous year, which is reasonable 
considering the interest generated by the 1983 legislation. Second, the one-fourth of new 
attorneys puts the number in perspective: this is not a rush to training. The number of 
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attorneys getting training is still a fraction of the number of attorneys being added by 
natural growth.  
The next three years show that the number of ADR per practitioner remains at 
15, and the number getting trained each year remains about the same (16 for 1985, and 
17 per year for 1986 and 1987), which is still about one-fourth of the total of new 
attorneys added. The 1983 legislation influenced the growth of ADR, but it did not start 
a stampede. Attorneys are enthusiastic, but are still cautious about the new procedures, 
and they must be sure that the case is “right” and “ripe” for mediation/arbitration.  
At the end of 1987, then, there are 87 practitioners (2.516% of attorneys) who do 
an average 15 ADR cases each, resulting in 1301 disputes that are settled without filing a 
lawsuit. The total number, 1301, is slightly more than 5% (5.101%) of the “new cases 
filed” during the year. This is still relatively small compared to the total court caseload, 
but it is a result of ADR experienced attorneys and relatively sophisticated clients who 
want the benefits offered by the ADR process.  
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TABLE A11: MEDIATION COUNTY, 1980-2010, with ADR 
YEAR # ATTN # PRACT 
% 
PRACT 
# 
TRAIN 
MED 
ATTN 
# 
MED % NCF NCF PC 
1980 3000 10 0.30% 5 3 30 0.14% 2.22% 
1981 3060 15 0.50% 7 4 60 0.26% 2.21% 
1982 3121 22 0.70% 8 5 110 0.48% 2.21% 
1983 3184 30 0.90% 8 7.5 225 0.96% 2.20% 
1984 3247 38 1.20% 16 15 570 2.37% 2.17% 
1985 3312 54 1.60% 16 15 809 3.30% 2.15% 
1986 3378 70 2.10% 17 15 1,052 4.21% 2.13% 
1987 3446 87 2.50% 17 15 1,301 5.10% 2.11% 
1988 3515 104 2.90% 34 15 1,554 5.97% 2.09% 
1989 3585 138 3.90% 42 15 2,071 7.81% 2.05% 
1990 3657 180 4.90% 50 15 2,704 9.99% 2.00% 
1991 3730 230 6.20% 51 14 3,226 11.69% 1.96% 
1992 3805 282 7.40% 52 13 3,661 13.00% 1.93% 
1993 3881 334 8.60% 53 12 4,006 13.95% 1.91% 
1994 3958 387 9.80% 54 11 4,258 14.54% 1.90% 
1995 4038 441 10.90% 55 10 4,415 14.78% 1.89% 
1996 4118 497 12.10% 57 9.5 4,720 15.49% 1.88% 
1997 4201 553 13.20% 58 9.03 4,994 16.07% 1.86% 
1998 4285 611 14.30% 59 8.57 5,239 16.52% 1.85% 
1999 4370 670 15.30% 60 8.15 5,456 16.87% 1.85% 
2000 4458 730 16.40% 61 7.74 5,647 17.12% 1.84% 
2001 4547 791 17.40% 62 7.35 5,815 17.28% 1.84% 
2002 4638 853 18.40% 64 6.98 5,960 17.37% 1.83% 
2003 4731 917 19.40% 65 6.63 6,084 17.38% 1.83% 
2004 4825 982 20.40% 66 6.33 6,218 17.41% 1.83% 
2005 4922 1,048 21.30% 68 6.06 6,355 17.45% 1.83% 
2006 5020 1,116 22.20% 69 5.82 6,495 17.48% 1.83% 
2007 5121 1,185 23.10% 70 5.6 6,638 17.52% 1.83% 
2008 5223 1,255 24.00% 72 5.41 6,784 17.55% 1.83% 
2009 5328 1,327 24.90% 73 5.23 6,933 17.59% 1.83% 
2010 5434 1,400 25.80% 75 5.06 7,085 17.62% 1.83% 
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After the 1987 legislation, a major impediment is removed—the impediment of 
uncertainty. Now the attorneys and clients are assured of confidentiality and 
enforceability, and they are confident that, should unresolved issues make it to court, the 
judge will rule in a manner consistent with the legislation. Now the rapid growth begins. 
In 1988, the number of attorneys who train in ADR rises to half of the total number 
added, and the ratio increases to 60% in 1989 and then 70% for the years after that. The 
number of ADR per practitioner stays at 15 through 1990, and then starts dropping off 
(as the number of attorneys who train grows, some of these may become “full-time” 
mediators/arbitrators; but many who train will continue in their own fields of specialty 
and serve as mediators/arbitrators only occasionally. The next table presents the example 
results, complete with data for 1980-2010 
In summary, the assumed parameters of Mediation County are: 
 1980 population of one million, with a 2% growth rate, 
 A “new cases filed” rate (before any effects of ADR) of 2.22%, 
 Number of attorneys is 3 per 1K population. 
 
The parameters added by the ADR example are: 
 There are 10 ADR “practitioner” attorneys in 1980, 
 The net number grows by the number “trained” each year, per the table, 
 The number of mediations per year is as shown in the table. 
 
Graphically, the number of ADR cases is shown in the figures, following. 
 
 
 171 
 
 
FIGURE A5: MEDIATION COUNTY NCF COMPARISON 
 
The impact on court congestion, specifically the “new cases filed,” is shown and 
new cases filed without ADR is included for comparison (both are per capita).  The 
graph of the per capita case filings with ADR shows a slight decline in the early 1980s, a 
steeper decline beginning about 1988, and then a tapering off. The graph shows the 
expected reduction in court congestion/filings with the introduction of ADR. There will 
be just a slight impact at first, a greater impact (negative slope) on the per capita filings 
associated with the growth of ADR, and then, at some point, a flattening out of the 
filings, which represents the level of filings for cases that are not appropriate for 
mediation and “belong” in the court system. 
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The parameters created to illustrate the expectations for new case filings, with 
modification, can also describe the expected impact on case dispositions that would be 
impacted by mediation. 
 
FIGURE A6: MEDIATION COUNTY --  D&A AS % OF TOTAL 
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FIGURE A7: MEDIATION COUNTY -  FJ AS % OF TOTAL 
 
Since the example assumes that all increases in default & agreed would 
otherwise be disposed of by trial (final judgment), final judgments, with mediation, 
should appear as shown.  
These graphs, collectively, illustrate the expected patterns to be observed in the 
data if mediation is reducing court congestion, either before or after filing.   
 The comparison of active counties, or counties where the impact of mediation 
should be evident, with control counties, or counties where the impact should be much 
weaker, can be done comparing a treatment with a control, as single active group with a 
single control group, as illustrated in figure provided. The concern, though, is whether 
the differences observed are merely normal variation, or meaningful differences.   
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FIGURE A8: MA NEW CASE FILINGS, ONE ACTIVE AND ONE CONTROL 
 
A better understanding can come from viewing multiple active groups and/or 
multiple control groups in the same graph.  This helps to distinguish normal variation 
from something that does not appear to be normal.  
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FIGURE A9: MA FILINGS FOR THE ACTIVE COUNTY GROUPS 
 
 The figure (A-9) confirms that the pattern of filings for the active groups was 
very similar.  Figure A-10 shows that the variation among the control groups was much 
greater.  The import is that the active groups do not display any significant timing or 
other differences due to ADR.  Both graphs show an upward trend until about 1988-
1991, and then downward trend. 
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FIGURE A10:  MA FILINGS FOR THE CONTROL GROUPS 
 
 
 
FIGURE A11: CAN FILINGS FOR THE ACTIVE GROUPS 
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FIGURE A12: CAN FILINGS FOR THE CONTROL GROUPS 
 
 Figures for the CAN filings show that the active and control groups displayed 
very similar patterns.  The variation displayed by the control groups is greater than the 
variation shown by the active groups.  Both active and control counties had peaks in 
CAN filings at about the same time, so ADR did not result in any discernable difference 
in terms of time.  The decline in CAN filings for the control groups that corresponds to 
the decline in filings for the active groups indicates that ADR was not responsible for the 
decline in filings.  Again, the greater variation in the control groups indicates that the 
variation seen in the active groups is unlikely to be due to ADR. 
 In figures for MA default and agreed judgments, there is a consistent pattern 
among the active groups, with much more variability in the control groups.  The pattern 
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for the active groups, however, is the wrong way: ADR should be increasing the D&A 
dispositions.  The small county control group, P9, shows a relatively high amount of 
variation.  Since the number of cases in the small counties is relatively few, more 
variation can be expected.  Another point of note is that the D&A dispositions for the 
control groups is relatively flat, in contrast to the trend for the active groups.  Instead of 
ADR increasing the D&A dispositions in the active group, it is just as  reasonable to 
conclude that D&A dispositions were abnormally high for the active groups during the 
first years—when ADR would have not had a chance to make much of an impact. An 
alternative conclusion would be that ADR had a negative impact on D&A dispositions. 
 
 
FIGURE A13:  MA DEFAULT AND AGREED DISPOSITION, ACTIVE 
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FIGURE A14:  MA DEFAULT AND AGREED DISPOSITION, CONTROLS 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A15:  NA DEFAULT AND AGREED DISPOSITION, ACTIVE 
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FIGURE A16:  MA DEFAULT AND AGREED DISPOSITION, CONTROLS 
 
 Figures are provided for filings for the NA case category.  Although filings 
should not be affected by ADR or mediation, the comparison is useful for verifying that 
the differences in trends and variation seen in the MA and CAN cases categories are 
very similar to what is found in the NA category.  Since NA filings are not affected by 
ADR or mediation, the similarities with the MA and CAN analysis lends further support 
to the conclusion that ADR is not producing the effects seen. 
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